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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When thinking about cooperation we tend to inevitably envision acts of help, mutual effort or comfort 
directed toward others. As a matter of fact, cooperative acts constitute a fundamental part of our 
personal lives, and of human societies.  We constantly interact with other people by joining efforts 
towards common goals such as when we play a football match, by asking for help when we get lost in 
an unknown place, by providing information when it is requested of us  or even by joining in simpler 
cooperative endeavours such as talking or walking together. However, cooperation is a widespread 
behavioural strategy among animals other than humans; and for instance, great apes (henceforth 
apes) also need to cooperate with conspecifics to reap the benefits of their group living. 
However, cooperation might entail a high-demanding endeavour for the individuals involved. This is 
especially true for socially complex animals such as humans and apes, living in ever-changing societies 
of different individuals having their own personalities, abilities, motivations and personal interests. In 
these species, individuals need to coordinate their actions effectively to achieve cooperative goals, 
especially when those require of simultaneous action. Moreover, individuals in these species are likely 
to face conflicts of interest when they need to decide whether or not to cooperate with other group 
members. During cooperative hunts, for instance, some chimpanzees may invest less by waiting for 
other group members to initiate the chase and, despite not participating themselves, still manage to 
obtain a piece of meat after the hunt has finished. However, if no chimpanzee starts hunting, no one 
would benefit.  Humans also need to manage situations in which people have different interests but, 
ultimately, all of them prefer to reach a compromise to resolve the conflict. Examples of these 
situations are present in our everyday life: although mutually sharing the efforts would be the best 
strategy for a group of friends when they meet to prepare a barbeque or for colleagues to write a 
manuscript, free-riders are always ready to avoid the costs and benefit from the derived payoff. Yet, 
in those situations individuals are still better off if they keep cooperating than if they do stop: if 
everybody prefers another to cook or to write there will be no steak to eat and no paper to publish. 
Importantly, besides the conflict of interest inherent to any cooperative situation, individuals usually 
have more than one course of action available, increasing the coordination challenge. For instance, 
they can mutually cooperate by acting together, take-turns over the collaborative endeavour, pursue 
the goal on their own or free-ride with the hope that others will carry out the work.  
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Although natural observations suggest that humans and other apes may have complex strategies for 
solving coordination problems, controlled experiments are essential to determine which strategies 
they are employing. Therefore, in light of the increasing evidence of the complexity of the problems 
that these species face, new experimental paradigms that account for that complexity are particularly 
necessary. These paradigms will need to confront individuals with more complex situations for 
coordination where multiple solutions are available by combining the need for cooperation with the 
necessity to manage conflicts of interest between individuals. 
In this thesis I will therefore investigate how humans and apes coordinate their actions and take 
decisions to strategically manage situations of conflict resembling natural scenarios for cooperation. 
To do so, I will present pairs of children, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), 
our two closest living relatives, with different tasks adapted from behavioural game theory, which vary 
in the degree of coordination required as well as in the nature of the risks associated with subjects’ 
decisions. Comparing humans with our closest living relatives in these contexts will allow me to shed 
light on the cognitive processes underlying both children and apes’ decision-making strategies to 
coordinate, and ultimately, to further understand the uniqueness of human cooperation. 
 
1.1 Theoretical background 
 
Cooperation, the ability and motivation of individuals to perform costly actions in order to achieve 
goals not available otherwise is an important part of social animals’ life (Dugatkin, 1997). Although 
cooperative patterns are everywhere —from unicellular organisms to human societies (Maynard 
Smith & Szathmary, 1997), cooperation is theoretically hard to explain. In populations composed of 
cooperators and defectors, the later will always have an advantage: they will avoid cooperative costs 
while benefitting from cooperators’ investments. Evolutionary theory will therefore predict 
cooperators to become extinct across generations (Dawkins, 1976). This problem is circumvented 
among genetically related individuals. Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory states that, by sharing the 
same genes, genetically related individuals can obtain indirect fitness benefits from being altruistic to 
each other (Hamilton, 1964; West, El Mouden & Gardner, 2011). This is elegantly encapsulated in the 
Hamilton’s rule: a cooperative behaviour will be stable as long as the benefits conferred to the receiver 
multiplied by the coefficient of relatedness between the receiver and the actor will out-perform the 
costs paid by the actor. Among unrelated individuals the coefficient of relatedness tends to be close 
to zero. Consequently, cooperative acts among non-kin should not thrive. 
Introduction 
  
3 
 
However, cooperation among unrelated individuals has evolved. To explain this phenomenon, several 
hypotheses have been postulated (Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971; West, Griffin & Gardner, 2007; Wilson 
& Sober, 1994). Yet, for the explanatory purpose of this work, I will focus on cooperative acts 
conducted by one individual (unilateral cooperation) and cooperative acts in which more than one 
individual contribute simultaneously (mutualistic cooperation or collaboration).  
 
Unilateral cooperation 
 
When an individual acts at a cost for itself in order to benefit another one, we say that the former is 
acting altruistically. Unilateral acts of cooperation should not be stable in nature (unless the recipient 
of the altruistic act is sufficiently genetically related). Altruistic individuals should be out-performed 
by those who do not pay the costs of cooperation and thus have lower probabilities to survive and 
reproduce. However, this picture radically changes if individuals engage in reciprocal altruistic acts 
across time (Trivers, 1971). The rationale of reciprocal altruism (often referred as direct reciprocity) is 
apparently simple: an actor performs a costly behaviour in favour of a recipient, and the recipient 
reciprocates in the future. For the actor the immediate benefit of defection is thus out weighted by 
the future benefit that accrues from the recipients’ behaviour.  
Although reciprocal altruism has been considered one of the main mechanisms to explain the 
emergence of cooperation between non-related individuals (Nowak, 2006), it suffers from several 
drawbacks. First, it presupposes that organisms possess the cognitive skills to successfully reciprocate 
across time, including a capacity for individual recognition (Stevens, Cushman & Hauser, 2005; Trivers, 
1971), the ability to remember their cooperative partner together with the value of the reciprocated 
reward (Stevens et al., 2005; Stevens & Hauser, 2004 but see Schino & Aureli, 2009 on emotional 
bookkepping) and the capacity to delay immediate outcomes in favour of greater benefits in the future 
(Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). In fact, clear examples of reciprocal patterns in 
nature are scant (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Hammerstein, 2003; West et al., 2007; but see Raihani & 
Bshary, 2011). 
Second, reciprocal altruism assumes that individuals engage in dyadic interactions, based on a process 
of partner control in which cooperation between isolated dyads is maintained by sanctioning partners’ 
defective behaviour and rewarding cooperation (Schino & Aureli, 2016; Trivers, 1971). However, in 
nature, individuals usually have the possibility to interact with multiple partners. Although they can 
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avoid defecting partners by choosing the partners with whom they interact1 (Noë & Hammerstein, 
1994), the delay between the cooperative act and the benefit still gives individuals the possibility to 
defect  (i.e., one individual can defect and change its partner to defect again; Gilby, 2012). 
Contrary to the limited evidence of reciprocity in non-human animals, reciprocal altruism appears to 
be common in humans and probably played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2001; Palameta & Brown, 1999; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Trivers, 1971; West et al., 
2011). Different hypotheses have been developed stemming from the premise that humans 
reciprocate altruistic acts.  
According to the Mismatch hypothesis (Burnham & Johnson, 2005), altruism towards unrelated 
individuals would be a maladaptive consequence of previous adaptations for living in ancestral 
societies characterized by high degrees of genetic relatedness and small numbers of individuals, which 
allowed for repeated interactions and, fostered opportunities to cooperate between highly related 
group members.  
Other authors have proposed the concept of indirect reciprocity to explain the emergence of 
cooperation among non-kin over long periods of time. This mechanism relies on the actors’ capacity 
to choose partners based on their reputation (i.e., based on their past cooperative or defective 
behaviour toward all group members), rather than on the personal history of previous interactions 
between actor and partner (Alexander, 1979; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Milinski, Semmann & 
Krambeck, 2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).  
Alternatively, other accounts suggest that kin-based or reciprocity accounts alone cannot explain the 
emergence of large-scale human cooperation. At some point in our evolutionary history, reciprocal 
altruists became “strong-reciprocators” who paid the costs of cooperation and punished others that 
did not cooperate (Bowles & Gintis, 2003, 2011; Gintis, 2000) (these social preferences could appear 
de novo as result of small behavioural modifications). These new social motivations to cooperate likely 
fostered new ways to interact with individuals who belonged to the same social networks, giving rise 
to groups sharing cultural practices and norms of behaviour transmitted between generations via 
learning and imitation, through a culture-gene co-evolutionary process (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; 
Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Chudek, Zhao & Henrich, 2013; Mesoudi, 2009). As a consequence of these 
intricate patterns of learning (Chudek, Heller, Birch & Henrich, 2012; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), 
groups creating social norms that fostered reciprocation (i.e., binding expectations about how people 
                                                          
1 Individuals are not completely “free” to choose their partners. In nature, factors such as dominance rank or 
social organization constraint individuals’ possibilities to choose among social and mating partners (Kutsukake 
& Nunn, 2006; Seyfarth, 1977). 
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should behave in cooperative contexts) became more successful and spread (e.g., Diamond, 1997; 
Soltis, Boyd & Richerson, 1995), outcompeting less cooperative groups through a process of cultural 
group selection (Chudek & Heinrich, 2011; Henrich, 2004; Richerson, et al., 2016).  
Finally, an interesting alternative to explain the emergence of cooperation among unrelated 
individuals through reciprocity, suggests that reciprocal acts among non-kin are easier to explain if we 
assume that each group member has stakes in other conspecifics (the Stakeholder model; Roberts, 
2005). Individuals may therefore become interdependent regardless of previous reciprocal patterns 
of interactions, as a by-product of the needs of group living (e.g., reducing predation risks through 
increased vigilance). Either way, as they are interdependent, they have to care about each other’s 
welfare and so, the temptation to defect is minimised. 
 
Mutualistic collaboration 
 
The notion of interdependence entails a need to interact with another individual in an obligate form. 
Some species often need to collaborate to obtain simultaneous benefits that cannot be achieved 
otherwise, and therefore, defection becomes a less attractive option. This form of cooperation, known 
as mutualistic collaboration is widespread in nature (Boucher, 1988, Clutton-Brock, 2009; Connor, 
1986). From an ultimate perspective a mutualistic act provides a simple explanation for the evolution 
of cooperation as the immediate benefits obtained by all individuals significantly diminish the 
incentive to free-ride. During mutualistic cooperation, individuals’ best option is thus to cooperate in 
their own self-interest (Völter, Rossano & Call, 2015). However, from a proximate perspective 
effective mutualistic collaboration might not be as simple as it seems. Animals, for instance, need to 
coordinate their actions in space and time. In some species, coordination can be explained by the use 
of very simple behavioural rules and associative learning mechanisms operating at the individual level 
in relation to local parameters like speed and position of individuals (Bailey, Myatt & Wilson, 2013; 
Couzin & Krause, 2003). For instance, fish schools or bird flocks are examples of self-organization 
among vertebrates (Hildenbrant, Carere & Hemelrijk, 2010; Ward, Sumpter, Couzin, Hart & Krause, 
2008). In some cases, also primates, including humans, might coordinate their decisions based on pre-
programmed sets of actions and heuristics (Dyer, Johansson, Helbing, Couzin & Krause, 2009; Petit & 
Bon, 2010; Strandburg-Peshkin, Farine, Couzin & Crofoot, 2015). However, in other occasions, 
primates are capable of coordinating decisions and actions in more complex and flexible ways, in a 
process of strategic decision-making. This ability might have evolved as a response to adaptive 
pressures such as the need to forage on unevenly distributed food resources (Milton & May, 1976) 
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and to interact with unpredictable social partners (Byrne, 1994; Dunbar, 1998). This would have led 
primates to evolve enhanced cognitive adaptations such as behavioural flexibility and a capacity to 
form mental representations which might be especially useful when it comes to coordination.  
Yet, despite its pervasiveness across the animal kingdom, mutualism has received little attention in 
some animal taxa such as primates (Gilby, 2012). Recently, mutualistic collaboration has been 
proposed to have played a central role in the evolution of human cooperation (Sterelny 2012, 2016; 
Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman & Herrmann, 2012). According to the Interdependence hypothesis 
(Tomasello et al., 2012), at some point in our evolutionary history, ancient hominids were forced to 
collaborate for mutual benefit in order to survive —for instance, to hunt large prey not otherwise 
attainable. This first key step in the evolution of human cooperation strengthened individuals 
interdependencies while fostering tolerance between them to overcome coordination challenges. As 
a consequence, unilateral cooperative acts such as helping and comfort would no longer constitute an 
evolutionary puzzle, as mutualistic partners would have felt obliged to care about each other for their 
mutual success (in a manner similar to the Stakeholder model described above). Over time, more 
efficient collaborators passed their genes across generations, while free-riders faded away. This 
selective pressure led to the formation of bigger human groups, in which cultural practices and norms 
gave rise to more complex forms of cooperation, serving as a starting point for the evolution of 
modern humans’ unique forms of cognition and morality. 
 
Conflicts of interest 
 
Cooperation can be thus maintained in nature through collaborations or reciprocal interactions among 
individuals. However, in spite of its prevalence in nature, cooperative acts are always intertwined with 
the temptation to defect, triggering inevitable conflicts of interest between cooperators, which need 
to be solved for cooperation to occur. 
 In the case of reciprocity, the temptations to defect are evident: individuals may reap the benefits 
from their partners help without reciprocating in return. In human societies, several mechanisms have 
evolved to reduce defections. Reputational concerns, for instance, tend to prevent people from free-
riding (Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) and third-party individuals are 
usually willing to sanction free-riders even at a personal cost (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), despite 
decreasing their fitness in relation to others unwilling to sanction (second order free-riders; 
Heckathorn, 1989; but see Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). In the case of mutualisms, individual 
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motivations to defect are alleviated due to a shared interest to reap mutual benefits. Moreover, in 
contrast to reciprocity, this form of cooperation does not pose problems such as time discounting or 
the uncertainty of future interactions (Sterelny, 2016). Yet, unequitable reward distributions (i.e., 
distributions in which resources are not divided equally or according to individual efforts) may still 
give rise to a conflict of interest between collaborators.  
In nature, common scenarios that test the coordinative abilities of individuals to cooperate together 
against their temptation to defect are collective action problem (CAP) (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; 
Nunn, 2000; Nunn & Lewis, 2001; Willems, Hellriegel & van Schaik, 2013). A CAP can be understood 
as a situation resulting from the need for public good which is costly for individuals to garner, but 
benefits the whole group including individuals who do not contribute to the good (Nunn & Lewis, 
2001). In a prototypical CAP, whilst collaboration towards a common goal is the most efficient strategy 
for the group as it results in shared benefits otherwise unattainable, the most efficient strategy from 
an individual perspective is to avoid the costs of cooperation while still benefiting from it. Yet, if all 
individuals defect, nobody will benefit. Interestingly, these scenarios are also unique in the sense that 
individuals not only have to decide whether to cooperate or defect, but also the way in which they 
can achieve cooperation. For instance, in a situation of cooperative hunting (Gilby, Eberly & 
Wrangham, 2008), individuals can mutually collaborate, increasing the likelihood of a successful hunt 
or chase alone and reciprocate in the future.  
In the case of non-human animals, some accounts suggest that CAPs can be solved either through 
majority consensus or by the decisions of a leader, which is usually a dominant group member 
(Conradt & Roper, 2005; King & Sueur 2011; Sumpter & Pratt, 2009).  Examples of CAPs among non-
human animals can be found when group members need to decide among different travel routes 
(Ruckstuhl, 1998; Strandburg-Peshkin et al., 2015) or during group and territorial defence (Kitchen & 
Beehner, 2007; Nunn, 2000). In all these situations, individuals may have opposite preferences (e.g., 
where to move next) or may prefer to take advantage of others’ actions (e.g., to avoid defensive costs). 
However, it is in their common interest to remain within the group and maintain its integrity as it 
provides benefits such as defence against predators or the possibility to find mates (Krause & Ruxton, 
2002). In humans, economic models have been designed to understand how human societies 
overcome CAPs (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). Recent models, for instance, suggest that 
individuals in a leadership position, with higher stakes or for whom the contribution costs into a CAP 
are lower, will contribute more in overcoming CAP, sometimes ending up with a smaller payoff than 
the rest of group members (Gavrilets, 2015; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014). Experimental research has 
found that at a local level, communities have reached successful solutions to overcome CAP involving 
common-pool resources through the creation of self-managed arrangements among locals (e.g., 
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fishermen taking turns to fish in their favourite spot; Berkes, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; but see Ostrom, 
Burger, Field, Norgaard & Policansky, 1999 for global level challenges). Moreover, according to recent 
models, leadership helps to solve CAP in small-scale societies (Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015).  
However, the study of CAPs has mainly focused on group level decisions, especially among non-human 
animals, without considering the motivations and the cognitive mechanisms underlying individuals’ 
decision-making strategies in these situations. In the present dissertation, I explore humans’ abilities 
to solve conflicts of interest in these types of cooperative situations from a dyadic perspective, and in 
order to obtain a broader view, I compared them with our closest living relatives, chimpanzees and 
bonobos. Apes provide an ideal model to understand the evolution of human cognitive abilities, and 
the comparison of their behaviour with that of children in similar contexts can offer key insights into 
the proximate mechanisms that regulate individuals’ decisions and actions in these contexts as well 
as their evolutionary roots, and in particular, how humans and apes coordinate when facing a conflict 
of interest.  
For this reason, I confront pairs of children, chimpanzees and bonobos with situations that a) varied 
in the degree of conflict between participants and b) differed in the way subjects could coordinate 
their actions in order to reap the rewards, (i.e., together or unilaterally).  
 
1.2 Human cooperation in conflict situations 
 
Humans are ultra-social animals, cooperating in many diverse ways and with a frequency uncommon 
to other species (Tomasello, 2014). We act altruistically even in some anonymous contexts (Eckel & 
Grossman, 1996, Gächter & Falk, 2002; although see Levitt & List, 2007), divide the outcomes of our 
collaborative efforts with others (Hill & Hurtado, 2009; Marlowe, 2005), punish unfair actions at a cost 
for ourselves (Cameron, 1999; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; but see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010 
for variations between different cultural groups) and coordinate in complex collaborative activities 
such as group hunting (Alvard & Nolin, 2002; Hill, 2002). In fact, we constantly need to coordinate our 
actions with others to succeed in our everyday interactions. 
Thus, our success as a species appears to be linked to our special ways to cooperate with others 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Tomasello, 2009). These exceptional human abilities and motivations to 
cooperate are grounded in unique cognitive skills such as the ability to share intentions and goals, to 
engage in joint actions for common objectives and to recognize the interrelation of different 
Introduction 
9 
individuals participating in cooperative endeavours (Call, 2009; Carpenter, 2009; Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005). In other words, from early on in our development we are already 
equipped with the psychological abilities and motivations for shared intentionality, the “ability and 
motivation to engage in collaborative activities with others through the creation of joint goals” 
(Tomasello et al., 2005).  
From a very young age, infants engage in cooperative behaviours such as helping (Liszkowski, 
Carpenter, Striano & Tomasello, 2006) and sharing (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols & Svetlova, 2013; 
Brownell, Svetlova & Nichols, 2009). By the age of 20-24 months old, toddlers are capable of 
coordinating simple movements to coordinate with their cooperative partners (Eckerman, Davis & 
Didow, 1989). By the age of two, they are already capable of actively coordinating their actions with 
peers to reach common goals (Brownell, Ramani, Zerwas, 2006) and to solve simple problems 
collaboratively (Ashley & Tomasello 1998; Brownell & Carriger, 1990). Later, between ages three to 
five, children begin to understand the normative side of their collaborative activities, feeling 
committed to the joint goals shared with their peers  (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg & Tomasello, 
2011) to the point that they attempt to re-engage their partners into ongoing joint tasks if those 
partners attempt to leave (Warneken, Gräfenhain & Tomasello, 2012). At the same age, children are 
capable of solving collaborative tasks by taking into account the different roles that partners must 
adopt to solve a joint task (Fletcher, Warneken & Tomasello, 2012). They are also able to plan division 
of labour in collaborative tasks (Warneken, Steinwender, Hamann & Tomasello, 2014). From three 
year old, children also start to reciprocate in cooperative tasks (Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). For 
instance, they share more with partners who have previously shared with them or with others (Levitt, 
Weber, Clark & McDonnell, 1985; Olson &   Spelke, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013) and from 5-
year old they are capable to match their partners’ previous actions (House, Henrich, Sarnecka & Silk, 
2013) and to share more with a partner that could share with them in the future compared to a partner 
that was unable to reciprocate (Sebastián-Enesco & Warneken, 2015). 
Children not only coordinate their actions in collaborative situations, but from a very young age they 
also coordinate their decisions to collaborate in efficient ways (Wyman, Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2013). 
Moreover, by the age of four, children are capable to leave aside a less preferred but secure reward 
to obtain a mutually preferred one (Duguid, Wyman, Bullinger, Herfurth-Majstorovic & Tomasello, 
2014). In particular, when children shared visual contact they succeed with minimal communication 
(similar to chimpanzees in the same context). However, in the absence of visual contact, children used 
communication to establish mutual knowledge of the presence of the preferred reward, reducing the 
coordination failure. Furthermore, at the age of five they can use first (i.e., I know that I X) and second 
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order (i.e., I know that you know that I X) degrees of intentionality when they need to coordinate their 
actions with an absent partner (Grueneisen, Wyman & Tomasello, 2015).  
Overall, these studies suggest that children from a very young age possess the capacities and intrinsic 
motivations to mutually coordinate their actions towards joint goals with their conspecifics, to provide 
help and to actively share resources. Later on in ontogeny, mechanisms for direct and indirect 
reciprocity develop to mediate acts of sharing (Olson & Spelke, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello 2013). 
As of yet, most research has focused on children’s abilities to coordinate their actions in circumstances 
of mutual benefit, when they share the same goals and their interests do not compete (Duguid et al., 
2014; Grueneisen et al., 2015 for examples). In these contexts, children share their mutual knowledge 
that a) each child is needed to successfully cooperate and b) that reaching the mutual goal is the best 
option for both (Bratman, 1992; Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960). Thus, from a theoretical point of view, 
children’s intrinsic motivations should be very similar, as they share a strong preference for the same 
mutual goal. However, in some human cooperative interactions, individuals also have opportunities 
to free-ride (despite sharing a preference for a mutual goal), creating a conflict of interest between 
cooperative partners. In those situations, despite people’s abilities to reciprocate their actions or 
collaborate simultaneously, each person would prefer to maximize their own outcomes by free-riding, 
resulting in a clear conflict between individuals when they need to actively coordinate.  
Adults are capable of managing this kind of social conflicts in diverse ways. Firstly, when recurrent 
conflict interactions occur at a local level (i.e., with familiar or well-known individuals), people directly 
negotiate compromises to resolve them. Examples of these may include the division of family duties 
(one cleans the dishes while the other cleans the bathroom) or the establishment of mutual 
commitments to resolve conflicts of interest. One intuitive way to resolve this type of conflict is to 
take turns in the execution of a specific, sometimes costly, action (Helbing, Schönhof, Stark & Hołyst, 
2005; Nowak & Sigmund, 1994). For instance, soldiers take turns to occupy the most dangerous 
positions during combats (Rominger & James, 2003). In this way, individuals can share the costs of 
their actions equitably.  
However, little is known about children’s capacities to coordinate when their interests compete, as 
well as the strategies they use to negotiate in those situations. Only recently, researchers have started 
to focus on these questions. In a recent study, for instance, Grueneisen and Tomasello (2016) 
presented 5-year old children with a version of the chicken game. In this task, each child had the option 
to cooperate or not with his or her partner. The optimal solution from an individual perspective would 
have been to defect while the partner cooperates. However, mutual defection resulted in no rewards. 
Alternatively, they could coordinate their actions by taking turns while losing part of their reward to 
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avoid mutual defection. In this task, children demonstrated that they could coordinate their actions 
by taking turns and they rarely failed to obtain the rewards. Moreover they used communicative acts 
to facilitate turn-taking interactions. In line with these findings, Melis and colleagues (Melis, Grocke, 
Kalbitz & Tomsello, 2016) presented pairs of 5- year old children with a collaborative task in which one 
child at a time could get rewards after both had collaborated. Children spontaneously took turns to 
obtain the rewards, in line with previous studies showing that children re-distributed unequal 
distributions after they had collaborated (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2014). In all, these 
studies show that from a very young age, children successfully manage conflict situations even when 
their interests are not aligned. Yet, little is known about children’s performance in situations where 
they can decide whether to act together or alone to resolve their dispute and obtain mutual rewards2. 
Moreover, no study has so far investigated the evolutionary roots of coordination in this type of 
conflict situations from a comparative perspective. 
 
1.3 Great apes coordination in conflict situations 
 
Field experiments 
 
Chimpanzees and bonobos are social primates. Both species have a classic fission-fusion organization, 
living in multimale-multifemale groups with stable memberships, although community members form 
temporal subgroups (parties) that lack fixed composition. As a result of their social organization, these 
species need to maintain multiple relationships with kin and non-kin individuals (Marchant & Nishida, 
1996; Watts, 2012). Although much of chimpanzees’ and to a lesser extent bonobos social lives are 
governed by competition (Muller & Mitani, 2005), these species also engage in a variety of cooperative 
activities with conspecifics, including food sharing (Wittig, Crockford, Deschner, Langergraber, Ziegler, 
Zuberbühler, 2014; Yamamoto, 2015) and grooming (Goodall, 1986; Kano, 1989). Chimpanzees and 
bonobos also form mutualistic coalitions with other group members. For instance, male chimpanzees 
join forces to outperform other males from privileged positions (Watts, 1998) while female bonobos 
form coalitions to counteract male harassment (Tokuyama & Furuichi, 2016). Moreover, there is 
anecdotic evidence of altruistic acts in chimpanzees such as the case of an adult male chimpanzee 
                                                          
2 Notice that in previous studies children could not act together  (Gruneisen & Tomasello, 2016) or could only 
act together for unilateral benefit (Melis et al., 2016), but could not resolve conflicts of interest via mutual 
collaboration (with the possibility to act on their own)  for mutual benefits. 
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taking care of an orphan infant in the Taï Forest (Boesch, Bole, Eckhardt & Boesch, 2010). In other 
occasions, chimpanzees also need to coordinate in complex situations in which individual and group 
interests may conflict, for instance during group patrolling of territorial borders and cooperative 
hunts.   
 
Group patrols 
Group patrols consist of several individuals travelling around the boundaries of their territory to 
protect it from out-group individuals (Watts & Mitani, 2001), and sometimes into the territory of 
neighbouring groups (Boesch, 2003; Wrangham, 1999). While this behaviour is very common among 
chimpanzees (Boesch, Crockford, Herbinger, Wittig, Moebius & Normand, 2008; Watts & Mitani, 2001; 
Watts, Muller, Amsler, Mbabazi & Mitani, 2006; Wilson, Wallauer & Pusey, 2004), it has not been 
reported in any bonobo community (Furuichi, 2011; Hohmann, 2001). Patrol bordering increases the 
probabilities to meet other groups, and thus may lead to inter-group aggressive encounters (Wilson, 
Hauser & Wrangham, 2001). As a consequence, chimpanzees can maximize their individual benefits 
by delaying their movements or letting others occupy the front positions of the patrolling party. To 
date, it remains unclear how chimpanzees overcome this CAP, and which individuals initiate these 
patrols and occupy the riskiest positions. While some studies have found that there might be specific 
individuals who are willing to start patrolling (Gilby, Wilson & Pusey, 2013), others have suggested 
that travel initiations by male chimpanzees positively correlate with mating success (Watts & Mitani, 
2001) suggesting that those males who are more likely to benefit from the patrols —expanding  their 
home range or increasing the number of females in the group— are also more likely to pay the 
associated costs with group patrols, including a tendency to go further compared to low ranking males 
when they visited the periphery of their range (Wilson, Kahlenberg, Wells & Wrangham, 2012).   
 
Cooperative hunts 
Chimpanzees and bonobos hunt in groups although reports of cooperative hunts in bonobos are scant 
(Surbeck & Hohmann, 2008).  Conversely, chimpanzee group hunts have been widely studied in 
several chimpanzee communities (Uehara, 1997). Demographic and ecological conditions vary across 
communities (Caldecott & Kapos, 2005; Inskipp, 2005) and these differences appear to impact 
communities’ diverse hunting strategies (Boesch, 1994a; Newton-Fisher, 2015; Pruetz, Bertolani, Ontl, 
Lindshield, Shelley & Wessling, 2015). For instance, chimpanzees in Gombe seem to hunt in parallel 
with little if any coordination between them. In these environments chimpanzees do not probably 
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need to coordinate their actions in complex ways as they can constantly track their prey and other 
group members due to the short canopy of the forest (Boesch, 1994a). In contrast, the dense canopy 
in the Taï forest would hinder chimpanzees’ visual access to their prey and group mates. Thus, to cope 
with the environmental contingencies, chimpanzees in Tai would have developed more efficient ways 
to coordinate their actions while hunting (Boesch, 1994a, 1994b, 2002).  
Two main accounts have been proposed to describe the complexity of cooperative hunts in 
chimpanzees. One account suggests that each individual has a specific role during the hunt and it is 
also aware of each other’s role and position (Boesch, 2002). Similarly to individuals acting as a team 
(Anderson & Franks, 2001), chimpanzees would therefore be able to effectively coordinate their 
actions towards the shared common goal. This explanation presupposes that chimpanzees have the 
ability to form joint goals and take complementary roles during hunts (Boesch, 2005) —skills that have 
so far only been detected in humans. A more parsimonious account therefore suggests that 
chimpanzees act in a “I-mode group behaviour“ while hunting, in which coordination arises as the by-
product of each individual trying to capture the prey on its own, while taking advantage of others’ 
movements (Kun, Boza & Scheuring, 2006; Gilby & Connor, 2010; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tuomela, 
2006) In this way, hunts are likely to be initiated by a single individual followed by other group 
members, resembling a Stackelberg or “leader-follower” strategy (von Stackelberg, 1934).  
Regardless of the cognitive abilities required, cooperative hunting still posits a CAP, as hunts are a 
costly activity and individual chimpanzees might prefer others to start the hunt (Gilby & Connor, 2010). 
By waiting, chimpanzees can benefit in different ways: they can avoid the costs of the chase and they 
can also track the initial movements of the monkeys so they can act more effectively. However, the 
chances to get the prey increase and the group benefits from all individuals collaborating and sharing 
the prey. Moreover, the current interpretation of cooperative hunts as instances of CAP is supported 
by recent research suggesting that specific chimpanzees are more prone to pay the initial costs of the 
hunt and solve the CAP while promoting the likelihood that other members of the hunting party join 
in (Gilby, Machanda, Mjungu, Rosen, Muller, Pusey & Wrangham, 2015).  
In the wild, it is clear that chimpanzees and bonobos are able to coordinate actions to cooperate in 
efficient ways even when dealing with complex scenarios. Yet, even though the observational study 
of natural behaviours such as cooperative hunts has been extremely useful to understand 
chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ coordinative patterns in real life scenarios, behavioural observations do 
not suffice to determine the exact decisions and strategies underlying individual actions in these 
contexts. For instance, in the case of cooperative hunts or group patrols, behavioural observations 
alone cannot provide any information as to whether initiators take into account others’ decisions 
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before acting. Therefore, in order to address these questions in more detail, we need well-controlled 
methods which are more feasible to implement in experimental set-ups. 
 
Experimental research 
 
As with children, the majority of experimental studies on apes’ cooperation have mainly focused on 
the ability of pairs of chimpanzees to coordinate their actions towards common goals, in which 
collaboration is the only solution to solve the task and subjects’ interests are completely aligned 
(Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis, Hare & Tomasello, 2006a). In addition, some studies have also explored 
apes’ capacity to reciprocate with conspecifics (Amici et al., 2014; Brosnan, Silk, Henrich, Mareno, 
Lambeth & Schapiro, 2009; Pelé, Dufour, Thierry & Call, 2009; Yamamoto & Tanaka, 2009) and overall 
have found that apes did not reciprocate in ways contingent to the partner’s previous behaviour.  
Focusing on mutual collaboration, early work demonstrated that pairs of chimpanzees succeeded 
when they had to pull together from a heavy box to obtain a reward (Crawford, 1937).  Importantly, 
the box could not be moved by one individual alone so that apes needed each other to obtain the 
rewards. Although apes were able to coordinate their actions in these task and similar ones 
(Chalmeau, 1994; Chalmeau & Gallo, 1996), they may have achieved the goal by randomly pulling their 
ropes  simultaneously, casting doubt on whether they really took into account their partners’ actions 
to solve the task.  
A better approach to the study of coordination presented pairs of chimpanzees with a long board 
baited at its ends. Importantly, only one rope was threaded through loopholes on the board, with each 
end within reach of one of the two subjects. Consequently, if only one chimpanzee pulled, the rope 
came loose without moving the platform, preventing chimpanzees from obtaining the rewards (Hirata 
& Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a). In this task,  chimpanzees were able to recruit the best 
collaborators based on previous experience (Melis et al., 2006a), by actively opening a door so that a 
partner could join them in the test room, and even waiting to pull the rope until the partner was ready 
to join in (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007). Moreover, in another related study, chimpanzees could solve a 
coordination problem by acting on different but complementary roles (Fletcher et al., 2012). 
However, in these studies coordination might have been relatively easy to achieve as individuals were 
only presented with one option (i.e., pulling or not). Moreover, chimpanzees could have solved these 
tasks by simply waiting until some force is applied to the rope before pulling (see also Albiach-Serrano, 
2015). Therefore, recent studies have focused on the abilities of chimpanzees to coordinate in more 
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complex situations in which individuals do not only need to coordinate their actions by performing a 
similar action at the same time, but also have to make similar decisions between different alternatives. 
To operationalize this situation, Bullinger and colleagues (Bullinger, Wyman, Melis & Tomasello, 
2011a) presented pairs of chimpanzees with a Stag Hunt situation where each member of a pair had 
access to a less-preferred secure option (i.e., juice). However, after a certain time, they could 
coordinate their actions towards a mutually preferred option (i.e., pieces of banana), while losing 
access to the less preferred alternative. Therefore, chimpanzees experienced a coordination conflict, 
having to decide whether to abandon the secure reward, with the risk of losing all rewards if the 
partner does not coordinate. Importantly, in this task chimpanzees did not experience a conflict of 
interests as both individuals shared a mutual preference for the stag. Chimpanzees were capable to 
coordinate their actions towards the stag using a leader-follower strategy that consisted of the leader 
abandoning the less-preferred option to approach the stag, and the follower joining in right after. This 
strategy is in line with some accounts describing chimpanzees’ group hunting behaviour in the wild 
(Gilby et al., 2015). In a follow up study Duguid and colleagues (2014) showed that when audible and 
visual cues were prevented, chimpanzees’ success significantly decreased as compared to a full-view 
situation. However, chimpanzees still managed to coordinate their actions around half of the time, 
using a leader-follower strategy and occasionally communicating once they were next to the stag.  
As yet, only few experimental studies have focused on how chimpanzees coordinate their actions to 
collaborate in situations with a real conflict of interest. In a first attempt, Melis and colleagues (Melis, 
Hare & Tomasello, 2009) presented pairs of chimpanzees with two identical baited trays. The first tray 
was equally baited on both ends while the second tray was unequally baited, providing more food to 
one of the subjects. This arrangement created a conflict of interest, as both chimpanzees preferred to 
pull from the side containing the highest amount of food. In this situation, subjects had to coordinate 
their pulling actions and also decide which tray to pull. Despite the apparent conflict of interest, 
chimpanzees succeeded in obtaining the reward in between 78-94% of the cases. However, when only 
one chimpanzee could obtain the resources from the collaborative work, cooperation tended to 
disintegrate over time (Melis et al., 2016). Therefore, as an overall result, these studies suggest that 
chimpanzees cooperate in mutualistic ways as long as both members of a pair obtain a net benefit 
from the interaction, even when the mutual benefit is unequally distributed. In contrast, when mutual 
efforts only yield benefits to one member of the party and members need to engage in reciprocal 
mechanisms to sustain cooperation, cooperation tends to disappear. 
In a different line of research, Schneider and colleagues (Schneider, Melis & Tomasello, 2012) 
presented chimpanzees with more complex scenarios for cooperation in an attempt to mimic natural 
CAP situations. In this task, chimpanzee groups of three individuals were presented with a Volunteer’s 
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Dilemma situation, in which a food dispenser released food in a main room as long as it was activated 
from an adjacent one. Importantly, from the adjacent room chimpanzees were not able to retrieve 
any reward. Thus, one chimpanzee had to volunteer by paying the costs of moving to the adjacent 
room and activate the mechanism while the others benefited from the food released. However, 
researchers found that the most dominant individual activated the dispenser and still obtained the 
majority of rewards, casting doubts on whether chimpanzees interpreted the task as a real CAP.  
Contrary to chimpanzees, bonobos’ abilities to coordinate in mutually collaborative set-ups have not 
been studied in such detail. When confronted with a task in which individuals needed each other to 
pull from a baited tray, Hare and colleagues (Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings & Wrangham, 2007) found 
that bonobos succeeded as well as chimpanzees. Moreover, due to bonobos’ higher rates of social 
tolerance towards conspecifics, unlike chimpanzees (Melis, Hare & Tomasello, 2006b), they were also 
capable to coordinate their actions and to pull together when they were confronted with 
monopolizable food (i.e., when the food was baited in the middle of the tray, equidistant to each 
individual). However, little is known about bonobos’ abilities to collaborate and coordinate with others 
when their interests compete. 
Yet, although these studies have explored different facets of individuals’ abilities to coordinate and 
negotiate conflicts, other factors that are likely to influence individual decisions deserve some 
attention. First, in the majority of previous studies, chimpanzees had to collaborate to obtain the 
rewards facing no other alternatives to succeed (in Bullinger et al., 2011a and in Duguid et al., 2014 
chimpanzees did not need to collaborate to obtain rewards but the collaborative option was the 
preferred for both individuals). In contrast, in more ecologically relevant scenarios such as when 
intergroup aggression arises, cooperative hunts start or patrol borders are initiated, individuals always 
face multiple options; for instance they can delay their actions to take advantage of others’ 
movements, or they can act individually towards the achievement of the common goal, or do not act 
at all. Therefore, no work has yet explored the decision-making strategies that chimpanzees and 
bonobos would use in conflict scenarios in which collaboration is only one of the multiple options to 
solve the task.  
Second, in natural scenarios such group hunting, individuals may face time constraints (e.g., prey 
availability) when having to decide whether to cooperate or not. Therefore, to explore the effect of 
time in chimpanzees and bonobos decision-making abilities when facing conflicts of interest, shorter 
time-frames are needed to increase the coordination challenges as well as the likelihood to fail. 
Third, inter-individual differences in propensity to take risks are likely to influence in the decisions of 
chimpanzees and bonobos in these contexts. In general it has been suggested that bonobos are more 
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risk averse than their closest relatives, the chimpanzees possibly as a by-product of adaptations to 
different food resources (Haun, Nawroth & Call, 2011; Heilbronner, Rosati, Stevens, Hare & Hauser, 
2008; Rosati & Hare, 2012). Nevertheless, these studies have focused on apes unilateral decisions in 
non-social scenarios or in scenarios confronting the subject with a human competitor (Rosati & Hare, 
2012). In the case of humans, individuals tend to take riskier decisions when others observe them 
compared to when they are alone, a phenomenon called risk shift (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; 
Vinokur, 1971). Thus, it is possible, that when chimpanzees and bonobos are confronted with social 
scenarios in which actors’ and partners’ decisions are interdependent, their propensities towards risky 
choices may differ, as compared to individual contexts. 
Fourth, in chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ everyday life, conflicts of interest do not only occur when 
individuals need to coordinate to reap cooperative benefits. In competitive context, such as when two 
individuals want to mate with a third one, conflicts of interest are constantly present —although in 
this kind of situation coordination might not be necessary (i.e., when both individuals prefer to mate 
before the other one). Therefore, in the context of this thesis, one possibility to make sense of 
individuals’ decisions and actions when their interests conflict in cooperative contexts is to present 
them with competitive situations in which every subject best strategy is to act on its own (i.e., pull 
from a tray to obtain most of the food before the partner). With this condition, we fulfill two goals: 
we present subjects with an ecologically relevant situation that serves us, at the same time, as a 
baseline to explain and compare our results.  
Overall, in order to systematically compare apes’ and children’s strategies to coordinate, we would 
need to present these species with the same social dilemmas across different scenarios, differing in 
the degrees of conflict and risk associated. For this purpose, I will draw upon adapted models taken 
from the game theory literature. 
1.4 Models of cooperation and conflict 
Game theory is the study of conflict and cooperation through mathematical modelling. A prototypical 
game consists of a 2x2 matrix that depicts each player’s choices (X and Y in Figure 1) and payoff 
outcomes (A, B, C, D in Figure 1) as a result of their previous choices.  
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Figure 1. Prototypical payoff matrix of a dyadic game theory model. 
 
According to Halevy and colleagues (Halevy, Chou & Murnighan, 2012), two general types of models 
can be used to understand humans’ psychological mechanisms and motivations to coordinate their 
decisions and actions: cooperative and conflict models. On one hand, cooperative models such as the 
Stag Hunt (Skyrms, 2004) and the Maximizing game (Marwell, Ratcliff & Schmitt, 1969) present 
scenarios in which both agents share their  preferences (Balliet, Tybur & van Lange, 2016). In a typical 
cooperative scenario, both agents obtain the highest benefits by cooperating. On the other hand, 
conflict models such as the Snowdrift game3 (Sugden, 1986) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) present agents with situations in which their interests compete with 
each other, and individuals obtain the highest benefits by defecting while the partner cooperates. 
In analytic terms, a crucial factor to compare these two sets of models resides in their Nash 
Equillibrium. The Nash Equilibrium is defined as the state of a game in which no player can benefit 
from a unilateral change of strategy (Nash, 1950). In cooperative games like the Stag Hunt, mutual 
cooperation is the best strategy for both players and it is also a Nash Equilibrium solution. In contrast, 
in conflict games such as the Snowdrift game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, mutual cooperation is not 
a stable strategy. In these games, although mutual cooperation provides more benefits than mutual 
defection, individuals would prefer to defect when their partners cooperate, originating a conflict of 
interests between players. However, there is a crucial difference between the two models.  In the 
Snowdrift game, unilateral cooperation yields a benefit and thus, individuals would prefer to 
                                                          
3 This game is also referred as the Chicken game (Rapoport & Chammah, 1966) or the Hawk-Dove game 
(Maynard Smith, 1978). 
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cooperate rather than defect given that the partner defects. However, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
unilateral cooperation is the worst outcome, and so, to avoid these high costs, players would end up 
defecting. In short, it is expected that individuals would show more cooperative behaviour in a 
Snowdrift situation as unilateral cooperation would be rewarding. Thus, for the purpose of this work, 
I will use an adapted version of the Snowdrift game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma to model cooperative 
scenarios in which individuals’ self-interests compete.  
The Snowdrift game 
In the classic description of the Snowdrift scenario (Sudgen, 1986) two cars become stranded on a 
highway that is covered with snow. The snow must be shovelled off the road before the drivers can 
return home: they could shovel the snow together and share the work, or alternatively, one driver 
could do it alone. In this scenario, each driver should prefer the other to carry out the whole work. 
However, if one of them clearly defects, the other should shovel the snow and pay the whole burden 
to return home. Thus, on one hand both drivers have a common goal that can be achieved through 
mutual cooperation (cleaning the snow together) but on the other hand, as their interests are 
conflicting, they may prefer to wait for their partner to act alone and benefit from their cooperation 
without incurring any cost. However, if both remain in their car and free ride, they run the risk that 
none cooperates and both lose. 
The Snowdrift models a situation in which the best strategy for an agent is to carry out the opposite 
action of its partner. Figure 2 depicts a prototypical Snowdrift payoff matrix. In this scenario, if player 
A chooses to cooperate, player B’s best strategy is to defect and viceversa. Thus, the Snowdrift game 
can be thought of as an anti-coordination game with two stable strategies –the two anti-coordination 
outcomes. Yet, this analysis only exemplifies a singular Snowdrift interaction. Reality is much more 
complex and group living animals such as humans and apes are very likely to encounter situations in 
which the same individuals recurrently face similar conflicts. In those situations, individuals may 
develop other strategies to manage repeated sequences of conflict. 
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Figure 2. Snowdrift payoff matrix. 
 
During repeated encounters, one possible way to overcome the conflict set-out by the Snowdrift 
game, for instance, is to collaborate and obtain mutual benefits while sharing the costs of cooperation. 
This, however, is not a stable strategy as at any given time one could defect and obtain most of the 
benefits if the partner cooperates.  Another way to solve the dilemma is to take turns, or reciprocate, 
over the cooperative endeavour. In this way, individuals would benefit from the cooperative acts of 
their partners every second time while they would pay the costs of cooperation half of times. Thus, 
turn-taking is a stable strategy that resembles the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Yet, although both 
collaboration and turn-taking strategies may yield to the same benefits in the long term, only the latter 
is immune to defection by rational agents. Moreover, in a Snowdrift situation, individual differences 
may lead to stable fixed strategies where a dominant individual always defects while the submissive 
partner pays the recurrent costs of cooperation (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). 
According to recent literature, CAPs such as group hunting and other animal cooperative activities 
such as territorial defence or group foraging posit challenges that are similar to the Snowdrift game 
(reviewed in Kun et al,. 2006; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). From this perspective, CAPs can be understood 
as N-person Snowdrift dilemmas between group members. Other researchers have suggested that 
cooperation is more likely to evolve in Snowdrift-like scenarios as the majority of cooperative acts in 
nature lead to positive benefits for cooperators as opposed to scenarios in which unilateral 
cooperation leads to the worst outcome for the cooperator (Bshary, Zuberbühler & van Schaik, 2016). 
These theoretical accounts have been in turn supported by empirical results  in human dyads (Duffy 
& Feltovich, 2002, 2006; Kümmerli, Colliard, Fietcher, Petitpiere, Russier & Keller  et al., 2007; 
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Rapoport & Chammah, 1966) and groups (N-person games) (Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel & Wolters, 1986; 
Wit & Wilke 1992), and by agent-based simulations (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Doebeli, Hauert & 
Killingback, 2004). For instance, Duffy and Feltovich (2002, 2006) have shown that people tend to 
cooperate more when they are presented with a Snowdrift compared to a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
situation. All together, these findings suggest that organisms may be more prone to cooperate in 
Snowdrift scenarios, due to the low risk of mutual defection and the fact that cooperative acts provide 
net benefits regardless of other individuals’ actions. Therefore, the Snowdrift game stands out as a 
promising model to study decision-making strategies when individuals need to coordinate their 
actions in spite of a conflict of interest.  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the traditional version of the game, two suspects are interrogated in separate rooms. Each can 
either confess the crime, thereby implicating the other (defect), or keep silent and cooperate. If both 
remain silent, both get the same treatment, one year in prison. However, if one confesses while the 
other keeps the secret, the confessor is set free while the cooperator awaits for the worse sentence, 
three years in prison. Finally, if both confess, both face the same penalty, two years in prison, which 
is worse than if both had remained silent. Thus, no matter what the other suspect does, each can 
improve his own position by confessing.  
Thus, the Prisoner’s Dilemma models a situation in which an agent’s best strategy is to always defect 
regardless of its partner’s action –the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Figure 3 illustrates the traditional 
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff. In this figure, it can be seen that regardless of player’ A’s choice (either to 
cooperate or to defect), player B’s best choice is always to defect; and that mutual cooperation 
provides higher benefits for both players compared to mutual defection. Therefore, when individuals 
are confronted with iterated versions of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, mutual defection is no longer the 
best solution although it is the only stable outcome of the game. Therefore, individuals during 
repeated encounters need to efficiently deal with the conflict.  
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Figure 3. Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix (following the example above). 
 
One intuitive way to solve an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is to cooperate if your partner has previously 
cooperated (i.e., Tit-for-Tat strategy; Axelrod, 1987; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). When decisions are 
concurrent, Tit-for-Tat results in iterated instances of mutual cooperation. However, when decisions 
are not concurrent, a Tit-for-Tat strategy can be practically understood as players taking turns to 
reciprocate their cooperative costs in every following round of the game. Yet, if the costs of 
cooperation outperform the benefits, a turn-taking mechanism will not be stable.  
 
In all, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is perhaps the most influential model to study cooperation (Hauert, 
2013). Still, despite its prevalence in the cooperation literature, there are few examples of non-human 
animals interacting in ways resembling a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Doebeli & 
Hauert, 2005; Kun et al., 2006). It is possible that due to the high risks that the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
imposes to cooperators, scenarios resembling this game are less common in nature, where 
mutualisms and interdependencies between group living animals decrease the risks to act 
cooperatively. In humans, experimental studies have shown that people do not seem to follow rational 
strategies but rather tend to behave more cooperatively than theoretically predicted (Andreoni & 
Miller 1993; Sally, 1995), even when presented with one-shot versions of the game (Camerer, 2003; 
Engel & Rand, 2014; Kiyonari, Tanida & Yamagishi, 2000). In any case, the Prisoner’s Dilemma offers 
an elegant framework to explore the strategic decision-making capacities of children and apes to 
cooperate in high risk scenarios, in which unilateral cooperation is strongly penalized, compared to 
more relaxed situations such as in the Snowdrift game. 
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1.5 Focus of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into three chapters. 
 
Chapter 1  
In the first chapter of the dissertation I explored whether pairs of chimpanzees possessed the abilities 
to cooperate when their interests were in conflict. To recreate a conflict scenario, I used the Snowdrift 
game. For this purpose, pairs of chimpanzees were presented with a situation in which they could 
either pull together (mutual cooperation or collaboration) from a weighted tray and share the 
cooperative costs, or pull alone –unilaterally paying the burden of cooperation. As in a Snowdrift 
situation, in this study chimpanzees also had the opportunity to free-ride and get the benefits from 
their partners’ actions. Importantly, pairs had a limited amount of time to solve the dilemma before 
the food disappeared, resembling natural situations such as cooperative hunts in which monkeys may 
leave at any time.  
The main interest of the study was to explore whether chimpanzees would behave strategic in the 
conflict scenario, by trying to maximize the food rewards while minimising costs (i.e., waiting longer 
to pull when cooperation costs increased). Moreover, I was also interested in the strategies that 
individuals would adopt to overcome the conflict situation (i.e., acting unilaterally or collaborating). 
Finally, I explored whether chimpanzees would change their strategies depending on the identity of 
their partners in an attempt to investigate whether they adjusted their behaviour to the contributions 
of others.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
In the first part of the second chapter (Studies 2a and 2b), I used a modified version of the Snowdrift 
game to address whether pairs of bonobos, chimpanzees and children would coordinate their actions 
when they were presented with a conflict task in the form of a rotatory tray baited with an unequal 
reward distribution. In the critical condition, the preferred reward could only be obtained by waiting 
for the partner to pull. This condition was compared to a competitive control in which the preferred 
reward could only be accessed by pulling before the partner. In both conditions, pairs had a limited 
amount of time to retrieve the rewards from the tray before those were removed. Contrary to the 
traditional Snowdrift game presented in the previous section, in this version mutual cooperation 
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within a trial was not possible but individuals could use other strategies over the course of the study 
to overcome the conflict of interest presented (e.g., through turn-taking).  
The main interest of this second study was to explore whether chimpanzees, bonobos and children 
would behave strategic in this version of the Snowdrift, showing higher latencies to pull in Snowdrift 
trials compared to the competitive control condition. I was also interested in the strategies that the 
three species would use to coordinate their decisions and to maximize their reward. Finally, I 
investigated the role of communication when pairs of individuals needed to coordinate their actions 
to overcome situations of conflict.  
Due to the strategies shown by some apes in the first section of this chapter, I tested pairs of 
chimpanzees and bonobos in a follow-up study (Study 3) to explore in more detail apes decision-
making strategies when individuals’ interests compete. In the second part of this chapter, I presented 
apes with the same apparatus we used in Study 2a with the addition of an alternative secure option 
for each individual. In this situation, each subject should decide whether to access the rotatory tray 
(social option) or the alternative option, which varied in the quantity of rewards presented between 
sessions (non-social option). From a rational perspective, apes had to access either the social or the 
non-social option depending on the rewards distribution and their partners’ actions.  
I hypothesized that the addition of an alternative option would allow subjects to better manage the 
risk and to behave more strategically compared to the previous study. With the opportunity to decide 
between different options we approximate ecologically relevant scenarios such as cooperative hunts. 
I expect subjects to take decisions based on the available options and their partners’ likely decisions.  
  
 
Chapter 3 
In the third and last chapter of the dissertation, I used the Prisoner’s Dilemma model to further 
investigate the strategic capacities of chimpanzees and children to coordinate their actions in 
situations of conflict in which unilateral acts of cooperation resulted in the loss of all rewards for 
cooperators. The Prisoner’s Dilemma was presented in the form of an elevator that either delivered 
all the rewards to a partner or to one-self. In the critical condition, the rewards could only be obtained 
by waiting for the partner to act first. In contrast, in the competitive control condition, the rewards 
could only be obtained by acting before the partner. Moreover, in this task subjects could also 
collaborate and divide the rewards by acting together at the same time in both conditions. As in the 
previous studies of this dissertation, pairs of chimpanzees and children had a limited amount of time 
to retrieve the rewards from the elevator before those were removed.  
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The main interest of this last study was to explore whether chimpanzees and children would overcome 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The main interest was to investigate whether individuals would behave in a 
strategic manner, showing higher latencies to cooperate when that could lead to the loss of rewards. 
As in the previous studies, I was also interested in the strategies that these species would use to 
coordinate their decisions depending on the condition presented (i.e., whether individuals will engage 
in mutual cooperation or would rather take turns to reciprocate and divide their rewards). Finally, in 
the case of children, I explored the role of communication when children pairs needed to overcome a 
situation of competing interests. 
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CHIMPANZEES COORDINATE IN A SNOWDRIFT TASK 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Social species need to coordinate with others to benefit from living in a group. However, in many cases 
individuals have competing interests. For instance, chimpanzees (Boesch, 1994b, 2002) and lions 
(Scheel & Packer, 1991) are more successful when they hunt and defend their territories as a group; 
but individuals may be tempted to lag behind to avoid potential costs (e.g., risk of injury) and benefit 
from others’ efforts (Gilby & Connor, 2010).  
Previous experimental studies have found that when individuals need to work together to retrieve 
food chimpanzees can coordinate their actions in a variety of situations (Chalmeau, 1994; Cronin, 
Bridget, van Leeuwen, Mundry & Haun, 2013; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a; Suchak, Eppley, 
Campbell & De Waal, 2014; Suchak, Eppley, Campbell, Fieldman, Quarles & De Waal, 2016). To a 
certain extent, chimpanzees can also coordinate their actions to obtain a high-value reward when 
there is an alternative (though lower-value) reward that can be obtained individually (Duguid et al., 
2014). Even when a conflict of interest was introduced by presenting chimpanzee pairs with an 
unequal (5-1) and an equal (3-3) reward distributions, pairs still cooperated in the majority of trials 
(Melis et al., 2009). In contrast, Bullinger, Melis and Tomasello (2011b) found that chimpanzees 
preferred solitary over social work to obtain the same amount of food. This preference, however, was 
reversed when the payoff of the social option was higher than the non-social option. 
In previous studies that did not offer subjects an alternative non-social option (but see Bullinger et al., 
2011b), subjects needed to cooperate with a partner to complete the task regardless of the payoff’s 
distribution (Melis et al., 2009) or time constraints (Duguid et al., 2014). However, in some situations, 
initiating the action and investing energy in a cooperative act is not necessarily the best strategy from 
an individual’s perspective. For instance, in the case of chimpanzee cooperative hunts, if a group 
member starts a hunt, others can benefit without actively participating and incurring the costs. 
However, if no one starts the hunt, they all lose the chance to get the prey. The dilemma faced by 
individuals in such situations is thus whether to initiate the action or not, given that if no-one initiates 
everyone loses out. In theory, each individual’s preference ranking should be that: (1) other begins, 
(2) I begin, (3) no one begins. Despite the observational work of previous studies (Boesch, 2002; Gilby 
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et al., 2015) there has been little experimental work studying how chimpanzees would behave in 
situations where a conflict of interest  is present (but see Schneider et al., 2012).   
These types of interactions have been modelled by theorists in the Snowdrift game (Doebeli & Hauer, 
2005; Kun et al., 2006; Sudgen, 1986). The Snowdrift is an anti-coordination game in which the best 
strategy is to do the contrary of your opponent. Therefore, in such dilemmas individuals have a 
common goal that can be either achieved by performing a cooperative act (either unilaterally or 
mutually) or free-riding. Of course, it is in the interest of each subject to defect and let the partner 
incur the cost but if neither pays the costs both lose. According to recent literature (Kun et al., 2006) 
chimpanzee hunting could be explained by applying the metaphor of the Snowdrift game. 
Chimpanzees would prefer others to start the hunt unless no one else starts. In the latter case, the 
chimpanzee would prefer to begin the hunt rather than let the monkey escape. So, unlike in other 
scenarios such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982) acting 
cooperatively can avoid the worst-case scenario as a cooperative act will always provide a benefit, 
even for the subject that carries out the costly action.  
Besides agent-based model studies, the Snowdrift game has been empirically applied to study human 
strategic behaviour (Duffy & Feltovich, 2002, 2006; Kümmerli et al., 2007; Rapoport & Chammah, 
1966). Overall, these studies have found that humans cooperate more when they are faced with a 
Snowdrift game in comparison to the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.  
The aim of this study was to use the Snowdrift game to investigate how chimpanzees solve a 
coordination task with a conflict of interest. For this purpose, pairs of chimpanzees were presented 
with a version of the Snowdrift game in which they obtained food rewards by pulling a weighted tray 
towards them. They could either perform a cooperative act unilaterally (only one chimpanzee pulls 
the rope) or collaborate (both chimpanzees pull and thus share the load). Alternatively, they could 
free-ride while the other did the work. Importantly, chimpanzees were free to decide the amount of 
weight they pulled. Therefore, collaboration, defined by both individuals pulling during the same trial, 
could be skewed towards one subject depending on the efforts invested by each member of the pair. 
This adjustment was aimed to reflect real life situations such as cooperative hunts where chimpanzees 
are able to vary their degree of investment by starting the chase, follow other individuals and join the 
chase or lag behind and reap the benefits from the hunt (Boesch, 2002; Gilby et al., 2015). For instance, 
in the case of hunting, chimpanzees could theoretically initiate the hunt but then let others do most 
of the work, although this has not been empirically demonstrated. Therefore subjects are not only 
faced with a binomial decision (either cooperate or free-ride) as in the majority of previous 
cooperative games (Chalmeau, 1994; Duguid et al., 2014; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a, 
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2009) but can adjust their actions by investing different amounts of effort, allowing them to make 
precise decisions based on the physical contingencies and the partners’ actions. Importantly, in this 
task there was no need for mutual cooperation as both subjects could get the same amount of food 
as long as one chimpanzee pulled. However, if neither pulled within a certain time-frame both lost the 
food. This set-up reflects the payoffs of the Snowdrift game where the best strategy for a chimpanzee 
was to wait for the partner to pull and obtain the benefit (b) but pay the cost of the action if the 
partner did not pull (b-c) to avoid losing the rewards if no one pulls (b = 0). At the same time, if both 
partners pull simultaneously, that results in an intermediate cooperative strategy where costs are 
divided (b-c/2). 
Importantly, although this set-up uses the same payoff matrix as behavioural economic experiments 
with adults, it differs from these studies in that chimpanzees in this task were not strangers and they 
were free to interact during the task. However, this set-up is more ecologically valid for chimpanzees 
because interactions with strangers are relatively rare and often aggressive; cooperation occurs 
between known group members (Boesch et al., 2008).  
The main interests of the study was whether chimpanzees a) would maximize their benefit (food – 
cost of pulling) by waiting for a partner to pull first, b)  would solve the task (get the food) by 
cooperating or free-riding, c) change their strategies with different partners. Weight and time were 
manipulated to approximate the contingencies of chimpanzee hunting: the weight modelled the apes’ 
costs to initiate the action while the time aimed to reflect the limited availability of the prey. 
Chimpanzees acting strategically were expected to wait longer to pull when the costs of pulling the 
tray were high –it was heavy– and for one individual to free-ride more often (understood as not pulling 
at all) while the other always pulled. In contrast, during low weight trials chimpanzees were expected 
to pay less attention to their partners’ actions and thus wait less to pull. Finally, chimpanzees were 
also expected to wait longer in long time trials as they would have more opportunity to free-ride 
compared to short time trials. The study consisted of two test phases: all chimpanzees completed the 
test with one partner first before partners were re-shuffled for a second round. This manipulation 
served to study the overall effect of experience and whether chimpanzees were able to  adjust their 
actions to the behaviour of their partners as they should not only consider the physical contingencies 
of the task (weight and time) but also their partners’ decisions to maximize their rewards and 
coordinate their actions.   
 
Coordination in conflict situations 
30 
 
2.2 Material and Methods 
 
Subjects 
We tested seven females and five male captive chimpanzees (Xage=23.4; see Table A1 in the 
Appendices for more information) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig 
Zoo, Germany. In the first phase of the study all 12 made up six unique pairings. In the second phase, 
10 of the 12 made up five new pairings. The experimental set-up required subjects to be in the same 
cage during testing. Consequently, only chimpanzees with a high degree of tolerance could be paired. 
Additionally, chimpanzees were paired according to similar weight (as a proxy for strength).  
 
Material 
The task required subjects to obtain out-of-reach food rewards (one 4 cm banana piece for each 
individual) by pulling on ropes to move a tray (54.5X24 cm) (positioned on a fixed table (62.5 X 50 cm)) 
towards them (Figure 4; movement 1). Each subject had access to one of two ropes and the tray could 
be pulled with either one or both ropes. The weight of the tray –and thus the effort required to pull it 
in– could be adjusted by the experimenter. This weight was created by the friction of a pair of brakes 
connected to a training-bike wheel (23 cm of diameter). The weight (in kg) pulled by each individual 
was measured by two sets of scales that connected each of the ropes to the central weight. During 
trials, digital cameras recorded the weight measurements displayed on each of the scales. Then, the 
measurements were averaged for each individual per trial. 
A 1 meter mesh barrier split the tray into two equal parts ensuring that each subject could only access 
one rope and one side of the tray (with its corresponding food).  There were approximately another 
1.5 meters between the end of the mesh barrier and the room’s back wall.  This means that subjects 
could still move around the room but they were unable to grab both their own and their partner’s 
rope and/or food simultaneously.  To reduce the likelihood that subjects would move around the 
barrier to steal from one another, trials were started when each chimpanzee was positioned in front 
of the apparatus on opposite sides of the mesh barrier.  
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The food rewards were placed in small bowls (10 X 10 cm) on either side of the apparatus and the 
bowls could be moved towards the edge of the tray by the experimenter pulling a nearly invisible 
piece of fishing line. Once the bowls reached the edge of the tray they fell, together with the food 
rewards, and became inaccessible (Figure 4; movement 2).  
Figure 4. Experimental set-up. Both chimpanzees can either pull or not from their ropes to move the tray and 
retrieve the rewards (movement 1); at the same time the bowls move towards the edge of the tray (movement 
2). 
Procedure 
Chimpanzees were tested in a within subjects design in the high and low weight conditions (between 
sessions) and long and short trials (within sessions). At the start of a trial, one experimenter released 
the security peg. Next, experimenters baited the trays. During short time trials, one experimenter 
started to pull the invisible line after baiting the rewards.  
Movement 2 
Movement 1 
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Training 
The training consisted of two parts. At first, each chimpanzee had to perform an individual training 
session to understand the physical contingencies of the apparatus. On the next testing day, pairs of 
chimpanzees that previously succeeded in the individual training performed a social training session 
to understand and experience all three possible outcomes during the following test phase. During 
both training sessions (individual and social) only low weight was used to keep subjects motivated 
during the training sessions. However, experience with high weight was provided prior to starting with 
high weight sessions. 
 
Individual training 
Each subject had to perform an individual training session composed of eight trials: four long time 
trials where the food remained on a tray for 40 seconds (30 seconds in a static position on the tray + 
10 seconds moving towards the edges of the tray) and four short time trials where the food remained 
for 10 seconds (constantly moving towards the edges of the tray from the beginning of the trial). These 
two time conditions were the same across all training and test sessions. Subjects had to pull eight 
times to receive the rewards (both sides of the apparatus were baited). Each subject pulled four times 
(two times per condition) from the right side of the apparatus and four from the left side. All conditions 
were randomised within the session (also during social training and the test sessions). 
 
Social training 
Each pair completed one training session together. The session was composed of 12 trials: in four trials 
both subjects had access to their own rope; in the remaining eight trials only one subject had access 
–four trials for each. During this training session, chimpanzees experienced more trials where they 
had to pull compared to trials where they did not pull. However, it was necessary for chimpanzees to 
experience the three potential outcomes that they could face during the test sessions (pull alone, pull 
together and not pull). Each training condition included two short trials where the food remained for 
10 seconds and two long trials where the food remained for 40 seconds.  In this training each subject 
experienced four trials pulling together with the partner, four pulling alone to obtain the reward and 
four not pulling but getting the reward. The pulling side could not be controlled as in the individual 
training because the chimpanzees were free to move between sides although the amount of trials per 
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condition that each chimpanzee pulled was controlled, by waiting until both chimpanzees were 
positioned in front of the apparatus.  
Test sessions 
Each pair performed eight test sessions: four heavy weight sessions (mean weight of tray = 70.64 kg) 
and four light weight sessions (mean weight of tray = 26.96 kg). Each session consisted of eight trials: 
four long trials, in which the food rewards were available for 40 seconds and four short trials in which 
the food was available for 10 seconds before falling off the tray. Chimpanzees could differentiate 
conditions once the trial started. In long trials the food was stationary until the last 10 seconds when 
it moved towards the end of the tray. In short trials the food started to move when the trial started. 
As the subjects were free to move between the sides of the apparatus, their positions at the beginning 
of each trial were not counterbalanced. Prior to each test session subjects were given two individual 
trials to experience the weight they were going to face in the subsequent session. These trials served 
to inform the subjects about the weight they would face in the following test session and to be sure 
they could move the weight alone. Although it was not possible to visually detect weight differences 
in the apparatus, subjects were expected to rely on the information provided in these two trials to 
make decisions in the test trials. These trials were the same as in the individual training.   
Coding 
We measured the outcome of chimpanzees’ actions (success/failure), the weight each partner pulled, 
and the timing of pulling. Based on the weight pulled by both subjects, we calculated a “measure of 
equality” (ME) to evaluate all possible instances of cooperation between individuals. To measure the 
ME we calculated the average of the weights (higher than 1.5 kg to avoid noise produced when 
subjects were just holding the rope) shown on the scales while the subjects were pulling from their 
ropes. Then, the difference between averages of the two subjects was divided by the sum of both 
averages. This resulted in a ME, ranging from -1 to 1.  We transformed all of the values to positive 
values for analysis (1 - (ఀ ௐ₁
 ିఀௐ₂
ఀ ௐ₁ ାఀௐ₂
)). Thus, an ME of 1 indicated perfect collaboration (subjects pulled 
an equal weight) while 0 indicated complete free-riding (only one individual pulled). Importantly, by 
using this measure, we identified the exact degree of cooperation (the investment by each subject).  
To assess whether subjects waited for a partner to pull we recorded the time between the start of the 
trial and the first subject of the pair to pull. The timing was measured from the time the bananas were 
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baited (when chimpanzees were not pulling while we baited the dishes and the peg was already 
released) or alternatively, when the peg was detached until the first subject started to pull (when 
chimpanzees were already pulling before the food was baited). This was possible as all sessions were 
recorded with digital cameras that allowed calculating times up to ଵଶହ of a second.  Subjects change of 
behaviour between partners (N=10) was tested based on the weight chimpanzees moved with 
different partners.  
In a post-hoc analysis we investigated whether the partners’ previous actions had an effect on the 
subject’s likelihood to pull on a subsequent trial. To do so, we constructed an index based on the 
number of trials in which the subject’s partner had pulled within a particular session prior to the 
subject’s action in a given trial. This index ranged from 0 (no pull in all previous trials) to 1 (pull in all 
previous trials). Importantly, the first trial of each session was not taken into account as there was no 
previous experience.  
The inter-observer agreement was excellent based on the 15% of the data (R2 = 0.99) and latencies (R2 
= 0.94). 
 
2.3 Results 
 
Overall, chimpanzee pairs coordinated their actions and obtained the food in 96.7% of trials.  
Chimpanzees showed evidence of minimising their costs. In high weight sessions, chimpanzees waited 
longer to pull across trials while they decreased their latency to pull across trials in low weight sessions 
(Model 1; LMM: F21 = 6.127, N = 586, p = 0.013, CI [-0.195, -0.022]; Figure 5a).  Rather than being 
strategic this finding could be a result of subjects getting tired in later trials. However, they did not 
show this latency difference between high and low weight trials during the experience trials prior to 
the test when there was no partner present (Model 2; LMM: F22 = 1.265, N = 166, p= 0.26). Moreover, 
when the total time that chimpanzees spent pulling was analysed, they decreased their time during 
the last trials of high weight sessions (Model 3; LMM: F21 = 10.76, N = 586, p = 0.001, CI [0.047, 0.188]; 
Figure 5b) further suggesting that waiting was strategic and not a consequence of fatigue.  
However, despite indications of strategic behaviour, we found that collaboration (i.e., pulling together 
or a ME > 0) was the dominant strategy to solve the task: 60% trials in low weight and 79% in high 
weight. Collaboration tended to increase across high weight sessions although the result was not 
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significant, (Model 4; GLMM: F21 = 3.518, N = 702, p = 0.06, CI [-1.911, -0.108]; Figure 5c), which 
suggests that chimpanzee pairs tended to cooperate more often when the effort was high. 
While collaboration was common, the effort invested by individuals was often unequal (XME= 0.58) 
with no significant effects of weight condition on session, trial or type of trials (Model 5; LMM: F28 = 
9.716, N = 490, p= 0.286). However, the percentage of weight pulled by the first puller increased across 
sessions in the high weight condition (Model 6; LMM: F21 = 7.252, N = 478, p = 0.007, CI [-0.103, -0.021]; 
Figure 5d) and the percentage of the total weight pulled by the first puller was always greater than 
50%. This indicates that being the first to act is more costly, and this cost differential increases with 
experience.  
Figure 5. a) Latency to pull the tray in high and low weight conditions across trials; b) Time spent pulling the tray 
in high and low weight condition across trials after starting the action; c) Proportion of trials that subjects pulled 
together in high and low weight conditions across sessions and d) Proportion of weight pulled by the first puller 
across sessions. The dotted-lines represent the fitted-model and the coloured areas represent the CI at 95%. 
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Interestingly, the length of the trial neither influenced the timing of their decisions nor their likelihood 
to cooperate, suggesting that it was mainly the effort and not the time pressure that influenced the 
subject’s actions. Phase (1 or 2) did not have a systematic effect in any of the models, suggesting that 
previous experience with another subject did not influence the subjects’ performance with another 
partner. However, subjects did change their behaviour between phases: they significantly varied in 
their effort (46% of difference in weight moved) between partners (Model 7; LMM: X=45.89, CI [27.84, 
63.56]; see the Appendices for more information about this model) suggesting that chimpanzees did 
not act in the same way when they were paired with different partners. Figure 6 shows that the pulling 
latencies of the subjects overlap suggesting that individual differences in pulling latency do not fully 
explain the differences observed in pulling effort between subjects. 
Figure 6. Pulling latencies (in seconds) for all subjects. 
 
The post-hoc analysis on the pulling probability as a function of the previous proportion of partner 
pulls within a session revealed no significant effect (Model 8; GLMM: F28 = 6.202, N = 1228, P =0.4) 
neither in high nor in low weight conditions, suggesting that chimpanzees did not take into account 
their partners’ previous decisions to pull when deciding whether to pull or not in a subsequent trial. 
See the Appendices for further details of model construction and model results. 
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2.4 General Discussion 
In a task where chimpanzees could potentially free-ride and benefit from their partner’s actions, pairs 
solved the coordination problem by pulling together (i.e., mutual cooperation or collaboration), with 
a tendency to pull more often together when those costs were high. However, there were also 
indications that chimpanzees acted strategically to minimise their effort: they were more likely to wait 
longer to pull at the end of high weight sessions and the effort invested by first and second puller was 
imbalanced. Therefore, although chimpanzees did not free-ride (by not pulling at all) more in high 
weight conditions as it was predicted, they did it so in more subtle ways, by investing unequal efforts. 
Chimpanzees also differed significantly in the effort they invested when tested with different partners. 
Previous studies established that chimpanzees cooperate when it is either the only option to get food 
(Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2009) or the option that produces the largest food payoff (Bullinger 
et al., 2011a; Duguid et al., 2014). Here it has been shown that chimpanzees cooperate even when 
there is the option to free-ride. One possible explanation for this outcome is that they do not know 
that they could free-ride and get the food without pulling because they were trained to pull 
individually.  This means that when they were paired with a partner, they continued to pull as they 
had done in the past. However, all subjects had experienced that food could be obtained without 
pulling during the social training. Recall that these subjects experienced receiving food after a partner 
pulled and they just waited. Moreover, they also experienced pulling and a partner benefiting from 
the food without them pulling at all. However, to train subjects equally on all outcomes, they 
experienced more trials where it was necessary to pull compared to trials where they obtained the 
food without pulling. Thus, it is possible that this effect could have influenced their likelihood to pull.  
Alternatively, it could be that some chimpanzees were just pulling to obtain the food regardless of the 
effort and the partners’ presence. But if this were true no differences in their latency to pull between 
conditions would be expected. On the contrary, subjects behaved strategically when pulling high 
weights. Moreover, it was not expected that cooperation tended to increase across sessions when 
subjects had already experienced in the social training that they could obtain food without pulling, but 
it increased over time in the high weight condition suggesting that subjects collaborated depending 
on the effort they were required to contribute and their prior experience.  
The chimpanzees showed further evidence of minimising their costs: they waited longer for their 
partner to pull during high weight sessions in which the difference in weight moved between first and 
second puller increased across sessions. Increased waiting and high levels of cooperation could be a 
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result of subjects trying to avoid being the first to pull because a) initiating the movement of the tray 
required more pulling effort and b) by pulling second there was less risk of their partner free-riding.  
As has been already discussed, fatigue seemed not to affect their responses. Therefore subjects were 
not simply cooperating to share the effort but acted to obtain the rewards and avoid the costs.  
A more plausible explanation for the high levels of mutual cooperation observed here could be related 
to the amount of experience with the task; subjects learned that by pulling simultaneously the task 
became easier and therefore, they continued to pull simultaneously until the end of the study. This 
would have been especially salient during the high weight condition in which mutual cooperation 
tended to increase across sessions. The perception of weight reduction driven by its division should 
have been the same in both conditions (the same proportion between the total weight and the divided 
weight). However, due to the fact that low weight trials were already easier to perform for all 
individuals, it is possible that the division of weight in high weight trials would have been more salient 
for the chimpanzees. Additionally, social facilitation could have contributed to maintain a high level of 
cooperation. Seeing another chimpanzee pulling led them to pull thus making free-riding less likely 
(Galloway, Addessi, Fragaszy & Visalberghi, 2005). Finally, it is also possible that the high rates of 
mutual cooperation that were found in the task were due to the high degree of tolerance between 
the members of the pair selected for the study (Hare et al., 2007). This suggestion needs to be 
corroborated by further studies testing pairs that differ significantly in their affiliative relationship. 
Contrary to the study expectations, time played no crucial role. It is possible that the trial duration 
was too long (10 or 40 seconds) to influence subjects’ decisions, which were made quickly (mean time 
to start pulling = 0.84 seconds), so there was never any real time pressure despite the salient 
movement of the dishes. Prior to the start of the session subjects could not visually assess the pulling 
effort required to obtain the rewards but they could experience it at the very first trial of the session 
and they experienced the same weight in the individual trials just before the test session. Although 
the pre-test trials were designed to provide this information to the subject and the weights used for 
each session did not change between the pre-test trials and the test session, it is possible that some 
subjects did not use this information. It is still an open question whether enabling subjects to explicitly 
see the different weights involved before engaging with the task might elicit more strategic behaviour. 
Although chimpanzees mainly cooperated, they differed in the effort they invested when they were 
tested with different partners. Based on the median latencies of each subject when pulling, all 
chimpanzee pairs except one initiated their pulling at similar latencies. This result suggests that 
variation in the amount of weight invested between partners can be better explained by subjects 
taking into account and adjusting to their partner’s behaviour rather than individual variation in 
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latencies to pull (e.g., having quick and slow subjects). These results are in line with previous evidence 
which show that chimpanzees can differentiate between their partners’ behaviour in cooperative 
tasks (Melis et al., 2006a; Engelmann & Herrmann, 2016).  
Partner’s previous decisions did not have an effect on a subject’s likelihood to pull, suggesting that 
chimpanzees were not taking into account their partner’s previous responses to decide whether to 
pull in a given trial. One possible explanation is that chimpanzees only took into account their partner’s 
current actions, not their past actions. However, their partner’s previous responses are not the only 
information subjects could have used to make their decisions. Their own previous actions as well as 
the quantity of effort that their partners had invested could have also contributed to their decisions. 
Alternatively, assuming that they were averse to the risk of losing the rewards, chimpanzees preferred 
to secure their rewards (by pulling), with the option to adjust how much they pulled. Moreover, 
chimpanzees also showed signs of strategic decision-making as they waited longer to pull across trials 
of high weight sessions.  Therefore, only in cases where the partners would have been highly reliable, 
chimpanzees were expected not to pull and thus completely free-ride. This result helps to explain why 
they acted strategically by waiting and pulling less weight as second pullers, while still cooperating 
frequently.  
When the strategies used by chimpanzees in this study were compared to those human adults employ 
when they are presented with a Snowdrift game, chimpanzees, despite responding flexibly when 
paired with different partners, do not take into account partner’s last actions whereas humans use 
flexible strategies such as Tit-for-Tat or Pavlov (Kümmerli et al., 2007). These differences could be due 
to chimpanzees’ aversion to the loss of food rewards (as ultimately one member of the pair pulled and 
secured the rewards despite the partner’s action) or due to methodological reasons. In fact, human 
studies are difficult to directly compare with this task because human subjects are usually paired with 
partners who they do not know or see, they experience real losses, and they cannot decide how much 
they can invest in the cooperative act as it is generally a binary decision.  In contrast, chimpanzees 
from this study lived in the same group, experienced the loss of potential gains, and were able to 
decide how much effort they invested in pulling. To help explaining these possible differences 
between chimpanzees and humans, in the following chapter, I compare how apes and 
developmentally matched human controls (i.e., 5-year old children) behave when presented with the 
same version of the Snowdrift game. 
Overall, we found that chimpanzees pulled together in most trials (70%) although it was not strictly 
necessary to get the food. These results are interesting because they are similar to other studies where 
chimpanzees must cooperate to retrieve their food rewards (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a, 
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2009). In a cooperative task where subjects faced conflict situation (Melis et al., 2009) cooperation 
decreased when pairs of chimpanzees pulled for unequal rewards between them, but still were able 
to cooperate in approximately half of the trials. In the current task, chimpanzees pulled together in a 
greater proportion of the trials but minimised the costs in the high weight condition (the pulling effort 
was not the same for each subject). In contrast to Melis et al. (2009), in this task mutual cooperation 
was not required to obtain the rewards but they still pulled together.  
Moreover, Bullinger et al. (2011b) found that chimpanzees preferred to work alone rather than with 
a partner to obtain the same rewards in a cooperative task. In contrast, in this task chimpanzees, 
despite having the option to work alone (by only one subject pulling), often still preferred to pull with 
their partner rather than free-ride to obtain the same rewards. Perhaps the difference between both 
studies is that in this task both chimpanzees interact with the same apparatus and therefore social 
facilitation in combination with the uncertainty of losing rewards if no one pulls, could have helped to 
maintain the high levels of cooperation we found. In Bullinger and colleagues (2011b) the subject had 
a clear alternative to work alone and completely avoid the risk of defection by the partner (i.e., the 
partner refusing to pull). In the current task there is no risk associated with cooperation because 
chimpanzees can solve the task alone. However, free-riding comes with a slight risk that no one pulls. 
Thus chimpanzees can remove the risk completely by always pulling (and as a consequence increasing 
their costs) or they can remove the costs by free-riding and risk losing the rewards if no-one pulls. 
Therefore, if a partner is required to access the rewards in a cooperative task and no other solution is 
available, chimpanzees cooperate (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2009).  When the partner is not 
needed and an individual option providing the same rewards is available, chimpanzees prefer to work 
alone (Bullinger et al., 2011b), avoiding the risk of defection by the partner in the cooperative task. 
However, in the current task where cooperation is not necessary to obtain a reward, chimpanzees still 
cooperate in many trials. These contradictory results can be reconciled if they are considered in terms 
of risk avoidance and cost reduction. In Bullinger et al. (2011b) chimpanzees prefer to work alone to 
avoid the risk of defection by the partner. In the current study subjects avoid the risk by pulling more 
often (and thus cooperating) but reduce costs by waiting for the partner and pulling less.  
The aim of the current experiment was to present chimpanzees with a simplified version (the 2-person
Snowdrift game) of the type of decision they would need to make to coordinate in the wild when
conflicts of interest between group members are involved; collective action problems (CAPs) (Kitchen
& Beehner, 2007; Nunn, 2000; see Schneider et al., 2012) such as border patrols (Watts & Mitani,
2001) or group hunting (Boesch, 1994b, 2002 although see Gilby et al., 2015 and Tomasello, 2009 for
other interpretations). In these situations, some individuals can potentially reap the benefits of group
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living without the need to cooperate as long as one or a few others pay the costs (e.g., being the first 
to start the chase or defend the boundaries of the group range).  Moreover, in these situations of CAP 
each subject can potentially adjust their degree of investment and minimise costs while maintaining 
successful coordination as it has been observed in the present study.  
In summary, in a task where free-riding was possible, subjects chose to mutually cooperate in most 
trials, though there were indications of strategic behaviour.  Chimpanzees are capable of cooperating 
in some situations involving a conflict of interest by managing the trade-off between maintaining 
successful coordination within the time limits and minimising costs.  
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CHIMPANZEES, BONOBOS AND CHILDREN 
SUCCESFULLY COORDINATE IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
Many animal species regularly face situations in which individuals need to coordinate to overcome 
conflicts of interest. Most research has focused on how groups decide on the direction of travel when 
individuals have differing preferences (Couzin, Krause, Franks & Levin, 2005; King & Sueur, 2011; 
Strandburg-Peshkin et al., 2015) but, as with humans, there are many other contexts involving a 
conflict of interest. For instance, lions (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995) during inter-group encounters or 
chimpanzees (Boesch, 2002) that lag behind in cooperative hunting events waiting for others to start 
the chase may avoid fighting, injuries and energy expenditure (Gilby & Connor, 2010).  But if everyone 
waits, no hunt will ensue. Recent evidence suggests that some chimpanzees solve the coordination 
problem by starting the hunt and thus paying the initiation costs (acting as “impact-hunters”) (Gilby 
et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear whether the benefits that “impact-hunters” obtain from the 
hunt outweigh the initiation costs. In other words, it is unclear whether these subjects strategically 
take into account the potential costs and benefits of the hunt when they initiate it. 
Situations of the type described above can be understood as CAPs (Kitchen & Beehner, 2007; Nunn, 
2000), or at the dyadic level, as Snowdrift games (Doebeli & Hauer, 2005; Kun et al., 2006; Rapoport 
& Chammah, 1966; Sudgen, 1986). The Snowdrift occurs when an individual (A) would prefer another 
individual (B) to carry out a costly action that benefits both A and B. However, if B does not act, it is 
better for A to act alone rather than not act at all.  Therefore the preference for A would be 1st) to 
wait for B to act, 2nd) divide the cost by acting together and 3rd) pay all the cost of the action. One 
crucial difference between the Snowdrift and other classical games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Axelrod, 2006) is that the worst case scenario in the Snowdrift game occurs when both partners 
defect while in the Prisoner’s Dilemma occurs when the individual cooperates but the partner defects.  
Consistent with the idea that cooperation is less risky in a Snowdrift than in Prisoner’s Dilemma, both 
agent-based simulations (Kümmerli et al., 2007) and human behavioural experiments (Duffy & 
Feltovich, 2002, 2006) have found higher and more stable levels of cooperation in Snowdrift than 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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In general, models in which mutual defection is the worst-case scenario offer a better explanatory 
model of the emergence of cooperation and helping in natural conditions (Bshary et al., 2016). 
Although models like the Stag Hunt (Skyrms, 2004) show crucial differences between the way 
chimpanzees and humans manage the challenge of coordinating actions and maintaining high levels 
of cooperation (Duguid et al., 2014; Tomasello et al., 2012), Snowdrift models seem a better fit for 
situations in which chimpanzees need to coordinate actions towards common goals (Chalmeau, 1994; 
Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a; Suchak et al., 2016), especially as soon as there is conflict of 
interest. Recently, Grueneisen and Tomasello (2016) have investigated how five-year old children 
coordinate their actions in a Snowdrift game. The study presented pairs of five-year old children with 
a different version of a Snowdrift: two toy trains with rewards in the cargo. Each child controlled one 
train which had to arrive at its own station positioned behind the partners train to retrieve the 
rewards. However, if both trains continued along the track they were on, they would crash into each 
other before arriving to their stations and all rewards would be lost. Thus, one child needed to swerve 
onto a side track at the cost of some cargo. Therefore, it was in each child’s interest to wait for the 
partner to swerve. Children rarely crashed the trains by taking turns swerving.  
Grueneisen and Tomasello (2016) study is in line with the previous study presented in this dissertation 
(Study 1 in Chapter 1). Yet, although these two studies demonstrated that both species can solve 
Snowdrift dilemmas, they are not directly comparable because chimpanzee pairs had the option to 
collaborate and share costs within trials (Study 1), whereas children did not (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 
2016). Consequently, the current study presented children and two ape species, chimpanzees and 
bonobos, with the same Snowdrift game paying special attention to any indication of strategic 
decision-making (i.e., waiting to pull). Although bonobos have not been studied in Snowdrift 
dilemmas, previous studies on cooperation indicate that they performed better than chimpanzees 
under some conditions that required higher tolerance towards conspecifics (Hare et al., 2007).  Study 
2 investigated subjects’ decisions in a Snowdrift and a competitive condition. The best strategy in the 
Snowdrift condition was to wait for a partner to pull and thus obtain the higher of two rewards. 
However, as in the classical Snowdrift situation, it was better to pull if no-one pulled. The Snowdrift 
was compared to the competitive condition, which required subjects to pull faster than the partner to 
obtain the higher reward. If subjects behaved strategically, a higher latency to pull was expected in 
Snowdrift than in competitive and a higher frequency of both individuals pulling in competitive than 
Snowdrift.  Finally, based on a recent study (Duguid et al., 2014), communication was expected to play 
a role in children’s coordination but not in chimpanzees or bonobos.  Afterwards, a follow-up study 
was conducted with apes (Study 3) because some individuals consistently refused to pull in both 
conditions. Thus, to investigate whether this behaviour was strategic or some individuals were just 
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content with the food received, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos the same apparatus (and 
conditions) as in Study 2 with the addition of an alternative option for each individual. We 
hypothesized that this would allow subjects to better manage the risk by choosing the alternative 
option depending on the options available in the apparatus and their partner’s preferences. 
3.2 Material and Methods: Study 2a 
Subjects 
We tested ten captive chimpanzees (5 females; Mage= 20.5 years) and 6 captive bonobos (5 females; 
Mage=13.7 years) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo (see Table A6 
in the Appendices for more information about the subjects). During the first phase of the study, the 
chimpanzees made up 5 unique pairs and the bonobos made up 3 unique pairs. In the second phase 
pairs were reshuffled to create 5 new chimpanzee pairs and 3 new bonobo pairs.  
Materials 
Pairs of apes were presented with a rotating tray (91x10 cm) (Figure 7) attached to a platform 
(88.5x96.5 cm) placed between two rooms. Each end of the rotating tray was baited by different 
amounts of fruit (banana slices for chimpanzees and half grapes for bonobos). Subjects faced each 
other across the platform, each with access to one side of the apparatus. Two identical ropes (76 cm) 
were attached to the interior end of the tray with Velcro and fed into each subjects’ room. Subjects 
could access the apparatus via a small window on either side of the platform; the experimenter 
opened these windows at the start of a trial but the windows remained closed between trials. Apes 
could only access the interior or the exterior end of the tray by pulling the rope towards them or by 
waiting for the partner to pull from the other side, respectively. Thus, when a subject pulled its rope, 
the roped end of the tray rotated towards her while the free end rotated towards her partner.  
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Figure 7. Experimental set-up of Study 2a. 
 
Procedure 
We used a within-subjects design with two conditions (Snowdrift & competitive). In the Snowdrift 
condition, we placed one piece of fruit on the roped end of the tray and four pieces on the free end, 
thus creating a Snowdrift dilemma because the subject’s best choice was to wait for the partner to 
pull and bring the free end within her reach. In the competitive condition, we placed the four pieces 
of fruit on the roped end while the free end was baited with one piece. In this condition subjects 
should pull faster than their partner to obtain the higher reward.  
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At the start of a trial, two experimenters allowed subjects access to their respective ropes by opening 
the windows. The subjects then had 30 seconds to pull the rope and get the rewards placed on the 
rotating tray or wait for the partner to pull. If no ape pulled after the 30 seconds, the experimenter 
removed all rewards and ended the trial. In case both individuals pulled simultaneously, one or both 
ropes disconnected from the tray resulting in a random movement and a possible loss of all rewards. 
Individual training 
This training phase served to show the subjects the main contingencies of the apparatus and how to 
access the rewards. Subjects were required to pull the tray to retrieve food (only one of the two ropes 
was attached to the tray at a time). After pulling the rope subjects could access both rooms and 
retrieve the food from both sides of the apparatus. Within each session subjects completed two trials 
in each condition from each side of the apparatus for a total of four Snowdrift trials and four 
competitive trials, in a predetermined random order. Each subject performed two sessions on 
separate days.  
Social training 
This training served to demonstrate that, depending on the condition, subjects could get either high 
or low rewards by either pulling themselves or by waiting for a partner to pull.  Subjects were trained 
in the pairs that they would be in during the first phase of the test sessions. They experienced all four 
possible outcomes: obtain the high or the low reward by pulling (Snowdrift and competitive conditions 
respectively); or obtain the high or the low reward by waiting (competitive and Snowdrift conditions 
respectively). Subjects were in adjacent rooms and the door between them was closed. A trial started 
after an experimenter checked that subjects were looking when the food was placed on the tray. If 
subjects were not looking they were called by the experimenter. After placing the rewards, the 
experimenters opened the windows. Each pair had two sessions (on separate days) of eight trials each. 
Subjects experienced all possible combinations from both sides of the apparatus (swapping their 
position between sessions). As in the individual training, only one rope was attached to the tray during 
a trial.   
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Test sessions 
After completing the training phases, each pair received eight 8-trial test sessions (four trials per 
condition in a randomised order). Subjects only received one session per day and switched sides 
between sessions. Test sessions were identical to the dyadic training sessions except that both 
subjects had access to their own rope.  After completing eight sessions with their first partner (phase 
1) each subject was paired with another one for another eight sessions (phase 2). 
 
Coding 
Our measure of coordination success was the percentage of trials in which pairs succeeded, defined 
as trials in which at least one member obtained a reward. We scored three further dependent 
variables: subjects’ latencies to pull, their pulling rate (derived in three different measures) and 
communication. We defined the latency to pull as the elapsed time between the opening of the doors 
and the first pulling action.  We defined a pulling action as either the first instance of tray movement 
towards a subject or the first instance of tension between the ropes of both subjects, which occurred 
when both subjects pulled simultaneously.  Communication was defined as any vocal or gestural 
communicative acts directed towards the partner or the partner’s actions during test trials. Vocal 
communication was defined as any vocalization directed towards the partner or the partners’ actions. 
We included screams and whimpers. Screams were defined as loud, high-pitched sounds that apes 
directed towards the partner or the partners’ actions. Whimpers were defined as low, feeble sounds 
expressing fear (moans) directed towards the partner or the partners’ actions. We also coded claps 
(attentional getter) as gestural communication. Claps were defined as sounds resulting of the 
repeated strike of individuals’ hand palms. 
We calculated three measures derived from the subject’s pulling rate.  First, we considered whether 
apes behaved strategically by comparing the number of strategic choices (i.e., the proportion of pulls 
in the competitive condition plus the proportion of non-pull decisions in the Snowdrift condition) to 
the levels expected by chance. With this information, we also classified subjects as pullers (pulling ≥ 
75% of trials in both conditions), non-pullers (pulls ≤ 25% of trials in both conditions) and strategisers 
(competitive pulling > Snowdrift pulling resulting in a food intake significantly above chance in both 
conditions).  Second, we scored conflict trials defined as both subjects pulling simultaneously and 
investigated whether their likelihood of occurrence increased by the occurrence of a conflict in the 
previous trial. Finally, we investigated subjects’ flexibility defined as the change in pulling behaviour 
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shown between subjects. To do that, we required a comparison of the subject’s frequencies of pulls 
per condition with each partner. 
The inter-observer reliability was excellent based on the 20% of the data (time of pulling: r = 0.99 for 
both species; 1.1 % of data mismatch between observers in bonobos and 2.5 % in chimpanzees). 
3.3 Results 
Overall, pairs of apes obtained the rewards in 98% of trials. Subjects waited longer to pull during 
Snowdrift than in competitive trials (Model 9; LMM: F21 = 9.181, N = 1019, p = 0.002, CI [0.057, 0.483]; 
Figure 8). From their pulling rates, four subjects were classified as pullers, three as non-pullers and two 
as strategisers. The remaining seven subjects were unclassified. The two strategisers (one male 
chimpanzee and one female bonobo) pulled in competitive trials and not in Snowdrift trials (binomial 
test, p < 0.005), a behaviour that resulted in a maximization of their payoffs (Table A12 in the 
Appendices). However, when the strategies at the dyadic level were considered a different picture 
emerged. In nine of 16 pairs one subject pulled in most of trials (>75%) while the other almost never 
pulled (<25%). Thus, a high proportion of pairs displayed a strategy based on only one subject pulling 
in both conditions. Pulling rates also indicated that apes were more likely to pull simultaneously in 
competitive than Snowdrift trials (Model 10; GLMM: F21 = 6.607, N = 895, p = 0.01). Previous conflict 
trials had no effect on their subsequent response (Model 10; GLMM: F21 = 1.636, N = 895, p = 0.2). 
Subjects’ behaviour changed between partners: 31% of subjects modified their behaviour (i.e., 
subjects varied in more than 50% their pulling rates between partners; Figure 1A in the Appendices). 
Finally, it was found that apes almost never communicated with their partner to solve the task 
(individuals protested, uttering screams and whimpers, on 0.01 % trials). See the Appendices for 
further details of model construction and model results. 
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Figure 8. Latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in Snowdrift (SD) and competitive (COM) trials. The dotted lines 
represent the fitted model. Latencies in seconds are presented in a logarithmic scale.  
 
Discussion 
Chimpanzees and bonobos came up with an efficient, simple solution to coordinate in this task, the 
“only-one-partner-pulls” strategy. Although this strategy prevented subjects from maximizing their 
own payoffs, the randomised presentation of the rewards led to an almost equal division of rewards 
between partners. Moreover, two subjects behaved strategically although it was unclear why so few 
did so (2 out of 16 individuals) and what strategic level their decisions entailed. Next, 5-year old 
children were presented with the same basic task to compare their strategies to those of apes (Study 
2a) and subsequently probed apes strategic behaviour further by varying potential payoffs for the 
subject and the partner in Study 3. 
 
3.4 Material and Methods: Study 2b 
 
Subjects  
We tested twenty pairs of 5- to 5.5-year old children (10 pairs of girls and 10 pairs of boys) in 
kindergartens in the Leipzig area.  
 
Chimpanzees, bonobos and children successfully coordinate in conflict situations 
51 
Materials 
In general, pairs of children were presented with the same task as chimpanzees and bonobos (Figure 
9). The apparatus was a wooden box with a lid that prevented children from directly accessing the 
rewards (60X60X25 cm). The box was placed on the ground between both children. Access to the 
ropes was blocked by two sliding doors. Only Experimenter 1 could open them to allow access at the 
start of the trial. In contrast to Study 2a, the rewards were not collected from the rotating tray (54X10 
cm) but fell through a hole to the ground, in front of each child. In the children’s version of the
apparatus we added a small peg under the rotating tray to prevent it spinning 360°. In contrast to 
apes, children collected tokens (wooden blocks during training and more valuable plastic marbles 
(“jewels” of four different colours) during test sessions); this allowed children to monitor their own 
and their partners’ rewards across the study. 
Figure 9. Experimental set-up of Study 2b. 
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Procedure 
At the beginning of a trial, children had time to check the reward distribution on the tray. Afterwards, 
the experimenter removed the two sliding doors simultaneously. After 30 seconds, the experimenter 
removed all the rewards and ended the trial. 
 
Training 
Children were only trained and tested with one partner. In Study 2b we did not conduct individual 
training in order to reduce the testing time per dyad. However, during the first half of the social 
training session Experimenter 2 emphasized the rewards distribution with the aim of highlighting all 
possible outcomes that children could encounter during the test. 
 
Social training 
The social training was essentially the same as in Study 1a except that children only performed one 
session of eight trials. Therefore, children swapped sides halfway through the session (between trials 
four and five). During the training children collected rewards (wooden blocks) they could insert into a 
box to produce music. 
Prior to the social session, Experimenter 2 explained to the children that they would play a game that 
consisted of collecting “jewels” (the marbles) from a magic box. However, in order to collect the 
“jewels”, they were first required to remove the “stones” (the wooden blocks). 
After the short explanation, Experimenter 2 entered the test room with the children and showed them 
the wooden box and introduced them to Experimenter 1. Each child took their position in front of the 
openings on the sides of the box. Experimenter 2 sat between the children, on the other side of the 
apparatus from Experimenter 1. Experimenter 2 told the children to insert the wooden blocks in the 
music box. At the end of each trial, Experimenter 2 pointed the opening of the music box towards each 
child to facilitate them to insert the blocks. During the training and the test sessions, Experimenter 1 
relocated the ropes and baited the rewards between every trial. Experimenter 1 only instructed the 
children to swap sides between trials four and five of the training and the test sessions.  
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Test sessions 
After the training, each pair performed three test sessions on two consecutive days –apes received 16 
sessions.  The first session was conducted after the training and the second and third sessions were 
conducted on a second day. Each session consisted of eight trials and children swapped sides after 
completing trial four. Children received two competitive and two Snowdrift trials in a randomised 
order from each side of the apparatus. At the beginning of each trial, Experimenter 1 showed the 
reward locations to the children before allowing them to access to the ropes. In the test sessions, 
children collected their rewards and kept them in their own plastic tubes previously provided by the 
experimenters. 
Prior to the first test session, Experimenter 2 presented the children with Plexiglas tubes. He told them 
that now they were going to collect “jewels” and instructed them to collect as many as possible and 
to put them inside their own tube. After the instructions, Experimenter 2 presented the apparatus 
again (which was already baited with the first set of marbles) and left the test room. At the end of the 
first session they were told to write their names on the tubes and to leave the tubes in the room for 
the next day. In the second test day and prior to the second session, Experimenter 2 briefly instructed 
the children again to collect “jewels” and give them their Plexiglas tubes. Between sessions 2 and 3, 
the children left the test room and waited for approximately 7 minutes with Experimenter 2 while 
Experimenter 1 reset the apparatus before children entered the test room again. At the end of the 
third session, every child chose four marbles to take home. 
Coding 
We analysed the same dependent measures as in Study 2a, excluding flexibility because children only 
played with one partner. Additionally, we adjusted our coding to include verbal communication.  We 
only analysed verbal communication related to the task by focussing on the five following types.  
Imperative: deontic verbs used to direct their partners’ actions (e.g., “You should pull”), protests: 
statements of disapproval and objection about a partner’s actions or intentions (e.g., “No, I also 
wanted”), informative: acts aimed at informing partners about a child’s current or impending actions 
or intentions (e.g., “I am going to pull now”), turn-taking: stating previous or future actions aimed at 
influence others’ decisions. This type of communication could be coupled with either imperative, 
protests or informative (e.g., “I pull because you pulled before”; “Next time you pull”) and deception: 
acts aimed at explicitly cheating their partners.  
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For every trial, we coded whether pairs communicated (by either one or both children). In every trial, 
a measure of 1 or 0 was given depending whether communication occurred or not. In addition, we 
coded whether each of the five categories of communication (imperative, protests, informative, turn-
taking and deception) was present within a pair (uttered by either one or both children).  
The inter-observer agreement for the timing of decisions based on the 20% of the data was excellent 
(pulling actions from child on the left side: r = 0.93, 1.5 % of data mismatches between observers; 
pulling actions from child on the right side: r = 0.99, 4% of data mismatches between observers). The 
inter-observer reliability for communication based on the 20% of the data was also excellent (Cohen’s 
Kappa = 0.94). 
 
3.5 Results 
 
Overall, pairs of children obtained the rewards in almost all trials (99%). Children increased their 
latency to pull across sessions in Snowdrift trials and decreased it in competitive trials (Model 11; 
LMM: F21 = 4.913, N = 478, p = 0.027, CI [-0.023, 0.223]; Figure 10) indicating that like apes, they 
distinguished the conditions. Based on their pulling rates, most children were classified as pullers (24 
of 40) and one child was classified as a non-puller. Three children made strategic decisions significantly 
above chance (binomial test, p < 0.005) by pulling in competitive trials and not pulling in Snowdrift 
trials. At the dyadic level, only one pair followed the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy described for 
apes. Instead, most child pairs followed a “both-partners-pull” strategy regardless of the condition. In 
contrast to apes, children both pulled equally often in competitive (53 % of times together) compared 
to Snowdrift trials (43 % of times together) (Model 12; GLMM: F24   = 5.305, N = 420, p = 0.257). Finally, 
it was found that children communicated more often in Snowdrift than in competitive trials (Model 
13; GLMM: F21   = 4.719, N = 480, p = 0.03, CI [-0.219, 2.464]). Communication occurred in 32% of the 
trials (in 96 Snowdrift and 56 competitive trials out of 240 trials per condition; Figure 11). Although  
the distribution of children communicative types could not be statistically analysed, imperative 
utterances (e.g., “you should pull”) were mostly used in situations in which they needed a partner to 
act against the partners’ self-interest (58% of 96 communicative acts in Snowdrift trials). In contrast, 
no communicative type predominated in competitive situations. See the Appendices for further 
details of model construction and model results. 
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Figure 10. Latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in SD and COM trials across the three test sessions. The dotted 
line represents the fitted model and the shadowed areas represent the CI at 95%. Latencies in seconds are 
presented in a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 11. Percentage of trials in which every type of vocal communication occurred at least once within a trial. 
In a comparison between children’ and apes’ strategies, the most strategic individuals were children. 
This is evident from Figure 12, which shows the proportion of strategic choices in competitive and 
Snowdrift trials. The upper right quadrant (above 50% strategic choices in both conditions) is clearly 
dominated by children. However, it is important to note that due to the reduced statistical power of 
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the children’s data (children performed three sessions while apes did sixteen) not all individuals in this 
quadrant performed significantly above chance, even though they made strategic choices more often 
than the apes categorized as strategisers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Proportion of strategic choices in both SD and COM trials for all subjects of the three species. The most 
strategic individuals in both conditions are in the top-right corner of the plot. The size of the dots represents 
frequencies of subjects for different scores. 
 
Discussion 
Children were as successful as apes and made a similar proportion of strategic choices compared to 
apes (53% of strategic choices in children, 51% in chimpanzees and 54% in bonobos). However, they 
did so with much less experience with the task (24 compared to 128 trials).  Unlike apes, we found 
that most children followed a “both-partners-pull” strategy regardless of the condition, which may 
not be that different in terms of complexity to the apes’ “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy.  However, 
children showed more signs of strategic decision-making than apes: they used communication to 
influence their partner decisions and learned to distinguish both conditions after only three sessions 
(Figure 10).  
Chimpanzees, bonobos and children successfully coordinate in conflict situations 
57 
3.6 Material and Methods: Study 3 
Subjects 
We tested eight captive chimpanzees (3 females; Mage= 13.5 years) and 4 captive bonobos (3 females; 
Mage= 13.5 years) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo (see Table 
A12 in the Appendices for more information about the subjects). Seven chimpanzees and all bonobos 
had taken part in Study 2a. Each individual was tested with three partners. During the first phase of 
the study, the chimpanzees made up four unique pairs and the bonobos made up two unique pairs. 
In the second and third phase, pairs were shuffled to create another four new chimpanzee pairs and 
two new bonobo pairs per phase.  
Materials 
We presented pairs of individuals with the same apparatus used in Study 2a with two main additions. 
In this new set-up subjects needed to move a sliding door either to the left or the right side to access 
the apparatus. If they moved the sliding door to the right side they could access the ropes as in the 
original apparatus. However, if they slid the door towards the left they could directly access an 
alternative option (Figure 13). The alternative option consisted of a fixed platform (10X10 cm) 
attached to the Plexiglas frame located approximately 5 cm above the apparatus to not interfere with 
the rotation of the tray. A pin was inserted in the door to prevent subjects from sliding it open before 
the start of the trial. The experimenter could remove the pin before the trial started.  When the door 
was opened to one side, another locking mechanism prevented it from being moved back to its original 
position. As a result, subjects could only make one choice per trial. 
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Figure 13. Experimental set-up of Study 3. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested in a within-subjects design in the same two conditions as Study 2a (Snowdrift 
and competitive). In this set-up the rotating tray was baited with one and five food pieces. The 
alternative platforms could be baited with either zero, one, three or five food pieces depending on 
the condition presented (non-social condition levels). Both alternative platforms were baited with the 
same food quantity on a given trial.  Chimpanzees and bonobos received the same kind of food as in 
Study 2a. 
At the beginning of a trial, two experimenters simultaneously removed the pin that had prevented 
choosing between options and apes had 10 seconds to make their choices. When a subject opened 
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the window to the alternative platform, they could immediately access the reward. When a subject 
opened the door to the tray they could either wait for the partner to pull the rope or pull themselves 
(as in Study 2a). An apes’ choice for the rotating tray was defined as the “social option” and the 
alternative platform as the “non-social option”. 
Individual training  
This training phase served to show the subjects how to access the rewards. 
Subjects were required to access the baited option and retrieve the reward. Within a session a subject 
faced eight trials presented in a randomised order: four trials in which only the rope end was baited 
and four trials in which only the alternative platform was baited with one piece of food (Figure 14, 
phase 1). The presentation side was counterbalanced between sessions. 
Subjects had to choose correctly in at least 80% of the trials during two consecutive sessions to 
continue with the next phase. The same criterion was used for the rest of training phases. 
Individual training 2 
This training served to demonstrate that subjects could either get a high or a low reward that could 
be placed on either the tray or the alternative platform.  
Subjects were required to choose the option with more food and then retrieve the reward.  Within a 
session a subject faced eight trials in a randomised order: four trials in which the rope end of the tray 
was baited with five pieces of food and the alternative platform with one, and four trials in which the 
alternative platform contained five pieces while the ropes’ end was baited with one (Figure 14, phase 
2). Subjects experienced all possible combinations from both sides of the apparatus, swapping their 
positions between sessions. 
Individual training 3 
The purpose of this training phase was to ensure that the apes took into account all the quantities 
involved in a given trial. In this training phase the door that separated both sides of the apparatus was 
open to allow subjects access to both sides of the apparatus.  
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Within a session subjects were presented with two conditions, the social and the alternative condition 
(Figure 14, phase 3). Each subject was presented four trials of each condition in a randomised order. 
In the alternative condition both ends of the tray were baited with one reward each and the 
alternative platform with four. In the social condition each end of the tray as well as the platform were 
baited with two rewards. Thus, in the alternative condition a subject had to choose the alternative 
platform while in the social condition a subject had to forego the food present on the alternative 
platform (which was closer) and access the ropes, obtain the two rewards from the ropes’ end and 
move to the other side of the room to retrieve the other two rewards from the free end. Subjects 
experienced all possible combinations from both sides of the apparatus. They swapped their positions 
between sessions despite the doors were open.  
The baiting order differed between conditions. In the alternative condition the rewards were baited 
first on the alternative platform and then on the tray, always starting from the rope’s end. The tray 
was always baited after the alternative platform to draw subjects’ attention to it and to be sure that 
they paid attention to all the rewards. 
In the social condition the platform was baited first on half of the trials and first the tray on the other 
half. This was done to control for possible attentional biases towards the last baited place. 
 
Social training 
This training was the same as the dyadic training of Study 2a (phase 2).  
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Figure 14. Training phases. 
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Test sessions 
After completing the training phases every pair performed eight test sessions. Each session contained 
four trials of each social condition presented in a randomised order. In the alternative platform, the 
levels of the non-social condition were randomly presented between sessions (staying constant within 
sessions), each level presented in two sessions. In the test sessions, both subjects had access to their 
own rope. Subjects switched sides between sessions. After the eight sessions with their first partner 
(phase 1) each subject was paired with two further partners for another two blocks of eight sessions 
(phase 2 and 3). 
 
Coding 
We measured the percentage of successful trials (defined as in Study 2). Additionally, to study how 
chimpanzees and bonobos solved this new version of the game, we considered two main dependent 
variables: choices and latencies (further divided in two latency measures). Choices were defined as 
the proportion of trials in which each subject chose the social or the non-social option. The first latency 
measure consisted of the elapsed time between the pins’ removal and the sliding of the door halfway 
to one side (at which point they could not change direction). The second latency measure was the 
elapsed time between accessing the social option and pulling the rope (defined as in Study 2a). These 
latencies allowed us to assess whether the 2nd actors made strategic decisions contingent on the 
previous action of the 1st actors during the same trial. 
To determine 1st and 2nd actors, we only considered those trials in which both individuals acted at 
different times (those trials in which both individuals opened the door). The average time between 1st 
and 2nd actors was less than 2 seconds. Then, for each combination of social and non-social conditions 
(8 combinations, see Table 1) the strategic choices of the 2nd actors based on the combination of social 
and non-social options was categorized. Moreover, we took into account those instances where the 
2nd actors could maximize their rewards by taking into account the previous action of 1st pullers (see 
the two combinations of non-social option 3 in Table 1). In other words, in these two combinations 
2nd actors strategic choices differed depending on the actions of the 1st actors. Finally, the proportion 
of strategic choices for each of the 8 combinations was calculated and compared them to chance 
levels.  
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Table 1: Rational choices dependent on the combination of social and non-social options. 
Social option Non-social option Strategic choice 
Snowdrift 0 Social option 
Competitive 0 Social option 
Snowdrift 1 Social option 
competitive 1 Social option 
Snowdrift 3 Same action of 1st actor 
competitive 3 Opposite action to 1st actor 
Snowdrift 5 Non-social option 
competitive 5 Non-social option 
The inter-observer agreement for the timing of decisions by chimpanzees, based on the 20% of the 
data, was excellent (time to access the non-social option: r = 0.98, 0.8% of data mismatches between 
observers; time to access the social option: r = 0.98, 1.4% of data mismatches between observers; 
time to access the ropes: r = 0.99, 3% of data mismatches between observers) and for bonobos (time 
to access the non-social option: r = 0.96, 1.3% of data mismatches between observers; time to access 
the social option: r = 0.97, 1.2% of data mismatches between observers; time to access the ropes: r = 
0.95, 3.5% of data mismatches between observers). 
3.7 Results 
Overall, chimpanzee and bonobo pairs obtained the rewards in 92% of trials. Both ape species 
behaved rationally by choosing the social option when there were no rewards available in the non-
social alternative (93% of trials). As expected, the proportion of choices towards the non-social option 
relative to the social option also increased as the rewards in the alternative platform increased. This 
change was not driven solely by the number of rewards in the alternative option but also by the social 
condition: the switch in preference from the social to the non-social option was steeper in Snowdrift 
trials compared to competitive trials (Model 14; GLMM: F21   = 9.572, N = 2218, p = 0.002, CI [0.284, 
2.258]; Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Percentage of the decisions towards the social choice as a function of the levels in the non-social 
condition and the levels of the social condition (SD and COM trials). 
 
The first latency measure was the time taken to open the door to either platform. When there was no 
reward in the non-social platform apes waited longer to open the doors in Snowdrift trials compared 
to competitive trials, replicating the findings from Study 2a. However, as the rewards in the non-social 
platform increased, apes tended to decrease their latency to decide, and the differences between 
Snowdrift and competitive conditions decreased. This decrease in latency occurred in conjunction with 
a change in their decisions, from the social to the non-social option (see Figure 16 left; see Figure A2 
with CI in the Appendices) (Model 15; LMM: F21   = 6.62, N = 2216, p = 0.01, CI [-0.007, 0.295]). Overall, 
chimpanzees were faster than bonobos in both conditions (Model 15; LMM: F21   = 8.06, N = 2216, p = 
0.004, CI [-1.061, -0.099]) but there were no significant interactions between species and conditions. 
The second latency measure focused on whether subjects waited further for their partner to pull in 
the Snowdrift condition, or whether the decision to open the door always led to immediate pulling of 
the rope. Both chimpanzees and bonobos did indeed wait longer to pull in Snowdrift trials compared 
to competitive trials. Additionally, as the rewards in the non-social option increased apes tended to 
wait longer to pull (see Figure 16 right; see Figure A3 with CI in the Appendices) (Model 16; LMM: F21    
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= 3.888, N = 773, p = 0.048, CI [-0.044, 0.37]), with a more pronounced effect in bonobos. This was 
unexpected as at that point the content of the non-social option was already inaccessible and thus 
should not play a role in their decision to wait.  However, these results should be interpreted 
cautiously as they are based on a small subset of trials (see Figure 15). 
Figure 16. Latency of the subjects to open the door (left) and to pull the rope (right) as a function of the number 
of food pieces in the non-social option and the social option (SD and COM trials). Latencies in seconds are 
presented in a logarithmic scale. 
Overall, individuals acting second (2nd actors) made strategic decisions on 85% of the trials. Moreover,
when they could respond to the decision that the 1st actors had made in that trial –in non-social option
3, they made strategic choices on 75% of trials. However, they only chose significantly above chance
when there were 0 or 5 food rewards baited in the alternative platform (pair-wise comparisons
derived from Model 17: Non-social option 0-Snowdrift: p = 0.008; Non-social option 0-competitive: 
p = 0.003; Non-social option 1-Snowdrift: p = 0.967; Non-social option 1- competitive: p = 0.257; 
Non-social option 3-Snowdrift: p = 0.224; Non-social option 3- competitive: p = 0.182; Non-social op-
tion 5-Snowdrift: p = 0.003; Non-social option 5- competitive: p =0.02; Figure 17). See the Appen-
dices for further details of model construction and model results.
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Figure 17. Proportion of strategic choices of 2nd actors across the 8 combinations of social and non-social options.   
 
Discussion  
Results of Study 3 substantially clarified those from Study 2a by showing that when apes had access 
to an alternative option, their decisions were clearly strategic. They understood the payoffs of the 
game and acted rationally according to all the rewards involved by maximizing their benefits, as shown 
in previous social dilemmas (Jensen, Call & Tomasello, 2007). This may have simply been due to 
increased experience, as all individuals completed Study 2a before Study 3. However, if this were the 
case, changes across sessions in Study 2a would have been expected. Perhaps, one important factor 
is that the inhibitory demands of Study 2a were higher. Subjects faced the decision to either act on 
the apparatus (pull) or not at all, but in Study 3 apes could decide between the two actions (sliding 
the door left or right). Thus, one possible way to interpret these results is that when apes had to 
actively decide between different alternatives, it may have been easier for them to inhibit and 
compare their potential options and act appropriately according to the payoffs of the game in order 
to maximize their rewards.  
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3.8 General Discussion 
Using the Snowdrift game to investigate how pairs of children, chimpanzees and bonobos coordinate 
their actions to overcome conflicts of interest, all three species were found to coordinate their actions 
effectively and succeeded in over 90% of the trials. All species showed clear indications of strategic 
decision-making, trying to maximize their own rewards while maintaining high levels of coordination. 
In Study 2b, children’s communicative acts revealed clear signs of strategic behaviour but no such 
indication was observed among apes. In Study 3, in which apes had access to an alternative (non-
social) option, their decisions were clearly strategic even though communication between partners 
was still virtually nonexistent.   
Children are skilled at coordinating for mutual gain from a young age (Brownell et al., 2006; Duguid et 
al., 2014; Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2016; Warneken et al., 2014; Wyman et al., 2013) Even in 
situations where the risk of coordination failure is increased, children are able to use communication 
and theory of mind reasoning to avoid this risk (Duguid et al., 2014; Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2016; 
Grueneisen et al., 2015; Wyman et al., 2013).  However, the goals of partners in those studies were 
aligned (i.e., there was no conflict of interest between partners).  The current study showed that even 
when facing with a potential conflict of interest, children’s rate of coordination failure was very low.  
Crucially, their success in the task cannot be attributed to a failure to appreciate the conflict of interest 
because their communicative exchanges indicated that they encouraged their partners to pay the 
higher cost to maximize their own rewards.   
The results of this study are consistent with Grueneisen and Tomasello (2016) who also observed high 
levels of coordination in five-year old children playing a version of the Snowdrift dilemma. 
Coordination in that study was maintained by turn-taking, which also has been shown to enable 
resource sharing in a collaborative task (Melis et al., 2016). Note however, that children in those 
studies always depended on their partner to obtain either the preferred reward (Grueneisen & 
Tomasello, 2016) or all the rewards (Melis et al., 2016). In contrast, the procedure used in this study 
eliminated a strict partner dependency because Snowdrift trials were randomly intermixed with 
competitive trials in which children competed to obtain the preferred reward by pulling first, without 
the need of their partner’s action.  Besides preventing partner dependency, mixing Snowdrift and 
competitive trials may have made a turn-taking strategy much more cognitively demanding than 
previous studies —and therefore useless— because it would have required children to keep track of 
all their previous actions and outcomes to maximize efficiency.  However, a consequence of this 
strategy is that the coordination was maintained despite a skewed reward distribution between 
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partners —also observed in Grueneisen and Tomasello (2016), perhaps because receiving some 
reward was more important than the social comparison, but further research is needed to determine 
the effects of resource inequality on coordination. 
Apes also solved the Snowdrift dilemma successfully (coordination in 98% of the trials) but their 
behaviour differed from children’s in two important ways:  there was little communication between 
partners and only one partner pulled in most pairs.  This strategy produced an equal distribution of 
rewards between partners, which may seem surprising given that apes behaved as rational maximizers 
in other studies (Bullinger et al., 2011b; Jensen et al., 2007).  However, the observed equal distribution 
may have been a by-product of the “one-partner-pulling” strategy combined with the 
counterbalancing of payoffs across multiple trials. Even when one of the partners was a passive 
participant (always waiting) it does not necessarily mean that they were indifferent to the outcomes.  
Apes experienced pulling in both conditions during the training and experimental sessions, and there 
is evidence suggesting that subordinate chimpanzees wait to pull a rope to “negotiate” a better reward 
distribution with a dominant individual (Melis et al., 2009). Thus, it is conceivable that some apes 
preferred to obtain lower rewards instead of competing for higher rewards to avoid conflict 
(Chalmeau, 1994). However, in the current study it is difficult to ascertain whether not pulling was a 
strategic decision, or some individuals were content with the food received for not pulling at all.  
Study 3 directly addressed this ambiguity by offering an alternative option to inaction.  Based on their 
change in preference from social to non-social choices (and their associated timing), apes generally 
behaved more strategically in Study 3 than in Study 2a. However, apes not always maximized their 
rewards in all conditions. For instance, when apes were confronted with the competitive condition 
(five pieces of food in the roped end) and the alternative option was baited with three pieces of food, 
they sometimes preferred the lower but secure reward even when they acted first (20% of times they 
chose the non-social option).  Perhaps an aversion to either risk or even competition with their 
partners led them to select lower value (but secure) rewards in those cases. In the absence of risk, 
chimpanzees prefer to act alone rather than to collaborate provided both actions yield the same 
rewards (Bullinger et al., 2011b) but they switch to collaborative options that result in better outcomes 
than acting alone. However, if social risks increase, as in the current study or other tasks (Duguid et 
al., 2014), they may prefer lower but more secure rewards, thus managing a trade-off between 
competition and reward maximization. 
Based on previous findings (Haun et al., 2011; Heilbronner et al., 2008) bonobos were expected to be 
more risk averse (preferring the secure option) than chimpanzees but no clear inter-specific 
differences were found. A possible explanation for this result is that most studies have focused on 
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non-social risk effects. Interestingly, in a study in which bonobos could choose between feeding alone 
or co-feeding with strangers, they preferred the social option (Tan & Hare, 2013) despite the potential 
social risks involved. Thus, further studies comparing chimpanzees and bonobos across different social 
and non-social risk tasks are needed to fully understand possible differences between these two 
species. 
Finally, it was investigated whether apes took advantage of situations in which they already had 
information about their partner’s decisions (i.e., when their partner acted before them). Overall, 
individuals acting second chose strategically. However, in those conditions where the strategic choice 
of 2nd actors differed depending on what their partner had chosen in that trial, they did not perform 
significantly above chance. The findings of this study are consistent with previous studies in 
competitive contexts showing that chimpanzees can adjust their strategies in anticipation of likely 
decisions of partners (Kaminski, Call & Tomasello, 2008; Schmelz, Call & Tomasello, 2011) but no clear 
strategic responses to a partner’s specific decision were found.  The short time that apes had to 
respond to their partner and the random presentation of conditions within sessions may have 
contributed to this outcome. Apes anticipated their partner’s likely behaviour when they faced a 
symmetrical conflict of interest in which both participants started with the same probabilities to 
maximize their payoffs. However, to explore in more detail whether apes act strategically in response 
to their partners’ decisions, future research could focus on how apes solve conflicts of interest when 
only one individual has bargaining leverage (i.e., only one member of the pair has access to an 
alternative option). 
In conclusion, using a Snowdrift game to model situations such as group hunting or agonistic 
intergroup encounters in which individuals need to overcome a conflict of interest to coordinate with 
others, it was found that pairs of children, chimpanzees and bonobos successfully solved this social 
dilemma. However, they did so in different ways.  Whereas both partners pulled and communicated 
in children, one of the partners did most of the pulling in apes with virtually no communication.  
Nevertheless, an additional study that included an additional secure option revealed that apes 
behaved strategically by choosing options that maximized their own payoffs, which in some cases 
included delaying (or accelerating) their choices to net the largest reward available.
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CHIMPANZEES AND CHILDREN COOPERATE IN A 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
4.1 Introduction 
Cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature. From unicellular organisms to human societies, 
evolutionary complexity can only be explained through cooperative processes in which biological 
entities work together to achieve common benefits (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary, 1997). 
Sometimes cooperation is the best strategy for all agents (Boucher, 1988; Clutton-Brock, 2009) but in 
other occasions cooperation comes together with the possibility to defect and reap the benefits from 
the cooperative acts of others. This tension between cooperation and defection is best captured in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma model (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Tucker, 1950). In this model two players 
can either cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation is always better than mutual defection. However, 
for a single player it is always better to defect regardless of the other player’s decision, leading to 
mutual defection if both play rational. In this situation, thus, cooperation cannot thrive (Dawkins, 
1976). Yet, cooperation has evolved. Therefore, to solve this conundrum, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has 
been widely used to study the conditions in which human cooperation could have evolved, bridging 
experimental research (Sally, 1995; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996) and agent-based modelling (Axelrod, 
& Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund, 1994). Moreover, its use has also been extended to investigate 
animal cooperation (Dugatkin, 1988; Stephens, McLinn & Stevens, 2002; Wilkinson, 1984; Wood, Kim 
& Li, 2016). 
Besides its importance as a model to study the evolution of cooperation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma also 
provides a promising framework to explore in detail the decision-making strategies that social animals 
require to resolve situations of conflict. From a comparative perspective it is of special interest for us 
to compare the strategies of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees, with those of children in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. This approach, in line with previous studies exploring the strategic 
abilities of chimpanzees and children to coordinate in other cooperative games (Duguid et al., 2014; 
Studies 2a and 2b in Chapter 2), contributes to understand the evolutionary roots of human 
cooperation and decision-making.  
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From the literature, the general picture states that humans tend to cooperate during Prisoner’s 
Dilemma interactions and thus, deviate from the rational assumptions of the game (i.e., mutual 
defection)4. In fact, people cooperate more than expected in a wide range of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
versions including one-shot interactions (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross, 1996; Engel & Rand, 2014; 
Kiyonari et al., 2000) and iterated presentations of the dilemma (Cooper et al., 1996; Camerer, 2003; 
see Rand & Nowak, 2013 for a review) in which people increase their likelihood to cooperate when 
the probability of future interaction is high (Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011). This is in line with results in 
other non-cooperative models such as the Dictator and the Ultimatum Game. In those studies, people 
generally depart from the rational assumptions of the game; humans tend to behave altruistically 
towards others (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2001; but see Smith and Silberberg, 2010). 
From a very young age, human children already possess uniquely human cooperative motivations to 
help and share with others (Brownell et al., 2013; Liszkowski et al., 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2006). Moreover, from a young age children tend to deviate from the rational assumptions of social 
games such as the Ultimatum  (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998) and the Dictator Game (Benenson, Pascoe 
& Radmore, 2007), displaying altruistic behaviour in line with adult studies. However, little is known 
about young children strategies in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In a previous study, 
Matsumoto and colleagues (Matsumoto, Han, Yabrove, Theodoru & Carney, 1986) investigated four-
year old children behaviour when they were presented with a simplified version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. In that task, pairs of children had to choose between competition or cooperation cards to 
place on a board. The result of their choices determined whether they would obtain pennies or not; 
according to one of the four possible outcomes of the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. They found 
that children increased their moral solutions across sessions (a moral solution was defined as both 
children choosing to cooperate) and that the degree of friendship was positively related with their 
moral acts. However, in that task children were encouraged to discuss their strategies and express 
their thoughts and feelings; such actions thus, could have enhanced children strategic decision-
making. A more recent study by Blake and colleagues (Blake, Rand, Tingley & Warneken, 2015) 
presented 10- and 11-year old children with an anonymous Prisoner’s Dilemma game. They found that 
children cooperated more often in iterated versions of the dilemma compared to one-shot 
interactions. Anonymous context (i.e., when people cannot see or hear each other and they do not 
meet before the onset of the game) may be useful to control for factors such as reputation. Yet, this 
approach prevents a complete comparison between humans and apes. First, anonymous context are 
not common in young children and apes social interactions; the latter, in fact, live in the same social 
                                                          
4 Mutual defection is the rational strategy unless the game is played in an infinite amount of rounds (Friedman, 
1971). 
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groups and it is very complicated to test them with strangers. Second, it is difficult to determine 
whether apes and young children understand that they interact with a conspecific in an anonymous 
context.  
Unlike children, chimpanzees have never been tested in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, results from 
other social studies have found that, overall, chimpanzees behave rationally to maximize their benefits 
regardless of others (see Jensen, 2016 for an extended review on apes prosociality; but see Engelmann 
and Herrmann, 2016). For instance, in non-cooperative games such as the Ultimatum game 
chimpanzees do not show other regarding preferences. In this game, both proposers and receivers try 
to maximize their rewards whenever possible: proposers keep the highest share for themselves and 
receivers, in turn, accept any share (Jensen et al., 2007, but see Milinski, 2013; Proctor, Williamson, 
De Waal & Brosnan, 2013). In cooperative scenarios such as the Stag Hunt, chimpanzees seem to 
coordinate for mutual benefit to increase their outcomes (Bullinger et al., 2011a; Duguid et al., 2014). 
When conflicts of interest are involved but cooperation is still necessary to reap benefits, chimpanzees 
can negotiate unequal reward distributions (Melis et al., 2009). Moreover, our previous findings 
suggest that chimpanzees and bonobos cooperate in different versions of the Snowdrift game (Studies 
1 and 2a in Chapter 1 and 2). In the Snowdrift, in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, unilateral 
cooperation is better than defection provided that the partner defects. Thus, would chimpanzees and 
children, coordinate their actions in scenarios where unilateral cooperation is not beneficial for 
cooperators? 
To answer this question we presented pairs of both species with a conflict of interest in the form of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma with two conditions: a Prisoner’s Dilemma and a competitive condition. In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the best strategy was to wait for a partner to pull and thus obtain all the rewards 
(2 grapes for chimpanzees and 2 glass marbles for children). The second best strategy was to 
coordinate with the partner and pull together to divide the rewards5. The worse strategy was to pull 
and send all the potential rewards to the partner. Finally, if both subjects defected they would lose 
the possibility to obtain any reward after a short period of time. We compared Prisoner’s Dilemma to 
competitive trials, in which subjects were required to pull faster than their partner to obtain all the 
rewards. In competitive trials pairs of chimpanzees and children could also pull together and divide 
the rewards as in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials.  
5 Unlike in the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in this task mutual cooperation is not incentivized. 
This change was not possible due to the apparatus contingencies —the food was baited all at once and thus all 
four possible outcomes stemmed from the initial distribution. Therefore, both collaboration and reciprocity 
leaded to the same rewards over time. 
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If subjects behave strategically, we expect higher pulling rates together with higher success in 
competitive trials, and higher latencies to pull in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials for both species. Moreover, 
we anticipate the frequency of coordination trials (i.e., trials in which individuals pull together and 
divide the rewards) to increase with experience in both conditions (i.e., within trials). Finally, based 
on previous studies (Duguid et al., 2014; Studies 2a and 2b in Chapter 2), we expected verbal 
communication to play a role in children strategies to overcome the conflict of interests presented, 
communicating more often during Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction when they require of their partners 
actions to obtain rewards. 
 
4.2 Material and Methods: Study 4a 
 
Subjects  
We tested 14 captive chimpanzees (7 males; Mage= 21.1 years; see Table A17 in the Appendices for 
more information) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo. During the 
first test phase of the study, the chimpanzees made up 7 unique pairs. After phase one, ten 
chimpanzees completed four cooperative training sessions with a human experimenter before they 
were tested again with the same partner for the second test phase. The remaining four subjects could 
not participate in the training sessions and in the second phase of the study as two of them moved to 
another zoo. 
 
Materials 
We presented pairs of chimpanzee with a rectangular tray (91x10 cm) placed between the two 
subjects (Figure 16). A rope was connected at either end of the tray so that each subject could pull 
from one of the ropes’ ends. The tray was baited with a grape at each end side. The tray could be 
placed either at the bottom (Prisoner’s Dilemma condition) or at the top position (competitive 
condition). If one ape pulled in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition, both grapes would roll down to its 
partner side (Figure 18a). In contrast, if one ape pulled in the competitive condition, the grapes would 
roll down to its own side (Figure 18b). Therefore, a pulling act during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials was 
defined as cooperation while pulling in competitive trials was defined as competition. At the same 
time, no pulling in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials was defined as defection. Alternatively, in both conditions 
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chimpanzees could coordinate their actions to pull from their ropes simultaneously and divide the 
rewards (Figure 18c).  
The end sides of the tray sat on two elevators. Each elevator was inserted in a vertical tower made of 
Plexiglas (65 cm high). The elevators could keep the tray at the bottom or at the top position 
(Prisoner’s Dilemma or competitive condition respectively). To maintain the elevators and the tray at 
the top position we used counterweights —metal cylinders of 0.5kg— attached to the elevators.  
Each tower was attached to one of the subjects’ rooms through a Plexiglas mesh that prevented the 
apes to reach the apparatus. Each Plexiglas mesh had two openings, one at the top and another at the 
bottom position that could be opened by the experimenters to allow chimpanzees’ access to the ends 
of the tray. Under the apparatus there were two ramps, each oriented towards one of the subjects’ 
rooms. 
The ropes were connected to its corresponding elevator through a system of pulleys that allowed the 
vertical movement of the elevators along the towers when the subjects pulled.  The baited rewards 
could be accessed from three different locations: directly from the tray through the openings at the 
top or at the bottom position, or from the ramps under the apparatus. 
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Figure 18. Experimental set-up of Study 4a. Prisoner’s Dilemma condition (18a), competitive condition (18b) and 
collaboration example (18c) 
 
Procedure 
Chimpanzees were tested in a within subjects design in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the competitive 
conditions. Subjects could either pull (cooperate and lose) or do nothing (defect and win) in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma trials, and pull (compete and win) or do nothing (lose) during competitive trials. If only one 
individual acted, the rewards would be collected from the ramps under the tray. If both individuals 
coordinated during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials (tray at the bottom position), they would lift the tray 
from the bottom position and obtain the grapes through the top openings. In contrast, in competitive 
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trials (tray at the top position) chimpanzees would pull down the tray from the top position to obtain 
the grapes through the bottom openings. 
At the start of a test session, one experimenter opened either the top openings during Prisoner’s 
Dilemma trials or the bottom openings during competitive trials. At the start of a trial, two 
experimenters baited the grapes at the ends of the tray. The subjects had 15 seconds to act. After this 
time, an experimenter would remove all the rewards left on the tray.  
Individual training 
This training phase served to show the apes the payoff contingencies of the task and how to access 
the rewards. During this training phase the door connecting both rooms remained open. Each subject 
was required to complete two individual sessions on separate days. Within each session subjects 
experienced four trials, one trial per condition from each side of the apparatus.  Trials were randomly 
presented within sessions. On a given trial, a subject had to pull to obtain the grapes either from the 
ramp oriented towards its room (in competitive trials; tray at the top position) or from the ramp 
oriented towards the opposite room (in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials; tray at the bottom position).  
Social training 
In this training phase we demonstrated that, depending on the condition, chimpanzees could either 
get or lose the rewards by either pulling themselves or by waiting for a human partner to pull. 
Therefore, apes experienced four possible outcomes: obtain all the rewards by pulling in the 
competitive condition, obtain no rewards by pulling in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition, obtain no 
rewards by waiting in the competitive condition and obtain all the rewards by waiting in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma condition.  
Each subject was required to complete four sessions with the human partner on separate days, 
changing sides between sessions. There were eight trials per session. In each half of the session there 
were two trials per condition presented in a randomised order. The subject and the human partner 
switched roles after the fourth trial so that in half of the trials chimpanzees had access to their rope 
and in the other half only the human stooge had access to their rope (the human stooge had always 
access to the rope but only pulled in half of trials). This manipulation was necessary to prevent 
chimpanzees from pulling and to let them experience all possible outcomes.  
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Additionally, there were two sessions in which chimpanzees could retrieve the rewards directly from 
the tray through the openings in the Plexiglas mesh. This training had the purpose to show the apes 
that they could also retrieve the rewards from the openings (in previous training sessions they only 
retrieved the rewards from the ramps). These two sessions were presented after the second and the 
fourth social training session. As in the individual training, chimpanzees were tested alone and the 
door connecting both rooms remained open. Each session contained four trials, one per condition 
from each side of the apparatus. Trials were randomly presented within sessions. In these trials, either 
the top openings during competitive trials or the bottom openings during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials 
were already accessible to the chimpanzees. Chimpanzees did not have access to the ropes during 
these two sessions.  
 
Coordination training 
After the first test phase, each chimpanzee performed four coordination training sessions with a 
human experimenter. The purpose of these sessions was to show chimpanzees that they could 
mutually coordinate their actions with their partner and divide the rewards —by accessing the 
rewards through the Plexiglas openings after pulling together with the human experimenter. To do 
so, we placed each grape inside a transparent dish attached to each end of the tray so that the grapes 
did not roll down when the tray was slightly inclined. Each session consisted of four trials per 
condition, randomly presented within sessions. The subject and the human switched sides between 
sessions.  
 
Test sessions 
After the social training, we paired chimpanzees in the test sessions. Each pair performed 16 test 
sessions divided in two test phases of eight sessions. Each phase contained four sessions per condition 
presented in blocks. Pairs were divided in to two groups so that half started with the four Prisoner’s 
Dilemma sessions and the other half with the four competitive sessions. Each session contained 8 test 
trials. In contrast to the training sessions, during test sessions each chimpanzee had constant access 
to its own rope end. In Prisoner’s Dilemma sessions the top openings remained open while the bottom 
openings were open during competitive sessions. Subjects switched sides between sessions. After the 
cooperation training, each pair was tested for another eight test sessions (test phase 2). Chimpanzee 
pairs started the second test phase with the condition they finished the first test phase. 
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Coding 
We scored five dependent measures: efficiency, latency to pull, pulling rates (including individual 
strategies derived from individual pulling rates), whether chimpanzees coordinated their actions 
within trials, and the length of coordination trials. We defined efficiency as the proportion of trials in 
which at least one member of a pair was successful —retrieving at least one grape. Latency was the 
elapsed time between the moment the experimenters baited the grapes on the tray until the first 
pulling action occurred. A pulling action was the first movement of either end of the tray. Coordination 
trials were defined as trials in which chimpanzees pulled together and split their rewards. Finally, the 
length of those trials was the elapsed time between the first movement of the tray until the last tray 
end sat horizontally at the bottom level (this was only coded for the competitive condition because 
coordination did not occur in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition). 
From the pulling rates —regardless of the rewards’ distribution— we calculated their proportion of 
strategic decisions: the proportion of times they competed in competitive trials and the proportion of 
times they defected in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. Based on the information scored, we classified 
subjects in three qualitative categories: pullers pulling in at least 75% of trials in both conditions, non-
pullers pulling in 25% or less of the trials in both conditions and strategisers as subjects that obtained 
rewards at rates significantly above chance in both conditions (by competing in competitive and 
defecting in Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions). 
The inter-observer reliability was excellent based on the 20% of the data on chimpanzees’ pulling rates 
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.88). To calculate the inter-observer agreement for the timing of decisions, we only 
counted the trials in which both observers scored a pulling action. The inter-observer reliability based 
on the 20% of the data on latencies was excellent (r = 0.99). 
4.3 Results 
Overall, pairs obtained the rewards in 89% of trials (either one or two grapes) and at least one partner 
pulled in 95% of trials. All unsuccessful trials (11%) in which no pair member pulled (5%) or pulled but 
failed to retrieve any reward (6%), occurred in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition.  We found that 
chimpanzees were more likely to wait in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials compared to competitive trials and 
these differences increased across sessions (Model 18; GLMM: F21 = 7.61, N = 720, p = 0.005, CI [-5.35, 
0.68]; Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. Proportion of trials in which chimpanzees waited for a partner to pull in Prisoner´s Dilemma (PD) and 
competitive (COM) trials. The lines represent the fitted model and the shadowed areas represent the CI at 95%.  
 
Additionally, when chimpanzees did wait to pull, they waited longer in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials than 
in competitive trials and this difference also increased across sessions (Model 19; LMM: F21 = 12.33, N 
= 590, p > 0.001, CI [-1.64, -0.45]; Figure 20 left) and trials (Model 19; LMM: F21 = 12.57, N = 590, p > 
0.001, CI [-0.77, -0.24]; Figure 20 right).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chimpanzees and children cooperate in a Prisoner´s Dilemma 
81 
Figure 20.  Latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in PD and COM trials across sessions (left) and across trials 
(right). Latencies in seconds are presented in a logarithmic scale. 
From their pulling rates we classified four subjects as pullers, none as non-pullers and four as 
strategisers. The remaining six were unclassified. The four strategisers (four male chimpanzees) pulled 
in competitive trials and not in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials (binomial test, p < 0.005). Moreover, we 
found a positive correlation (r = 0.84; Figure A4 in Appendices) between the average proportion of 
strategic choices and the ratio of grapes obtained per trial, suggesting that strategisers maximized 
their payoffs compared to other individuals. 
Overall, chimpanzees coordinated in a small amount of trials (only in 12%), mostly in competitive trials 
(see below). When chimpanzees coordinated, they did so more often in the second phase of the study, 
after they received the coordination training with a human experimenter (Model 20; GLMM: F21 = 5.61, 
N = 759, p = 0.018, CI [0.08, 1.81]).We also found a strong trend between condition and session; 
chimpanzees tended to coordinate more during competitive trials and these tendency increased 
across competitive sessions (Model 20; GLMM F21 = 3.58, N = 759, p = 0.058, CI [-0.95, 40.7]). The 
latency of coordination trials during the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition was higher (Xsec = 7.27, N = 4) 
compared to the competitive trials (Xsec = 1.6, N = 77). See the Appendices for further details of model 
construction and model results.  
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Discussion 
Chimpanzees were able to distinguish the Prisoner’s Dilemma from a purely competitive situation, 
adapting their strategies to maximize their rewards. Although chimpanzees tended to cooperate 
(unilateral cooperation, only one individual pulling) during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials, they increased 
their latency to pull when they were presented with the dilemma —they waited longer to pull across 
trials and sessions. At the same time, they became faster in the competitive situation. This strategy 
was advantageous as the most strategic individuals tended to obtain higher benefits. Next, we 
presented the same dilemma to 5-year old children to compare their strategies to those of 
chimpanzees. 
 
4.4 Material and Methods: Study 4b 
 
Subjects 
We tested 20 pairs of 5- to 5.5-year old children (10 pairs of boys and 10 pairs of girls) in kindergartens 
in the Leipzig area.  
 
Materials 
In general, pairs of children were presented with the same task as chimpanzees in Study 4a (Figure 
21). The apparatus was built inside a box made of wood and Plexiglas that prevented children from 
directly accessing the rewards (60x42x50 cm; vertical towers were 36.5 cm high). The front side of the 
box was opened so that Experimenter 1 (henceforth E1 and E2 for the second experimenter) could 
manipulate the apparatus. The box was placed on the ground between both children. Children 
collected glass marbles as rewards instead of food. They introduced their rewards in translucent 
plastic boxes. Therefore, it was hard for children to keep track of their rewards once those were inside 
their boxes.  
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Figure 21. Experimental set-up of Study 4b. Unilateral pull in Prisoner’s Dilemma condition (21a), unilateral pull 
in competitive condition (21b) and coordination example (21c). 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as the one presented to chimpanzees except for a few differences. 
Children only received two sessions compared to the 16 that chimpanzees received. Children did not 
conduct individual and coordination trainings in order to reduce the testing time per dyad and to 
prevent them to discover the collaborative solution.  
At the beginning of each test session, E1 opened either the top or the bottom openings. Importantly, 
this time E1 opened the openings that did not allow children to directly access the rewards on the 
tray; bottom openings in the competitive session (tray at the top position) and top openings in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma session (tray at the bottom position). At the beginning of each trial, E1 made visual 
contact with each child while showing the rewards. Then E1 baited the rewards on each end side of 
Coordination in conflict situations 
84 
 
the tray and waited for 15 seconds approximately. After this time, E1 removed the rewards left on the 
tray. 
 
Social training 
The social training was essentially the same as the one for chimpanzees except that children only 
performed one session of six trials (preceded by two pre-training trials) and they were tested in pairs 
with their peers; chimpanzees were tested with a human experimenter. Children swapped sides after 
the third trial of the session. During the social training, children collected rewards (black wooden 
marbles) that could be inserted in a box provided at the beginning of the training. Importantly, 
children did not keep those rewards for themselves after the training.  
Prior to the training, E2 entered the test room with both children, showed them the apparatus and 
introduced them to E1. Each child took his or her position in front of the box’ sides and E1 sat in front 
of the open side of the box. Next, E1 fed one rope through a little hole in the box so that one child 
could access the rope end. E2 told the child to pull. After the child pulled, E1 introduced the rope end 
back into the box. Then, he repeated the same procedure with the second child.  
After these two pre-training trials, the social training started. The first two trials of the social training 
were essentially the same as the pre-training trials except that this time E1 baited one black marble 
at either end of the tray. At the end of each trial, E2 emphasized what the child got and showed it to 
the other child. After these two trials, E1 removed the access to the ropes and baited two more 
marbles on the tray. Right after, E1 opened either the top or the bottom accesses to the tray 
depending on the condition (i.e., bottom opening if children were trained in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
condition and top opening if they were trained in the competitive condition). E2 enhanced children to 
obtain the marbles from the tray if children did not approach the openings.  With this trial children 
experienced they could obtain equal rewards. 
After these three social training trials, children swapped sides and performed the same three trials in 
the other condition. This time E2 did not show children what their partner obtained, but continued to 
emphasise the rewards’ distribution at the end of every trial. The order of conditions changed 
between pairs in the social training; half of them started with the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition and 
the other half with the competitive one. During the two pre-training trials the tray was always located 
at the bottom position regardless of the condition order. In half of the pairs the child at the right side 
started to pull and in the other half of the pairs the child at the left side started to pull. 
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Test sessions 
After the social training each pair performed one test session per condition. Each test session 
consisted of eight trials and children swapped sides after completing the fourth test trial. Half of the 
pairs started with the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition and the other half with the competitive condition 
(they started with the same condition they had previously started in the social training). Children 
started the first test session at the opposite side they had started the social training. 
Prior to the first test session, E2 told the children that now they would play the real game while E1 
showed the glass marbles —the rewards that children would collect in the following trials. Next, E2 
presented children with the test boxes. E2 told them to insert the obtained marbles in their boxes and 
to wait for E1 to bait the marbles before pulling. After the instructions, E2 left the room. At the end of 
the first test session, E2 returned to the test room and told children to follow her to another side of 
the room while E1 reset the apparatus for the second test session. After this short pause 
(approximately 1-2 minutes), children took sides again at the same sides they had started the first test 
session. The second test session started after E2 left the room again. At the end of the second test 
session, every child chose 3 marbles for themselves among the collected ones. 
Coding 
We analysed the same dependent measures as in Study 4a. Additionally, we examined whether 
children verbally communicated during the task, focusing on three types of communication. 
Imperatives: deontic verbs used to direct their partners’ actions; informatives: acts aimed at informing 
partners about a child’s current or impending actions or intentions and protests: statements of 
disapproval and objection about a partner action’s or intention. Moreover, we analysed pointing 
towards the partner as a sign of gestural communication. For every trial, we coded whether children 
pairs communicated (by either one or both children) and whether each of the three categories of 
communication (imperative, protests, informative) was present within a trial (uttered by either one or 
both children).  Communicative acts were scored from the moment E1 showed the rewards to the 
children until the children inserted their rewards into their boxes. 
The inter-observer agreement for the timing of decisions based on the 20% of the data was excellent 
(pulling actions from child on the left side: Pearson’s r =0.99, no data mismatches between observers; 
pulling actions from child on the right side: Pearson’s r = 0.98, 3% of data mismatches between 
observers). The inter-observer reliability for communication based on the 20% of the data was very 
good (Cohen’s Kappa =0.8). 
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4.5 Results 
 
Children pairs obtained the rewards in 95% of trials (either one or two glass marbles). At least one 
child pulled in 95% of trials. From all the unsuccessful trials (5% of trials), 58% occurred in the 
competitive condition and 42% in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition. Children waited significantly 
longer to pull in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition (Xsec = 2.91) than in the competitive condition (Xsec 
= 2.21) and this difference was significant (Model 21; LMM: F21 = 6.15, N = 303, p = 0.013, CI [0.005, 
0.69]). However, unlike apes, they did not increase their latencies to pull; instead, they pulled 
significantly faster across sessions (Model 21; LMM: F21 = 7.94, N = 303, p = 0.005, CI [-0.37, -0.015]) 
and trials (Model 21; LMM: F21 = 15.59, N = 303, p > 0.001, CI [-0.442, -0.142]) in both conditions (Figure 
22).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22.  Latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in PD and COM trials across sessions. Latency in seconds is 
presented in a logarithmic scale. 
 
Unlike chimpanzees, children took turns to perform their pulling acts, both in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and in the competitive condition. A turn was defined as the occurrence of a unilateral pull by individual 
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A preceded by a unilateral pull by individual B in the previous trial. At every trial children had a 12.5%
of probabilities to reciprocate the previous action by chance (see Model 22 in the Appendix for further
details). When we compared the occurrence of turns to chance levels (12.5 %) we found that children
significantly used a turn-taking strategy to divide their rewards (Model 22; GLMM: Intercept: estimate
= 0.22, SE = 0.56, p < 0.001). However, they did not distinguish between conditions and did not
increase their likelihood to engage in turn-taking across the study period; the full-null model
comparison including the effects of condition, session and trial revealed a non-significant effect of the
predictors (Model 22; GLMM: F42 = 2.562, N = 280, p = 0.634).
From their pulling rates we classified six subjects as pullers, none as non-pullers and only one as
strategiser (binomial test, p < 0.005). This result is in line with the finding that, overall, children took
turns in both conditions. In fact, seven children pulled in half of trials across conditions. According to
these results, we found a moderate positive correlation between the proportion of subject’s strategic
choices and the amount of marbles obtained (r = 0.5; Figure A5 in Appendices) suggesting that children
that acted more strategically obtained slightly more marbles than other children.
Overall, children coordinated in a small amount of trials (6% of trials; 50% of times on each condition). 
The latency of coordination trials was higher in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition was higher (Xsec = 
3.66, N = 9) compared to the competitive condition (Xsec = 1.85, N = 10).    
Children communicated about their actions in 32% of trials (in 59 Prisoner’s Dilemma and 44 
competitive trials out of 160 trials per condition; Figure 23). Although children communicated slightly 
more often during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials (the situation in which they needed their partner to act 
in order to benefit), a full-null model comparison including the effects of condition, session and trial 
revealed a non-significant effect of the predictors (GLMM: F24 = 8.75, N = 320, p = 0.068). Although we 
were not able to analyse statistically the distribution of children communicative types, the majority of 
communication consisted in imperative and informative utterances (78% of the communication), 
occurring slightly more often during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials (see Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Percentage of trials in which every type of vocal communication and pointing occurred at least once 
within a trial. 
 
In a comparison between children’ and chimpanzees’ strategies, the most strategic individuals were 
chimpanzees. This is evident from Figure 24, which shows the proportion of strategic choices in 
competitive and Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. The upper right quadrant (above 50% of strategic choices 
in both conditions) is slightly dominated by chimpanzees. This can be explain by the fact that a majority 
of children took turns to retrieve the rewards, pulling around half of times in both conditions (depicted 
in the centre dot). See the Appendices for further details of model construction and model results. 
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Figure 24. Proportion of strategic choices in both PD and COM trials for all subjects of the two species. The most 
strategic individuals in both conditions are in the top-right corner of the plot. The size of the dots represents 
frequencies of subjects for different scores. 
Discussion 
Children actively cooperated to solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma task. Similar to chimpanzees’ results, they 
were able to distinguish both types of conditions but, unlike the apes, they established a strategy 
based on turn-taking to divide the rewards. Interestingly, this strategy was equally used in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the competitive condition. Moreover, children became faster across the study 
period (in both conditions), suggesting that once the turn-taking strategy was established, children 
did not need to wait for their partners’ decisions to act. Finally, children mainly used informatives and 
imperatives to coordinate their actions. Surprisingly, in contrast to previous findings in the Snowdrift 
game (Study 2b in Chapter 2), 5-year old children did not use specific types of communication to 
influence their partners during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. This, however, is not surprising given the fact 
that children did not try to maximize their rewards during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials, reflected by the 
general use of the turn-taking strategy. 
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4.6 General Discussion 
 
In a study of how chimpanzees and children coordinated their actions to solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game, chimpanzees cooperated (unilateral cooperation; one individual pulling) on 79% of trials during 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition and competed on 100% of competitive trials. Children, in contrast, 
were equally successful in both conditions (≥94% of trials).  
In line with previous studies exploring children’s behaviour in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Blake et al., 2015; 
Matsumoto et al., 1986), in our task children cooperated to overcome a conflict of interest (mutual 
defection occurred in less than 6% of trials across conditions). However, large methodological 
differences (e.g., anonymity condition) prevent a further comparison between studies. Thus, we 
discuss our results in line with other studies in which children directly interact with their peers to 
resolve a dispute (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2016; Melis et al., 2016; Study 2b in Chapter 2). 
Children mostly achieved cooperation through turn-taking (i.e., reciprocating cooperative acts). This 
behavioural strategy let children sustain cooperation over long periods of time and avoid direct 
competitive interactions while sharing benefits. This result contrasts with children’s behaviour in the 
Snowdrift game (Study 2b in Chapter 2). In that task, children pulled in the majority of trials in both 
conditions (they used a “both-partners-pull” strategy) to solve the conflict. However, a key difference 
between both studies is that while in the present study children were either presented with Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or competitive trials within a session, in the previous study both conditions were randomly 
presented within a session. Therefore, a strategy based on turn-taking was unlikely to be efficient.  
The result of the current study relates to previous studies showing that children tend to engage in 
turn-taking strategies to overcome conflicts of interest when repeatedly presented (Grueneisen & 
Tomasello, 2016; Melis et al., 2016). In these studies, although children preferred to take turns rather 
than to coordinate along a dominant asymmetry (i.e., when one individual always obtains the highest 
share), they could only divide their rewards through turn-taking6. In contrast, in the current study 
children also had the possibility to coordinate their actions to act together (collaboration) and divide 
the rewards in every trial. In our task, either turn-taking or mutual coordination lead to the same 
outcomes for both individuals. Nevertheless, mutual cooperation occurred rarely in either condition 
(only in 6% of the total trials). Several explanations can account for this finding. First, during training 
children only had experience in pulling alone. This could have hindered them to explore further 
                                                          
6 In Melis et al., (2016) children had to act together, but needed to take turns in order to equally split the 
rewards. Thus, turn-taking was the only available strategy to achieve equal shares between partners. 
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strategies (i.e., mutual cooperation). Second, by the age of 5-years old, children are capable of forming 
joint goals based on a mutual sense of “strategic trust” (Hamann, Warneken & Tomasello, 2012; 
Tomasello, 2016) in which both individuals understand what is better to do to achieve joint success. 
Thus, in this task children did not need to mutually coordinate their actions with their partners to solve 
the task if they mutually trusted each other as good reciprocators. Moreover, in line with recent 
findings in adults (Cohen, Wildschut & Insko, 2010), verbal communication could contribute to 
enhance trust feelings between children. Third, when individuals act together with others to achieve 
shared goals, they need mechanisms to support their coordination such as sharing sensorimotor 
information and planning actions (Vesper et al., 2016). Thus, in our task collaboration based on mutual 
coordination might have been cognitively harder to implement for 5-year old children compared to a 
strategy based on turn-taking (although see Stevens & Hauser, 2004 for a discussion on the cognitive 
requirements for turn-taking). To collaborate, children would have needed to time their actions in 
order to coordinate. Moreover, they would have needed to maintain the horizontal position of the 
tray while accessing the rewards.  
Although in general children applied a turn-taking strategy to cooperate in both types of conditions, 
they were capable of distinguishing between them. This was reflected in their latencies to pull. 
Children waited longer to pull in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials compared to competitive trials. This could 
be interpreted as a result of their conflicting preferences: on the one hand it is possible that children 
preferred to increase their personal gains, but on the other hand they could have also tried to avoid 
direct competition and maintain long term cooperation. Alternatively, they might have had a 
preference for fair outcomes. Yet, besides the differing latencies to pull between conditions, children 
tended to decrease their latencies to pull with experience in both conditions. It is likely that with 
experience children better understood the contingencies of the game and thus operated the 
apparatus faster regardless of the condition presented. Relatedly, a turn-taking strategy could have 
become a focal solution through precedence in order to avoid the risk of coordination failure 
(Schielling, 1960). 
Finally, we found that children did not communicate more often during Prisoner’s Dilemma compared 
to competitive trials. This might be partially explained by the fact that children treated both conditions 
similarly; they took turns to divide their rewards equally across conditions. This might also explain 
why, in general, children used similar communicative types across conditions (see Figure 23). The fact 
that children did not use specific types of communication during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials is supported 
by findings showing that adults’ communicative messages about their actions on a  Prisoner’s Dilemma 
do not have a strong effect on their partners’ decisions (Duffy & Feltovich, 2002). 
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Chimpanzees were also able to distinguish the Prisoner’s Dilemma from a purely competitive situation. 
They became more strategic with experience, waiting longer for their partners to pull by the end of 
the study in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition. Moreover, they became faster over time in the 
competitive condition, further implying that they learned the contingencies of the study and adapted 
their strategies to maximize their rewards over time.  
Chimpanzees did not collaborate to solve the task and divide the benefits. In contrast, they waited for 
their partner to pull; the only strategy that could lead them to maximize their rewards. However, these 
results cannot be explained due to chimpanzees’ inability to cooperate for mutual benefits: across 
several cooperative set-ups, chimpanzees have proven to be skilful collaborators (Duguid et al., 2014; 
Melis et al., 2006a) even when conflicts of interest arise or unilateral cooperation lead to rewards for 
both members of a pair (Melis et al., 2009; Study 1 in Chapter 1). Therefore, it is more plausible that 
our results could be explained in relation to other social scenarios in which chimpanzees seem to act 
as rational maximizers to increase their own benefits (Jensen et al., 2007; Bullinger et al., 2011). 
According to this idea, chimpanzees only cooperate if this strategy leads to the highest possible 
rewards for themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that in our task most of the coordination 
occurred during competitive trials. This outcome likely resulted from both chimpanzees pulling at the 
same time in an attempt to maximize their own rewards. Thus, a selfish behaviour resulted in an 
indirect division of rewards. Interestingly, chimpanzees coordinated to pull together more often 
during the second phase of the study, after they were tested in the coordination training sessions. 
This training could have helped chimpanzees to better understand the contingencies of the apparatus, 
although it seems that it only encouraged them to pull faster in competitive trials, an action that 
indirectly resulted in higher frequencies of coordination. In fact, chimpanzees did not start to 
coordinate for collaboration in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials after the cooperative training. In Prisoner’s 
Dilemma trials, unlike in competitive trials, chimpanzees could always defect (i.e., stop pulling at any 
time while their partner pulls). The risk of losing all the rewards, therefore, likely explains why 
chimpanzees did not collaborate during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. Besides coordinating their actions 
to collaborate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, chimpanzees could have also solved the game by dividing 
their rewards through reciprocity, taking turns to pull across trials —like children did. This strategy 
would have led to an equal distribution of the benefits during the task and reduced competition. 
However, in line with previous findings (Melis et al., 2016), they did not develop any clear turn-taking 
strategy.  
Interestingly, in this task four subjects clearly acted strategically: they pulled in competitive but not in 
Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. These results together with their increasing latencies to pull across 
Prisoner’s Dilemma trials, suggest that chimpanzees might have behaved more strategically in this 
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task than in the Snowdrift game (Study 2a in Chapter 2). Moreover, in the Snowdrift fewer individuals 
behaved strategically and most pairs solved the dilemma by applying an “only-one-partner-pulls” 
strategy that consisted of only one pair member pulling in both competitive and Snowdrift trials. These 
differences might be explained in relation to the nature of both games.  Unilateral cooperation is 
worse than unilateral defection in both games. Yet, this form of cooperation is rewarded in the 
Snowdrift game. This difference, in turn, might have encouraged chimpanzees to behave more 
strategically in the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, where the risk of ending up with zero rewards was 
higher. 
Yet, if chimpanzees were just playing as rational maximizers in this task, we would have expected 
higher frequencies of mutual defection during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials as a result of both subjects 
waiting for each other to pull. In contrast, they still cooperated in most of trials (79% of trials).  Several 
explanations could account for these results. First, it is possible that on some occasions chimpanzees 
would have pulled as a way to elicit their partners to pull and benefit from the interaction. This action 
only cost them the effort of pulling the rope and it increased their probabilities to obtain rewards. If 
both individuals pulled they could turn a Prisoner’s Dilemma trial into a competitive one: If an ape 
released its rope at any time, its side of the tray would return to the bottom position and, 
consequently, the grapes would roll down to its side. In a majority of successful Prisoner’s Dilemma 
trials (trials where at least one individual is rewarded), only one individual pulled and the partner 
benefited in 70% of occasions. However, consistent with this interpretation, in the 30% of successful 
trials in which both individuals pulled, first pullers obtained rewards in 43% of those trials. Second, it 
is possible that on some occasions, chimpanzees acted prosocially towards their partners. This 
interpretation would be in line with results showing that chimpanzees can help partners to obtain 
benefits (Melis, Warneken, Jensen, Schneider, Call & Tomasello, 2011; Yamamoto, Humle & Tanaka, 
2009, 2012; although see Tennie, Jensen & Call, 2016). However, this interpretation needs to be taken 
with caution; in previous studies chimpanzees helped partners when there was no possibility to obtain 
food for themselves. Moreover, in our study the two chimpanzees that obtained fewer rewards for 
themselves —puling most of times in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials— were paired with the two most 
dominant and strategic individuals. Therefore, these subjects might have just refrained from engaging 
in competitive interactions with dominant group members, only pulling when the dominant partner 
did not pull. Third, it is possible that some chimpanzees, despite understanding the contingencies of 
the task, could not inhibit pulling in a situation in which they had no alternative. In addition, these 
chimpanzees also had a long history of obtaining rewards through pulling. However, this seem unlikely 
as other studies have shown that chimpanzees can inhibit longer periods of time (i.e., 3 minutes) to 
obtain a preferred reward (Beran & Evans,  2006; Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Pate & Rumbaugh, 1999) 
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whereas in this task, trials lasted a maximum of 15 seconds. Yet, even though chimpanzees could 
potentially inhibit their pulls, our previous results showed that chimpanzees and bonobos were more 
strategic when they were given an opt-out of the social dilemma compared to a situation in which 
they could only pull a rope to obtain rewards (Studies 2a and 3 in Chapter 2). All in all, it is possible 
that a mixture of selfish (pull to influence their partner) and prosocial motives (pull for the benefit of 
the partner) together with individual differences (i.e., degree of inhibitory control), might underlie 
chimpanzees’ motivations to unilaterally cooperate when such a strategy yielded no benefits for 
cooperators. A possible way to disentangle whether selfish or prosocial motives underlie subjects’ 
cooperation during Prisoner’s Dilemma could be to present chimpanzees with Prisoner’s Dilemma 
trials in which only one subject can access the rope. In this situation, if only selfish motives underlie 
subjects’ cooperation, individuals might stop pulling provided that their partner cannot pull in return.  
Finally, our Prisoner’s Dilemma version differs from the canonical version of the game (Blake et al., 
2011; Duffy & Feltovich, 2002; Kümmerli et al., 2007) in the extent that collaboration is not 
incentivized —it does not provide higher shares over time compared  to other strategies such as turn-
taking. Children, in this scenario, came up with a cooperative strategy to reciprocate the potential 
rewards which provided them with the same benefits had they collaborated. Based on previous 
research on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Blake et al., 2011) and research  showing that children prefer to 
collaborate rather than to act individually to obtain the same benefits (Bullinger et al., 2011), it is likely 
that children would have preferred to collaborate in the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
However, it is an open question whether chimpanzees, acting like rational maximizers in this task, 
would have collaborated to increase their rewards in that scenario.   
In sum, by using the Prisoner’s Dilemma to further investigate chimpanzees and children’s strategies
to overcome conflict situations, we found significant differences between species. Children
cooperated to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma and took turns to divide their rewards with their peers.
Moreover, they used vocal communication to coordinate their decisions. In contrast, although
chimpanzees unilaterally pulled in a majority of Prisoner’s Dilemma trials, they presumably did so as
an attempt to obtain rewards for themselves. In addition, chimpanzees behaved strategically to
maximize their own payoffs according to the conditions presented.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation I have compared the strategies that pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and children 
used to coordinate their actions in situations of conflict. Overall, I found that all three species 
coordinated successfully, using specific strategies to overcome conflicts of interest across three 
different tasks based on the Snowdrift and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models. The results of these 
comparative studies contribute to better understand human cooperation from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
5.1 Great ape coordination under conflict 
A general finding stemming from the four studies conducted with apes is that chimpanzees and 
bonobos are capable of coordinating their decisions successfully to overcome conflicts of interest (see 
Table 2 for a summary of the main findings). Apes develop specific strategies to maximize their own 
benefits while reducing the risks of failure associated with each of the tasks presented (Studies 1 and 
2a in Chapters 1 and 2). For instance, when they face an opportunity to access a secure reward (and 
in consequence prevent the social interaction), chimpanzees and bonobos behaved more strategically 
compared to a situation in which the non-social option is not present; they select either the social or 
the non-social option as a function of the distributed rewards and their partners’ likely decisions 
(Study 2a and 3 in Chapter 2). Moreover, when the result of their interactions may lead to a loss of 
rewards (i.e., when they unilaterally cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma; Study 4a in Chapter 3), they 
behaved more strategically; they defect more and wait longer for their partners to act across the study 
period in comparison to situations in which they can still benefit from unilateral cooperative acts. In 
the next section I provide a general discussion of the thesis’ findings. Subsequently, I relate these 
findings with previous work on apes (both experimental and field studies) and coordination in other 
social animals. Special attention will be paid to tasks requiring coordination when conflicts of interest 
are present. Finally, I consider some methodological differences between the studies reported in this 
dissertation in an attempt to advance future lines of research. 
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Table 2: Summary of great apes’ studies. 
 
Study Main findings 
 
Study 1 
 
Chimpanzees collaborated to solve the task; 
they managed a trade-off between maintaining 
successful cooperation and minimizing costs. 
 
Study 2a 
Chimpanzees and bonobos waited for their 
partners to pull in the Snowdrift condition. A 
majority of dyads engaged in an “only-one-
partner-pulls” strategy. 
 
Study 3 
Chimpanzees and bonobos behaved strategic 
when a non-social option was provided. They 
managed the conflict by combining information 
about the rewards’ distribution and their 
partners’ likely decisions. 
 
Study 4a 
Chimpanzees waited for their partners to pull in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition, and became 
more strategic with experience. 
 
 
Discussion of the findings 
 
In the first study of this dissertation (study 1 in Chapter 1), pairs of chimpanzees were presented with 
a conflict of interest in the form of a Snowdrift game. In that task cooperation for mutual rewards was 
physically costly (apes had to move a heavy weight to access the rewards). Chimpanzees preferred to 
collaborate even though they had the opportunity to free-ride (one ape could always pull alone and 
provide benefits for both partners). Through collaboration, chimpanzees reduced the costs of pulling 
while securing rewards. However, they also acted strategically to minimize their efforts: they waited 
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for their partners to start pulling and tried to pull less weight than their partners during collaborative 
interactions. 
In the second study reported in this thesis (Study 2a in Chapter 2), pairs of chimpanzees and bonobos 
were presented with a different version of the Snowdrift game. In the study, chimpanzees and 
bonobos pairs could not collaborate within a trial but, instead, they had the possibility to reciprocate 
rewards over the course of the study. In contrast to the first study, cooperation was not physically 
costly. Instead, the conflict was presented in the form of an unequal reward distribution in an attempt 
to facilitate apes’ comprehension of the task (differential food distributions were more conspicuous 
prior to the start of the trial than differential weights). Apes waited longer for their partners to pull 
when the conflict was presented compared to a competitive control condition in which it was better 
to pull before the partner to obtain the highest rewards. In addition, two apes behaved clearly 
strategic: they only pulled during competitive situations to maximize their own rewards.  
Pulling simultaneously would result in direct competitive interactions as a result of each individual 
pulling in opposite directions, and likely losses of rewards. This reason, together with the fact that 
apes were always rewarded (unless both individuals refused to participate) might explain why in this 
task some apes developed an “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy that consisted in only one member of 
the pair pulling in both conditions. This strategy reduced the likelihood to compete at the cost of losing 
potential rewards while it secured a proportion of the rewards.  
Together, the results from the first two studies of this dissertation extend the idea that chimpanzees 
and also bonobos are capable to coordinate their actions and cooperate despite the conflict of interest 
presented as long as they can obtain benefits (e.g., food rewards) from their cooperative interactions 
(Bullinger et al., 2011a; Duguid et al., 2014; Hirata and Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a; 2009). In 
addition, the results of these two studies showed that apes would adjust their behaviour to the 
contingencies of each task, developing specific strategies to manage a trade-off between successful 
coordination and minimizing risks.  
However, the resulting rewards’ distribution in these two studies could also suggest that apes 
intentionally tried to divide rewards between partners: in the first study chimpanzees collaborated 
and partially divided costs between individuals while in the second study the “only-one-partner-pulls” 
strategy resulted in equal division of rewards between subjects. Thus, did apes tried to maximize their 
own rewards while minimizing risks or did they use specific strategies to divide their rewards between 
partners?   One factor that might have played a role in apes decision-making across these tasks is the 
fact that apes only had one course of action available (to either pull or not). This common feature in 
previous studies (Studies 1 and 2a) might have covered the strategic intentions of some individuals 
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(i.e., consistent pullers and non-pullers in Study 2a). Therefore, to further investigate the strategic 
decision-making abilities of apes, I conducted a follow-up task (Study 3 in Chapter 2). Pairs of 
chimpanzees and bonobos were presented with the option to decide between the Snowdrift game 
presented in the second study (social option) and an alternative secure reward that varied between 
sessions (non-social option). Building on previous findings (Bullinger et al., 2011b), I found that the 
proportion of choices for the non-social over the social option increased as the amount of rewards in 
the non-social option increased. Interestingly, even though apes could obtain a higher amount of food 
from the tray, they sometimes refrained from taking part in the conflict (i.e., the social option) and 
chose the alternative secure reward instead. Moreover in this task apes did not engage in simple 
strategies such as the “only-one-partner-pulls”, even when such a strategy could have provided them 
with higher rewards on some occasions. In contrast, chimpanzees and bonobos managed the conflict 
by combining information about the rewards in the social and the non-social option with their 
partners’ likely decisions. The results suggest that the addition of the non-social alternative allowed 
apes to behave more strategically in comparison to previous situations in which apes actions were 
restricted to one choice. The follow-up study served to clarify that the strategies apes adopted during 
previous studies (i.e., collaboration or the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy) were probably used as 
an attempt to cope with the risks involved in each task rather than as a strategy to equally distribute 
rewards between partners. 
In a final step to investigate the decision-making strategies used by chimpanzees to coordinate in 
situations of conflict, I presented pairs of chimpanzees with a Prisoner’s Dilemma task (alongside 
competitive control trials; Study 4a in Chapter 3). In this task chimpanzees could either collaborate or 
act unilaterally to overcome the dilemma. In contrast to previous studies presented in this 
dissertation, unilateral cooperation led to no rewards for cooperators —the key feature of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Interestingly, in this task chimpanzees did not develop any of the previous 
strategies used to solve the Snowdrift tasks; the “only-one-partner- pulls” strategy used in the second 
study would have resulted in no rewards for non-pullers. However, a collaborative strategy similar to 
the one used in the first study would have resulted in rewards for both participants over time. Yet, 
chimpanzees rarely collaborated in this study. It is thus possible that the difficulty to coordinate their 
pulls within a trial together with the risk of defection entailed in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials compared 
to Snowdrift trials, prevented chimpanzees from collaborating more often. In line with previous 
studies (Amici et al., 2014; Brosnan et al., 2009; Melis et al., 2016), chimpanzees did not develop 
strategies to reciprocate the rewards (i.e., turn-taking strategies). Such a strategy would have allowed 
chimpanzees to circumvent the social risks and overcome the Prisoner’s Dilemma while securing 
rewards around half of times.  
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Instead, chimpanzees learned to behave more strategically over the course of the study: they 
increased their latencies to pull across Prisoner’s Dilemma trials and sessions while reducing their 
latencies to pull during competitive trials.  Moreover, there were a higher proportion of strategic 
individuals (individuals that mainly pulled during competitive trials). These results contrasts with the 
previous Snowdrift studies (Studies 1 and 2a in Chapters 1 and 2); in those, apes waited longer to pull 
when the conflict was presented but did not increase their latencies over time and less apes were 
categorized as strategisers. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that the higher risk of losing rewards in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma could have led chimpanzees to act more strategically in this scenario, becoming more 
hesitant to pull in an attempt to avoid losing all the rewards during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. However, 
as a by-product of their increased latencies to cooperate, they slightly decreased their rates of success 
in comparison to the previous Snowdrift studies —in some trials the experimenter had to remove the 
rewards from the tray. This is in line with Melis and colleagues (2009). In that study, chimpanzees had 
to decide to either cooperate for an equal reward distribution (e.g., two banana halves for each 
individual) or an unequal distribution (e.g., two bananas vs. a banana slice). They found that, despite 
maintaining high levels of collaboration, chimpanzees increased their latencies when they were 
presented with the most imbalanced situations, increasing their likelihood to fail.  
Yet, despite their enhanced levels of strategic behaviour in comparison to the previous studies 
reported in this thesis (Studies 1 and 2a in Chapters 1 and 2), surprisingly, chimpanzees unilaterally 
cooperated in the majority of Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. From a theoretical perspective, unilateral 
cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is not a rational strategy. One possible explanation is that 
chimpanzees might have tried to entice other individuals to pull as well. While this behaviour usually 
resulted in unilateral cooperation —sending all the rewards to the partner, occasionally it resulted in 
both individuals pulling at the same time, turning Prisoner’s Dilemma trials into competitive ones. This 
situation allowed chimpanzees to gain control of the situation —they could stop to pull once the 
partner had started, and obtained rewards more often than had they mutually defected. 
Findings in the context of apes’ experimental studies 
Chimpanzees and bonobos successfully coordinate their actions to collaborate for mutual goals 
(Chalmeau, 1994; Hare et al., 2007; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a) even when coordination 
risks are high and unequal reward distributions are presented (Bullinger et al., 2011a; Duguid et al., 
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2014; Melis et al., 2009). Bonobos, in contrast to chimpanzees, also collaborate for monopolizable 
food rewards (Melis et al., 2006b; Hare et al., 2007) due to their higher levels of tolerance (Wobber, 
Wrangham & Hare, 2010). A general finding, thus, suggests that apes (especially chimpanzees) seem 
to collaborate effectively as long as their own actions secure direct benefits for themselves, even when 
reward distributions are imbalanced between collaborators (Melis et al., 2009). When this is not the 
case (i.e when mutual collaboration only benefits one individual), cooperation through collaboration 
tends to break down over time (Melis et al., 2016).  
In contrast to previous research, in all the studies presented in this dissertation, apes had the 
opportunity to solve the conflict independently (through unilateral cooperation). Additionally, apes 
could overcome the conflict presented through collaboration within trials in the first and the fourth 
studies of the dissertation. Chimpanzees collaborated more often when they had the possibility to act 
alone and still obtain benefits regardless of their partners’ actions (Study 1). When apes were 
confronted with a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario (Study 4a), in which collaboration entailed high risks 
of losing rewards, apes did not engage in collaboration (mutual cooperation). Instead, they acted 
strategically by waiting longer for their partner to pull, increasing their latencies to pull across the 
study period. With these results, I extend previous findings on the role of collaboration to solve 
situations of conflict in apes: when apes can decide whether to collaborate or free-ride but they still 
need to coordinate their actions, they are prone to collaborate and reduce the costs when the risks of 
losing rewards are minimal (Study 1 in Chapter 1). However, they prefer to act on their own when the 
risks of losing rewards increase (Study 4a in Chapter 3).  
The opportunity to obtain rewards while free-riding might explain, for instance, why chimpanzees 
succeeded (i.e., at least one individual was rewarded) in a majority of trials during the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma study (Study 4a in Chapter 3) but cooperated less often for unilateral reward distribution 
(i.e., when only a subject benefitted at a time) in a recent study by Melis and colleagues (2016). In that 
study chimpanzees were presented with two interconnected trays. Each tray was baited with one food 
reward. Chimpanzees could only benefit by pulling the tray towards its side of the apparatus. 
However, to obtain any rewards they needed to collaborate (i.e., pull the trays in the same direction); 
in other words, they could not obtain rewards through free-riding (i.e., waiting for their partner to 
pull). Chimpanzees did not succeed to overcome the conflict (i.e., they did not take turns to 
reciprocate and cooperation decreased across the study period); they should have foregone their 
short-term preferences to sustain long-term reciprocal interactions based on turn-taking. The authors 
argued that perhaps, chimpanzees limited skills for inhibitory control and social planning prevented 
apes to reciprocate rewards over time (Boysen, Bernston, Hannan & Cacciopo, 1996; Stephens & 
Hauser, 2004). In contrast, in the studies presented apes could free-ride and still get some rewards. 
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This possibility allowed chimpanzees to avoid risk situations stemming from collaboration, and in turn, 
behave more strategically (i.e., waiting for a partner to pull before them). Therefore, I would argue 
that based on the findings reported in this thesis, future research should consider in more detail apes’ 
possibilities to free ride —either acting on their own or with the use of non-social opportunities, to 
avoid competitive interactions when studying apes abilities to overcome conflicts of interest. For 
instance, one possible avenue to explore in more detail apes strategies to overcome situations of 
conflict could provide individuals with bargaining leverage. For this purpose we could use the setup of 
Study 3. In this study each individual can decide between a social and a non-social option. To create 
the leverage condition we would present only one subject with the possibility to obtain rewards from 
the non-social option. This difference will allow us to investigate whether apes would use the rewards 
in the non-social option as leverage to influence their partners’ decisions and whether they would 
understand the importance of others’ leverage. 
Findings in the context of apes’ field observations 
In the field, chimpanzees and bonobos find many situations in which different subjects’ interests may 
conflict and individuals have the possibility to coordinate in multiple ways. For instance, when they 
need to decide where to move next, during group defence or in situations of CAP such as cooperative 
hunts or group patrols.  In the studies presented in this dissertation I tried to model these types of 
situations by presenting chimpanzees and bonobos with conflict situations in which they could always 
decide whether to cooperate or free-ride. Therefore, these studies allowed me to test hypothesis 
about apes’ decision-making strategies in ecologically relevant contexts such as CAPs by focusing on 
their decisions and actions at the dyadic level. In the studies presented in the dissertation apes acted 
strategically to maximize their rewards while trying to minimize the risks contingent to each task. 
These results are consistent with field observations. In the context of cooperative hunts, for instance, 
it has been found that chimpanzees try to minimize risks when they hunt; chimpanzees are more likely 
to hunt when other food resources are secure (Mitani and Watts, 1999) or when estrous females are 
not around in order to maximize resources (Gilby, 2006). In the context of group patrols, chimpanzees 
are more likely to attack out-group members when they have numeric advantage and to modify their 
grouping and vocalizations to reduce risks of being detected in high risks areas (Wilson, Britton & 
Franks, 2002; Wilson, Hauser & Wrangham, 2001; Wilson & Wrangham, 2003). The finding that some 
individuals were willing to cooperate most times in Study 2a (i.e., the pullers) gives support to the 
hypothesis that, in the field, certain individuals, so-called impact hunters, are willing to initiate 
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cooperation during CAPs such as cooperative hunts or border patrols (Gilby et al., 2008, 2015), paying 
the cooperative costs (e.g., energetic expenditure, risks of injury or risks of attack) while increasing 
the group’s overall success.  Moreover, in the studies reported in this thesis chimpanzees and bonobos 
waited longer to act in conflict situations as a function of the conditions presented and their partners’ 
likely decisions. This is consistent with chimpanzees’ behaviour during group hunts; some individuals 
wait for others’ to start and likely benefit by reducing their own risk of injury (e.g., avoiding male 
colobus defence) (Gilby et al., 2008) or by occupying better hunting spots in relation the individuals 
initiating the hunt (Boesch, 2002). Therefore, the findings exposed in the dissertation bridge 
experimental work in apes’ cooperation during conflict situations with field observations of conflict 
resolution at the group level. Future research in both experimental and field settings should continue 
to investigate in more detail, for instance, the underlying motivations of impact-hunters to cooperate 
in such settings and the benefits they accrue from those interactions (i.e., whether impact-hunters 
benefit more than others or whether they behave truly altruistically for the benefit of other group 
members). In addition, experimental research should try to present apes with more conflicts of 
interest at the group level (i.e., CAPs) (Schneider et al., 2012) in an attempt to close the gap between 
individual decision-making at the group level and findings at the dyadic level such as the ones reported 
in the dissertation. 
 
Findings in the context of animal cooperation 
 
In the last few years, the study of the cognitive abilities of social animals to coordinate for mutual 
benefits, has extended the initial findings that chimpanzees flexibly coordinate with their partners to 
obtain mutually rewards (Hirata and Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006a). Since then, diverse species 
including elephants (Plotnik, Lair, Suphachoksahakun & De Waal, 2011), hyenas (Drea & Carter, 2009), 
dogs (Ostojić & Clayton, 2014), african grey parrots (Péron, Rat-Fischer, Lalot, Nagle & Bovet, 2011) 
and keas (Heaney, Gray & Taylor, 2017) have been tested using different versions of the pulling task 
design by Hirata and Fuwa (2007). The use of a general methodology allows us to compare the 
behaviour of a range of species and to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying their abilities 
to coordinate.  
However, little is known about animal capacities to coordinate in conflict scenarios such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Snowdrift. In a seminal study, Stephens and colleagues (2002) tested the 
capacity of blue jays to cooperate in an iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  In that study they 
found that blue jays reciprocated more often when subjects were paired with reciprocal partners 
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(partners that always cooperated) and when the rewards were accumulated over time (i.e., subjects 
could see the quantity of rewards increasing over time before they could access them). In contrast, 
when rewards were not accumulated —the obtained rewards were eaten at the end of the trial— and 
partners did not reciprocate, cooperation decreased over trials. In line with this result, a recent study 
by Wood and colleagues (2016) has shown that rats tested in a Prisoner’s Dilemma favoured the short-
term payoffs of defection over long-term mutual cooperation. Moreover, they did not develop any 
Tit-for-Tat or Pavlov strategy to maintain cooperation. Although these studies use the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to study animal capacities to cooperate, they differ in several aspects from our Prisoner’s 
Dilemma study, hindering the comparison between them. For instance, our chimpanzees lived in the 
same social groups while blue jays and rats were paired for the study period. Moreover, chimpanzees 
took their decisions in full view of their partners. In contrast,  blue jays and rats actions were much 
more restricted;  to either cooperate or defect subjects had to press a lever or hop on a perch, casting 
doubt whether individuals were able to understand their partners actions (in Stephens et al., (2002) 
this was not an option as the stooge partner always acted before the subject). Finally, in contrast to 
our study, in these studies active coordination (e.g., pull together to collaborate) was not required to 
solve the task. In all, more studies with comparable experimental designs (in the same vein of Hirata 
and Fuwa (2007)) are needed to provide insights into the nature of animals’ collaboration when 
situations of conflict arise. 
So far I have provided a general discussion of the results reported in this thesis, relating them to 
previous work conducted with apes in experimental settings as well as to field observations and 
extending the discussion to other animal species. However, to fully account for the significance of the 
studies that compose the dissertation, in the next section I consider possible methodological 
differences that may help to clarify some of the results of the dissertation. 
Methodological considerations 
In all the studies of the dissertation, pairs of apes were presented with conflict and control 
(competitive) trials. Depending on the study, they were presented either separately or intermixed 
within sessions. Therefore, it is possible that, instead of the conflict of interest in play, the order of 
trial presentation could have influenced individuals’ strategies to solve the conflict. For instance, to 
explain the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy that some subjects adopted in Study 2a, the most likely 
explanation is that such a strategy prevented direct competition over rewards, while both subjects 
still obtained a share. This strategy, however, was not feasible in Study 4a; it would have resulted in 
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no rewards during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials.  Another possible interpretation is that chimpanzees 
used the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy to deal with the difficulty of tracking previous reward 
distributions, independently of the type of conflict presented. This could explain why they only applied 
this strategy in Study 2a, in which Snowdrift and competitive trials were mixed.  Therefore, future 
studies should carefully consider the effects of trial presentation when exploring apes’ strategies to 
coordinate in situations of competing interests. 
Due to the methodological differences between the studies that compose the dissertation it is not 
possible to investigate in isolation the effect of each type of risk on the apes’ performance. However, 
based on the strategies that apes used in each task I would argue that the risks stemming from apes 
social interactions between partners (e.g., competitive interactions in Study 2a) could have strongly 
influenced the strategies apes used to deal with the conflicts presented. In Study 2a, for instance, 
when competitive risks were presented, a proportion of apes refused to participate (non-pullers). This 
was corroborated in Study 3 in which apes occasionally preferred the alternative option even when 
the social option offered them higher rewards. In contrast, chimpanzees did not stop participating in 
Study 4a —no subject was categorized as non-puller— even though unilateral pulls resulted in no 
rewards during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. In all, these findings suggest that apes strategies to 
overcome conflicts of interest are tightly influenced not just by the rewards at stake but by the social-
risks contingent to the task. 
 
5.2 Children’s coordination under conflict 
 
The general finding stemming from the two studies conducted with 5-year old children is that they are 
able to coordinate their decisions to overcome situations of conflict (see Table 3 for a summary of the 
main findings). Children use more sophisticated strategies to overcome the risk of failure in 
comparison to apes. Moreover, they use verbal communication to facilitate coordination when their 
interests compete. For instance, when they are presented with the opportunity to maximize their 
rewards by waiting for their partner to pull, they strategically wait longer and these latencies increase 
over the study period while securing a proportion of the potential rewards (Study 2b in Chapter 2). In 
contrast, when their unilateral actions lead to a loss of rewards, they develop cooperative strategies 
to divide the rewards (i.e., turn-taking strategy) while reducing competition (Study 4b in Chapter 3). 
In the following section I provide a general discussion of the findings and how the results of these two 
studies relate to previous research. 
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Table 3: Summary of children’s studies. 
Discussion of the findings 
When 5-year old children were presented with conflict situations in the form of Snowdrift and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games, I found that in line with previous research (Grueneisen et al., 2016; Melis 
et al., 2016), children coordinated their decisions to deal with the conflict situations presented. 
However, children substantially differed in their strategies to solve each game, in their latencies to act 
and in the ways they communicated during each type of interaction. I would argue that these 
behavioural differences are the result of two key differences between the two studies reported in this 
dissertation.  
The first difference resides in the nature of both games. Despite the fact that children faced a conflict 
of interest to be resolved in both tasks, in the Snowdrift game unilateral cooperation was always 
rewarded whereas in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it resulted in the worse possible outcome (Sugden, 1986; 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). The second difference refers to the way the conflicts were presented. 
In both studies we contrasted the game condition (either the Snowdrift or the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
condition) with a competitive condition in which it was always better for a child to be faster than his 
or her partner to retrieve the highest amount of rewards; in competitive trials there was no need to 
Study Main findings 
Study 2b 
Children coordinated their actions to solve a 
Snowdrift game by pulling in a majority of trials 
to secure a share of the rewards. They acted 
strategically, increasing their latency to pull 
across the study period. 
Study 4b 
Children took turns to solve a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. They waited longer to pull in 
Prisoner’s Dilemma trials but, overall, 
decreased their latencies across the study 
period 
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wait. In the Snowdrift study, both conditions were randomly presented within sessions (Study 2b in 
Chapter 2). In contrast, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma study, each condition was presented separately 
(Study 4b in Chapter 3). 
Given these differences, children adopted specific strategies to solve each type of conflict. In the 
Snowdrift game children developed a strategy that consisted of pulling on every trial to obtain 
rewards, the “both-partners-pull” strategy. This strategy might have been the result of children 
experiencing that they could always secure a share of the rewards on every trial. In fact, direct pulls 
resulted in rewards for both pair members on most trials. Therefore, it is not surprising that children 
used this strategy to solve the task while they increased the competitive nature of the game. 
Moreover, a complex strategy such as turn-taking would have been cognitively demanding for 5-year 
old children in this task. Besides the cognitive requirements necessary for effective turn-taking (see 
Stevens & Hauser, 2004), 5-year old children would have needed to keep track of all previous 
outcomes (both in Snowdrift and competitive trials) to maximize efficiency.  In contrast, in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, unilateral pulls only guaranteed the acquisition of rewards in competitive trials. 
This contingency, made evident through the training, likely allowed children to better understand the 
risk involved in the task. In support of this hypothesis, children established a turn-taking strategy to 
coordinate their actions in both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the competitive trials and thus, secure a 
fair proportion of the rewards for each child.  Moreover, the repeated presentation of the same 
condition within sessions presumably helped children to establish and maintain the turn-taking 
strategy. In contrast to the “both-partners-pull” strategy, the turn-taking strategy reduced the 
competitive nature of the game despite the conflict of interest presented.  
Thus, by focusing on the strategies children developed to overcome both types of conflicts, we could 
wrongly conclude that they only behave strategically in the Prisoner’s Dilemma task. However, this 
picture clearly changes when we focus on their latencies to act.   
In both tasks children waited longer to pull during the game conditions. In other words, when their 
interests conflicted, each preferred the other to pull. At the same time, they were faster in competitive 
trials to obtain the highest reward before their partner. Thus, from the results of their latencies I 
inferred that they distinguished both conditions and acted strategically to maximize their rewards. 
Yet, there were clear differences between the two studies in the way children waited. In the Snowdrift 
study, children became more strategic across the study period, waiting longer to pull across Snowdrift 
trials but, at the same time, reducing their latencies in competitive ones. In line with this strategy, 
their latencies clearly reflected the way children competed to obtain the rewards: they tried to 
maximize their rewards by waiting up to a certain point. Then, they preferred to pull and secure the 
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rewards. In that sense, children were acting rationally according to the payoffs of the game, preferring 
to cooperate when their partners defect to avoid the worst outcome (mutual defection). In contrast, 
children became faster across the Prisoner’s Dilemma study in both conditions, waiting slightly more 
to pull in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials. The fact that children became faster might be strongly related to 
the strategy they used to coordinate in this task; once the turn-taking sequence was established 
between the pair members (through the formation of a joint goal), children did not need to wait for 
each other to act.  
Finally, I found that children communicated differently between the studies presented in this 
dissertation. During the Snowdrift study, children competed more to obtain the highest share of the 
rewards and this was reflected in the way in which they communicated. They mainly used 
communicative acts to coordinate in Snowdrift trials. This makes sense if we consider that children 
preferred their partners to pull in that condition (evident from their increased latencies to pull across 
time). Moreover, in the Snowdrift trials they mainly used imperatives to influence their partners’ 
decisions for their own benefit. In contrast, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma task, children used a turn-taking 
strategy to divide their rewards. Therefore, although children tended to wait longer during Prisoner’s 
Dilemma trials, I would argue that they treated both conditions similarly. In line with this argument, 
children did not differ in their use of communication between conditions. Moreover, in contrast to 
the Snowdrift study, they did not only use imperatives to guide their partner’s actions but also 
informatives to inform their partners about their decisions and actions. These forms of communication 
likely helped children to maintain efficient coordination through the study period. 
Findings in the context of human cooperation 
The findings presented in this dissertation add to previous results by exploring children’s strategies to 
coordinate in different scenarios of conflict (Grueneisen et al., 2016; Melis et al., 2016). A general 
finding of the studies presented is that by the age of 5-year old, children are able to coordinate their 
actions and adjust their strategies and communication according to different types of conflict 
presented.  
The results of this dissertation are consistent with findings showing that, between the ages of three 
to five, children are already able to coordinate their actions to achieve common goals (Wyman et al., 
2013) and they use communication to coordinate their decisions effectively (Duguid et al., 2014). At 
this stage of development, children also begin to see their cooperative partners as potential 
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reciprocators and to care about their own reputation as good cooperators (Engelmann, Herrmann & 
Tomasello, 2012; Sebastián-Enesco & Warneken, 2015; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). Moreover, the 
results of this work are also consistent with finding showing that, between three to five years of age, 
children begin to understand the normative side of cooperation, feeling mutually committed to 
collaborate through the formation of joint goals and feeling obligated to keep up with their promises 
(Hamann et al., 2011; Kanngiesser, Köymen & Tomasello, 2017; Tuomela, 2006; Warneken et al., 2012; 
see Melis & Warneken, 2016 for a comparative review). The formation of joint goals with partners is 
therefore likely to be key in the establishment of efficient cooperative strategies based on “strategic 
trust” (Tomasello, 2016) such as turn-taking.   
Overall, the development of these cognitive abilities through ontogeny are necessary for the 
development of later human strategic abilities to cooperate in situations of competing interests (Blake 
et al., 2015; Kümmerli et al., 2007; see also Sally & Hill, 2006 for a positive relationship between Theory 
of Mind abilities and strategic behaviour in later childhood). 
 
Insights into the evolution of human cooperation 
 
The findings of this dissertation are in line with the Interdependence Hypothesis (Tomasello, 2012), 
which states that at some point in our evolutionary history, humans began to depend even more (in 
comparison to other social species) on their collaborative partners to survive. Thus, they were selected 
for their abilities to coordinate in collaborative endeavours, paving the way for the evolution of 
contemporary humans. Over the course of evolution, early human coordinative abilities for 
collaborative foraging likely had a spillover effect into more drastic situations such as when individuals 
needed to coordinate their actions in the face of adversity (e.g., defence against other predators). 
These types of situations would have further contributed to the selection of cooperative and 
trustworthy individuals, capable of coordinating even when this conflicts with their personal interest. 
This predicts a distinction between apes and human cognitive abilities to coordinate with others. In 
fact, this is what we see in the studies presented in this dissertation. Chimpanzees and bonobos used 
simpler, though specific, strategies to coordinate and maximize their rewards, in line with field 
observations in contexts of conflict (Gilby et al., 2015). In contrast, children used more elaborate 
strategies to coordinate their actions over time and to secure equal shares between pair members, 
especially in those cases in which the conflict was very evident. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
By adapting the Snowdrift and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models, we have advanced our understanding 
of chimpanzees, bonobos and children’s capacities to coordinate in situations of conflict of interest. 
The results of my studies have demonstrated that the three species were successful at solving 
different situations of conflict, showing some similarities in the ways they coordinated their actions, 
especially when those conflicts were difficult to predict and their own actions resulted in direct 
benefits. At the same time, the findings support the idea that children possess uniquely cognitive 
abilities to coordinate, allowing them to develop more efficient strategies to overcome situations of 
conflict.  
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APPENDICES 
Ethical note 
The ape’ studies presented in the thesis (Studies 1, 2a, 3 and 4a) were ethically approved by an internal 
committee at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Animal husbandry and research 
comply with the “EAZA Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and 
Aquaria”, the “WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and 
Aquariums” and the “Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioural Research and Teaching” 
of the Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. 
All children that participated in Studies 2b and 4b were recruited from a database of children whose 
parents had provided written consent to take part in child development and comparative studies, and 
in accordance with all applicable laws and rules governing psychological research in Germany.
General analysis for all studies 
All the analyses included in this thesis (except binomial tests in Studies 2a, 2b, 4a and 4b)  were 
conducted using Linear Mixed models (LMM) and Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) (Baayen, 
Davidson & Bates, 2008) and were run using R statistics (version 3.1.1). We ran all LMM with Gaussian 
error structure and identity link function and all GLMM with binomial structure and logit link function. 
All continuous variables were z-transformed when required.  
All full models were compared to a null model excluding all the test variables. Only when the 
comparison between the full and the null model was significant we further investigate the significance 
of the test variables. In some occasions, we reduced models that were almost significant after 
discussing the procedure with a statistician). The drop1 function of the lme4 package (Bates, 2010) 
was used to test each variable’s significance (including possible interactions between test predictors). 
Non-significant interactions were removed to produce a new reduced model.  A likelihood ratio test 
with significant set at p < 0.05 was used to compare models and to test the significance of the 
individual fixed effects (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily, 2013). The 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the 
reduced models were calculated when appropriate.  
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Moreover, to rule out collinearity, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were checked (Field, 2005). All VIF 
values were closer to 1. For every model, model stability was assessed by comparing the estimates 
derived by a model based on all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the random 
effects excluded one at a time. All models were stable. In linear mixed models is not possible to obtain 
effect sizes for each predictor. It is only possible to report size effects for the effect sizes as a whole 
(or fixed and random effects together). These general effect sizes were not considered informative for 
the purpose of these studies and were not reported. 
Chapter 1 Study 1 
Subjects’ information Study 1 
Table A1: Subjects' information for Study 1 in Chapter 1. 
Name Sex Age (years)
Paired with (phase 
1) 
Paired with 
(phase 2) 
Corrie F 38 Fraukje Ulla 
Fraukje F 38 Corrie Kara 
Frodo M 21 Lome Riet 
Kara F 9 Lobo Sandra 
Kofi M 9 Ulla Lobo 
Lobo M 10 Kara Kofi 
Lome M 13 Frodo Robert 
Riet F 37 Robert Frodo 
Robert M 39 Riet Lome 
Sandra F 21 Taï NA 
Taï F 12 Sandra NA 
Ulla F 34 Kofi Corrie 
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Model Information Study 1 
When the data for this study was analysed, one trial was removed due to a problem with the scales 
and another was missing due experimenter error. Thus the total number of data points was 702 
instead of 704.  
Model 1. Waiting time before pulling (LMM) 
Model 1 investigated the length of time subjects waited before acting. In this model we included only 
the trials were both subjects waited before the security peg was released (N = 586). The response was 
the time (in seconds) that subjects waited before start pulling. We expected subjects to minimise their 
own effort by waiting longer in high weight than in low weight conditions and that this strategy could 
increase across trials and sessions. We also expected the type of trial to influence in the subjects 
waiting time, decreasing their time when in short time trials. Phase was included to test whether 
subjects would wait more in phase 2 due to their previous experience in the task (during phase 1). The 
full model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as 
the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were 
sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes.  The 
comparison between the full and the null model was significant (GLMM: F28 = 17.004, N= 586 p = 0.03). 
Two non-significant interactions were dropped from the model: the interaction between weight 
condition and type of trial (LMM: F21 = 0.066, N = 586, p = 0.797) and the interaction between weight 
condition and session number (LMM: F21 = 0.556, N = 586, p = 0.456,). A significant interaction between 
weight condition and trial was found indicating that subjects waited longer to pull at the end of high 
weight sessions (see Table A2). 
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Table A2: Model 1.  
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept -0.123 0.158 - - - -0.432/0.197
Phase 0.049 0.099 0.22 1 0.638 -0.123/0.252
Sex of dyad - - 0.404 2 0.817 - 
Type of trial (long) -0.034 0.046 0.525 1 0.469 -0.126/0.059
Session number -0.017 0.054 0.099 1 0.753 -0.122/0.089
Weight condition*trial 
number 
-0.107 0.043 6.127 1 0.013 -0.195/-0.022
Model 2. Waiting time before pulling in pre-test trials (LMM) 
Model 2 investigated whether subjects differed in their waiting time (measured in seconds) between 
weight conditions when they were participating in the pre-test trials. The response was the time (in 
seconds) that subjects waited before start pulling in the pre-test trials. This test was conducted to 
determine whether subjects were influenced by the weight condition when no partner was present. 
We hypothesize that subjects will not differ in their latency between weight conditions in those 
situations. We only took into account the second trial of each pair of experience trials before the start 
of the test session. The full model included weight condition and session as test variables; the control 
variables were sex of the individuals as fixed effect; subject, partner and dyad as random effects and 
the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: 
F22 = 1.265, N = 166, p = 0.26) suggesting that subjects did not differ between weight conditions when 
they were alone.  
Model 3. Time spent pulling by at least one subject (LMM) 
Model 3 investigated the time that subjects spent pulling on the rope within a trial, either individually 
or simultaneously. In this model we included only the trials were both subjects waited before we 
released the security peg (N = 586). As a response variable we used the total time (measured in 
seconds) from the moment they started to pull until one chimpanzee touched a piece of banana.   If 
chimpanzees were getting tired across the trials of a high weight session, we would expect them to 
pull more slowly towards end of the sessions. We would expect them to pull faster in low weight trials 
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overall and to not change their time spent pulling within a session. The full model included the test 
variables weight condition, type of trial, session and trial as well as the interactions: type of trial, 
session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were phase and sex of the dyad as 
fixed effects; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes.  The comparison between 
the full and the null model was significant (LMM: F28 = 32.73, N = 586, p < 0.0001). Two non-significant 
interactions from the model were dropped: the interaction between weight condition and type of trial 
(LMM: F21 = 2.177, N = 586, p = 0.14) and the interaction between weight condition and session number 
(LMM: F21 = 0.013, N = 586, p = 0.909). A significant interaction between weight condition and trial was 
found suggesting that subjects got slightly faster across high weight sessions (See Table A3). 
Table A3: Model 3. 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 1.257 0.121 - - - 0.999/1.492 
Phase -0.003 0.076 0.002 1 0.968 -0.142/0.158
Sex of dyad - - 0.705 2 0.703 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
0.03 0.043 0.493 1 0.483 -0.054/0.115
Session number -0.07 0.032 3.13 1 0.077 -0.134/-0.007
Weight 
condition*trial 
number 
0.119 0.036 10.76 1 0.001 0.047/0.188 
Model 4. Likelihood to cooperate (GLMM) 
Model 4 investigated each dyad’s likelihood to pull together. In this model we included all the data (N 
= 702). We transformed the “measure of equality” (ME) into a binomial response where 1 meant both 
pulling and 0 meant that only one subject pulled. Cooperation was expected to increase across trials 
and/or sessions. We expected subjects to pull together more often in high weight trials. We also 
expected the type of trial to influence subjects in their likelihood to pull together, pulling together 
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more often in short time trials. Phase was included to test whether subjects would cooperate more in 
phase 2 due to their previous experience in the task (during phase 1). The full model included the test 
variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the interactions: type of 
trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were sex of the dyad and the 
total time until the subjects touches the reward as fixed effect; subject and dyad as random effects 
and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was marginally significant 
(GLMM: F28 = 13.457, N = 702, p = 0.097). Therefore, due to the observed trend (p < 0.1). We inspected 
how the test variables contributed to the response.  Two non-significant interactions were dropped 
from the model: the interaction between weight condition and type of trial (GLMM: F21 = 0.314, N = 
702, p = 0.575) and the interaction between weight condition and trial number (GLMM: F21 = 0.106, N 
= 702, p = 0.745).  We found an almost significant interaction between weight condition and session 
number suggesting that subjects pulled together more often during the last high weight sessions (see 
Table A4).  
 
Table A4: Model 4. 
 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 3.973 0.786 - - - 2.847/5.417 
Phase 0.543 0.515 0.938 1 0.334 -0.438/1.686 
Sex of dyad - - 9.919 2 0.007 - 
Total time until they 
touch the reward 
0.562 0.258 3.497 1 0.061 0.114/1.199 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.199 0.237 0.643 1 0.423 -0.725/0.277 
Trial number -0.283 0.168 1.985 1 0.159 -0.670/0.067 
Weight 
condition*session 
number 
-0.967 0.437 3.518 1 0.06 -1.911/-0.108 
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Model 5. Degree of cooperation (LMM) 
Model 5 investigated the dyad’s degree of cooperation. The response of the model was the ME. This 
model only took into account the dyads that pulled together (N = 490). We expected subjects to 
cooperate more in high weight condition (especially in short time trials were the risk of losing the 
reward were higher). At the same time, cooperation was expected to increase across sessions and/or 
trials in high weight trials as a consequence of the experience pulling together. In contrast, in low 
weight trials subjects were not expected to coordinate that often as they could easily pull alone.  The 
full model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as 
the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were 
sex of the dyad as fixed effect and subject and dyad as random effects.  The comparison between the 
full and the null model was not significant (LMM: F28 = 9.716, N = 490, p = 0.286) indicating that the 
test variables did not significantly contribute to the subjects degree of cooperation. 
Model 6. Difference in weight between 1st and 2nd puller (LMM) 
Model 6 investigated the percentage of the total weight pulled by the first puller (excluding trials in 
which only the first subject pulled (N = 212) and trials where both subjects pulled at the same time (N 
= 12). The response was the percentage of weight pulled by the first puller. We expected that the first 
puller would pull a higher weight than the second puller. Moreover, despite pulling together more in 
the high weight condition, we expect that the differences between both subjects might increase across 
high weight sessions because subjects would increasingly try to avoid pulling first (the most costly). 
The full model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as 
well as the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control 
variables were sex of the dyad, phase, type of trial, trial and session as fixed effects; subject and dyad 
as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was 
significant (LMM: F24 = 10.268, N = 478, p = 0.031). Two non-significant interactions were dropped from 
the model: the interaction between weight condition and type of trial (LMM: F21 = 1.074, N = 478, p = 
0.3) and the interaction between weight condition and trial number (LMM: F21 = 0.0009, N = 478, p = 
0.976). A significant interaction between weight condition and session was found significant 
suggesting that the 1st puller pulled more weight in later sessions of the high weight (see Table A5). 
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Table A5: Model 6. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 0. 577 0.0322 - - - 0.513/0.647 
Phase 0.003 0.013 0.06 1 0.807 -0.026/0.032 
Sex of dyad - - 2.139 2 0.343 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.043 0.025 2.516 1 0.113 -0.089/0.007 
Trial number -0.006 0.017 0.117 1 0.731 -0.042/0.028 
Weight 
condition*session 
number 
-0.065 0.0212 7.252 1 0.007 -0.103/-0.021 
 
Differences between model 5 and model 6 
These two models, despite answering similar questions differ substantially in their response. Model 5 
is not directional and measures the equality of cooperation between both individuals pulling while 
Model 6 is directional as it takes the percentage of the total weight pulled by the 1st puller compared 
to the 2nd puller as the response, answering the specific question of how much weight was pulled by 
the subject that initiated the action compared to the subject that lagged behind.  
 
Model 7. Difference in weight pulled regarding the partners (LMM) 
Model 7 investigated whether subjects performed differently (with regard to the average weight 
pulled) with the two partners they were tested with. As a response we used the difference in weight 
that the subjects moved when they were paired with different partners. To calculate the response we 
previously calculated the total average weight that each subject moved across all sessions with a 
specific partner and then the difference between those average values. Therefore we obtained 20 
responses; each was the difference in weight for the subject’s response between the two partners for 
each condition. The full model included weight condition as fixed factor and subject as random effect. 
The comparison between the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: F21 = 0.268, N = 20, p 
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= 0.605). Moreover, we investigated whether there was a general tendency, regardless of the 
condition, for subject’s differing in their average pulled weight when confronted with different 
partners. Due to the nature of GLMM we were unable to calculate the p-value to accompany the 
results. Instead, a bootstrapping (boot.glm function in R) was used to calculate the confidence 
intervals (CI). Subject’s rates of pulled weight differed significantly from 0 (no difference in subject’s 
response in relation to weight between different partners) (X = 45.89, CI [27.84, 63.56]) suggesting 
that they were moving significantly different amounts of weight when they were paired with different 
partners. 
Model 8. Previous experience effect on cooperation in subsequent trials (GLMM) 
Model 8 investigated whether subjects’ probability to pull was influenced by the partners’ previous 
decisions to pull within a session.  In this model we excluded the first trial of each session, as subjects 
had no previous experience before that trial. Therefore, we only used data were subjects had previous 
experience with a partner. As a response we used the ME. We expected that the likelihood to pull 
would have been constant regardless of the partners’ previous decisions to pull. However, in the 
extreme cases where the partners would have been very reliable, we would have expected subjects 
to pull less. We also expected the type of trial to influence subjects’ likelihood to pull, pulling more 
often in short time trials in order to secure the rewards. The full model included the test variables, 
weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the interactions: type of trial, session, 
trial and previous experience each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex of the dyad, 
phase, type of trial, trial, session and the total time until the subjects touches the reward as fixed 
effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full 
and the null model was non-significant (GLMM: F28 = 6.202, N = 1228, p = 0.4). 
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Chapter 2 Studies 2a and 2b 
 
Subjects’ information Study 2a 
Table A6: Subject information for Study 2a in Chapter 2. 
Name Species Sex Age (years) 
Paired with 
(phase 1) 
Paired with 
(phase 2) 
Fimi Bonobo F 7 Yasa Kuno 
Gemena Bonobo F 10 Luisa Yasa 
Kuno Bonobo M 19 Lexi Fimi 
Lexi Bonobo F 16 Kuno Luisa 
Luiza Bonobo F 10 Gemena Lexi 
Yasa Bonobo F 18 Fimi Gemena 
Frodo Chimpanzee M 21 Lome Riet 
Kara Chimpanzee F 9 Lobo Sandra 
Kofi Chimpanzee M 9 Natascha Lobo 
Lobo Chimpanzee M 10 Kara Kofi 
Lome Chimpanzee M 13 Frodo Robert 
Natascha Chimpanzee F 34 Kofi Taï 
Riet Chimpanzee F 37 Robert Frodo 
Robert Chimpanzee M 39 Riet Lome 
Sandra Chimpanzee F 21 Taï Kara 
Taï Chimpanzee F 12 Sandra Natascha 
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Model information Study 2a 
Model 9. Waiting time before pulling (LMM) 
Model 9 investigated how long the first individual waited to pull. In this model we included the trials 
were at least one subject pulled one rope (N = 1019). The response was the time (in seconds) that a 
subject waited before start pulling. We expected subjects to maximize their rewards by waiting longer 
to pull in Snowdrift condition and pull faster in the competitive condition. We also expected them to 
wait longer to pull in Snowdrift condition across trials and or sessions. We included phase as a test 
predictor to see whether subjects would wait more in phase 2 due to their previous experience in the 
task (during phase 1). The full model included the test variables condition, session, trial, phase and 
species as well as the interactions between condition and session and between condition and trial. 
The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject on the right, subject on the left and 
dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model 
was significant (LMM: F27 = 16.588, N = 1019, p = 0.02). We dropped the two non-significant two-way 
interactions between condition and session (LMM, F21 = 1.135, N= 1019, p = 0.29) and between 
condition and trial (LMM: F21 = 1.452, N= 1019, p = 0.23).  We found a main effect of condition and trial 
(see Table A7). Apes pulled faster in competitive trials and reduced their latency to pull in both 
conditions within sessions. 
Table A7: Model 9. 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 0.355 0.125 - - - 0.029/0.697 
Phase 0.01 0.07 0.02 1 0.886 -0.184/0.212
Sex of dyad - - 4.37 2 0.112 - 
Session 0.02 0.028 0.477 1 0.489 -0.59/0.0987
Trial -0.039 0.016 4.866 1 0.027 -0.082/0.007
Species 0.037 0.158 0.055 1 0.815 -0.386/0.488
Condition 0.266 0.077 9.181 1 0.002 0.057/0.483 
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Table A8. Percentage of times in which each subject obtained 4 rewards. 
Subject Species Sex % of trials in which a subject obtains 4 rewards 
Lobo Chimpanzee Male 65 
Gemena Bonobo Female 59 
Lome Chimpanzee Male 54 
Riet Chimpanzee Female 54 
Kara Chimpanzee Female 52 
Lexi Bonobo Female 52 
Sandra Chimpanzee Female 52 
Fimi Bonobo Female 50 
Natasha Chimpanzee Female 49 
Kuno Chimpanzee Male 49 
Frodo Chimpanzee Male 48 
Tai Chimpanzee Female 46 
Luisa Bonobo Female 45 
Robert Chimpanzee Male 42 
Yasa Bonobo Female 40 
Kofi Chimpanzee Male 34 
 
Model 10. Distribution of conflict trials (GLMM) 
Model 10 investigated the predictors of conflict trial occurrences (trials in which both subjects pulled). 
In this model we included all trials except the first trials of each session (N = 895). We transformed our 
response into a binomial response where 1 meant that both subjects pulled and 0 meant that only 
one subject pulled. We expected that previous conflict trials would decrease the likelihood of a 
subsequent conflict trial. We also expected more conflict trials in the competitive condition compared 
to the Snowdrift condition. Finally, we also expected that conflict trials would decrease across trials, 
session and phase. The full model included the test variables condition, trial, session, phase, previous 
conflict trial and species. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject on the 
right, subject on the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between 
the full and the null model was marginally significant (GLMM: F26   = 11.49, N = 895, p = 0.074). 
Therefore, due to the observed trend, we inspected how the test variables contributed to the 
response although we did not calculate the confidence intervals for the estimates. We found that 
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condition was significant suggesting that there were more conflict trials in the competitive condition 
(see Table A9). 
Table A9: Model 10. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate Standard Error Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
Intercept -1.437 0.704 - - - 
Phase -0.187 0.385 -0.062 1 1 
Sex of dyad - - 5.286 2 0.071 
Session -0.429 0.341 1.452 1 0.228 
Trial -0.131 0.166 0.461 1 0.497 
Species 0.553 0.88 0.126 1 0.723 
Condition -2.186 0.857 6.607 1 0.01 
Prev. Conf. Trial -0.654 0.409 1.636 1 0.2 
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Figure A1. Graph showing the proportion of trials pulled when paired with each of the two partners. Each line 
end represents the proportion of pulls by a subject when paired with the partner with whom the subject pulled 
less (left side) and with whom the subject pulled more (right side), if pulling rate had been equal across partners 
we would have expected to see flat lines for each subject. 
 
Model information Study 2b 
Model 11. Waiting time before pulling (LMM) 
Model 11 investigated how long the first child waited to pull. We only included the trials in which at 
least one subject pulled the rope (N = 478). The response was the time (in seconds) that a subject 
waited before starting to pull after the onset of the trial. We also expected that they would wait longer 
to pull in Snowdrift condition across trials and sessions. The full model included the test variables 
condition, session, trial as well as the interactions between condition and session and between 
condition and trial. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject on the right, 
subject on the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the 
full and the null model was significant (LMM: F25 = 18.117, N = 478 p = 0.002). We dropped the non-
significant two-way interaction between condition and trial (LMM, F21 = 0.019, N= 478, p = 0.89).  We 
found a significant two-way interaction between condition and session suggesting that children got 
slightly slower across sessions in the Snowdrift condition and slightly faster in the competitive 
conditional. We also found a significant main effect of trial (see Table A10). 
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Table A10: Model 11. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 0.347 0.052 - - - 0.214/0.498 
Sex of dyad - - 0.523 1 0.469 -0.27/0.152
Trial -0.037 0.018 3.905 1 0.048 -0.083/0.011
Condition *session 0.105 0.046 4.913 1 0.027 -0.023/0.223
Model 12. Distribution of conflict trials (GLMM) 
Model 12 investigated what predicted the appearance of a conflict trial. In this model we included all 
trials except the first trial of each session (N = 420).  We transformed our response into a binomial 
response where 1 meant that both children pulled and 0 meant that only one child pulled. We 
expected that previous conflict trials would decrease the likelihood of a subsequent conflict trial. We 
also expected more conflict trials in the competitive condition compared to the Snowdrift condition. 
Finally, we also expected that conflict trials could decrease across trials and sessions. The full model 
included the test variables condition, trial, session and previous conflict trial. The control variables 
were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject on the right, subject on the left and dyad as random 
effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was non-
significant (GLMM: F24 = 5.305, N = 420, p = 0.257). 
Model 13. Communication (GLMM) 
Model 13 investigated the occurrence of communication. In this model we included all trials (N = 480).  
We transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant the presence of any 
communicative act within the members of the dyad in a given trial and 0 meant no presence of 
communicative acts within the members of the dyad in a given trial. We expected children to 
communicate more in the Snowdrift condition. We also expected children to communicate more 
across trials or sessions. The full model included the test variables condition, trial and session. The 
control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject on the right, subject on the left and dyad 
as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was 
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significant (GLMM: F23 = 8.165, N = 480, p = 0.043). We found a significant effect of condition suggesting 
that children communicated more during Snowdrift trials (see Table A11). 
 
Table A11: Model 13. 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate Standard Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced 
model 
Intercept -2.276 0.769 - - - -5.617/-0.138 
Sex of dyad -1.805 1.186 2.232 1 0.135 -5.741/1.506 
Trial 0.079 0.150 0.253 1 0.615 -0.359/0.557 
Session 0.447 0.228 3.093 1 0.079 -0.274/1.21 
Condition 1.087 0.444 4.719 1 0.03 -0.219/2.464 
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Chapter 2 Study 3 
Subjects’ information Study 3 
Table A12: Subjects’ information for Study 3 in chapter 2. 
Name Species Sex 
Age 
(years) 
Paired with 
(phase 1) 
Paired with 
(phase 2) 
Paired with 
(phase 3) 
Fimi Bonobo F 8 Yasa Gemena Kuno 
Gemena Bonobo F 11 Kuno Fimi Yasa 
Kuno Bonobo F 20 Gemena Yasa Fimi 
Yasa Bonobo F 19 Fimi Kuno Gemena 
Bangolo Chimpanzee M 6 Frodo Sandra Lobo 
Frodo Chimpanzee F 22 Bangolo Taï Sandra 
Kara Chimpanzee M 10 Lome Lobo Kofi 
Kofi Chimpanzee F 10 Lobo Lome Kara 
Lobo Chimpanzee M 11 Kofi Kara Bangolo 
Lome Chimpanzee M 14 Kara Kofi Taï 
Sandra Chimpanzee F 22 Taï Bangolo Frodo 
Taï Chimpanzee F 13 Sandra Frodo Lome 
Coordination in conflict situations 
142 
 
Model information Study 3 
Model 14. Choices (GLMM) 
Model 14 investigated whether apes adjusted their choices according to the number of food rewards 
in the social and the non-social options. In this model we included all trials in which a subject accessed 
either the social or the non-social option and we removed the trials where they did not access any 
option (in total: N = 2218). We transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant 
that the subject chose the social option and 0 meant that the subject chose the non-social option. We 
expected apes to choose the social option more often when there was food only present in the tray 
and the non-social option, more often that when there were five items present in the alternative 
platform. We also expected that they will switch from the social to the non-social option more 
abruptly in the Snowdrift condition compared to the competitive condition. We also investigated 
whether species differed in their choices. The full model included the test variables social condition, 
level of non-social condition and species as well as the three-way interaction between social condition, 
non-social condition and species. The control variables were sex of the dyad, session, trial and phase 
as fixed effects; subject, partner, dyad and trial id (to account for non-independence of data points) 
as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was 
significant (GLMM: F27   =74.184, N = 2218, p <0.001). We dropped the non-significant three-way 
interaction between social condition, non-social condition and species (GLMM: F21 = 1.029, N = 2218, 
p = 0.31). We found a significant two-way interaction between social condition and non-social 
condition (see Table A13). 
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Table A13: Model 14. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 0.238 0.847 - - - -2.165/2.828 
Phase -0.367 0.191 3.347 1 0.067 -0.914/0.188
Sex of dyad - - 2.143 2 0.342 - 
Trial 0.181 0.078 5.418 1 0.019 -0.046/0.409
Session -0.202 0.107 3.256 1 0.071 -0.519/0.103
Species -0.971 1.031 0.85 1 0.356 -3.814/2.086
Social 
condition*non-social 
condition 
1.213 0.346 9.572 1 0.002 0.284/2.258 
Model 15. Latencies to open the door (LMM) 
Model 15 investigated the length of time from the start of the trial (when the experimenters released 
the security pegs) until the moment the subjects open the door to access either the social or the non-
social option. In this model we included the trials in which an opening action occurred (N = 2216). The 
response was the time (in seconds) that a subject took to open one of the doors. We expected subjects 
to open the door faster in competitive trials compared to Snowdrift trials and we also expected a 
decrease in their latencies in relation to an increase in the number of items presented in the non-
social option. We expected the decrease in latency to follow a quadratic distribution. In other words, 
we hypothesized the decrease in latency to be unequal between conditions, being larger between 0 
and 1 levels of the non-social option during Snowdrift trials. For this reason we included a squared 
term for the non-social option. We also investigated whether chimpanzees and bonobos would differ 
in their latencies to open the door. The full model included the test variables social condition, level of 
non-social condition and species as well as the three-way interaction between social condition, non-
social condition, and species. The control variables were sex of the dyad, session, trial, phase and 
choices as fixed effects; subject, partner, dyad and trial id as random effects and the random slopes. 
The comparison between the full and the null model was significant (GLMM: F212   = 52.856, N = 2216, 
p <0.001). We dropped the non-significant three-way interaction between social condition, non-social 
condition and species (GLMM: F21   = 1.31, N= 2216, p = 0.31). We found a significant two-way 
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interaction between social condition and non-social condition and also a main effect of species; 
overall, chimpanzees opened the door faster than bonobos (see Table A14 and Figure A2). 
Table A14: Model 15. 
Test category (reference 
category) 
Estimate Standard Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
p-
value 
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 0.368 0.137 - - - -0.004/0.717 
Phase -0.094 0.037 4.884 1 0.027 -0.203/0.008
Sex of dyad - - 6.711 2 0.0348 - 
Trial -0.027 0.035 0.6 1 0.438 -0.12/0.069
Session -0.032 0.043 0.546 1 0.459 -0.144/0.09
Choice -0.637 0.134 14.47 1 0.0001 -1.029/-0.264
Species -0.567 0.171 8.06 1 0.004 -1.061/-0.099
Squared non-social 
condition 
0.148 0.034 11.697 1 0.0006 -0.053/0.243
Social condition*non-
social condition 
0.156 0.051 6.62 1 0.01 -0.007/0.295
Appendices 
145 
Figure A2. Latency of the subjects to open the door as a function of the number of food pieces in the non-social 
option and the social option (Snowdrift (SD) and competitive (COM) trials).Each figure depicts a CI. Top left 
Bonobos COM, top right Bonobos SD, bottom left Chimpanzees COM, bottom right Chimpanzees SD. Latencies in 
seconds are presented in a logarithmic scale. 
Model 16. Latencies to pull the ropes (LMM) 
Model 16 investigated the length of time from the moment a subject opens the door to the social 
option only until they start pulling on the rope. In this model we included the trials in which pulling 
occurred (N = 773). The response was the time (in seconds) that a subject took to pull the rope. We 
expected subjects to pull faster in competitive trials compared to Snowdrift trials. We investigated 
whether the presence of food in the non-social option (although not available anymore for the 
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subject) had an effect on the latency to pull the rope. We also tested whether chimpanzees and 
bonobos would differ in their latencies to pull. The full model included the test variables social 
condition, level of non-social condition and species as well as the three-way interaction between social 
condition, non-social condition and species. The control variables were sex of the dyad, session, trial 
and phase as fixed effects; subject, partner, dyad and trial id as random effects and the random slopes. 
The comparison between the full and the null model was significant (LMM: F28   = 31.236, N = 773, p 
<0.001). We found a significant three-way interaction between social condition, non-social condition 
and species (see Table A15 and Figure A3). In this model we had to make a correction a posteriori. We 
removed three outliers we did not detect in an earlier analysis. The three way interaction and the full-
null model comparison remained significant after the correction. 
Table A15: Model 16. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 0.848 0.067 - - - 0.663/1.044 
Phase -0.025 0.042 0.342 1 0.558 -0.145/0.084
Sex of dyad - - 0.896 2 0.638 - 
Trial -0.048 0.024 3.448 1 0.063 -0.116/0.014
Session 0.055 0.046 1.363 1 0.243 -0.069/0.181
Social condition*non-
social 
condition*species 
0.152 - 3.888 1 0.048 -0.044/0.37
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Figure A3. Latency of the subjects to pull the rope as a function of the levels in the non-social option and the 
social option (Snowdrift and competitive trials). Each figure depicts a CI. Top left Bonobos COM, top right Bonobos 
SD, bottom left Chimps COM, bottom right Chimps SD. Latencies in seconds are presented in a logarithmic scale. 
Model 17. Strategic choices of 2nd actors based on 1st actor actions (GLMM) 
Model 17 investigated whether 2nd actors would make strategic choices based on the previous choices 
of the 1st actors. In this model we included the trials where both the 1st and 2nd actors opened the 
sliding door (N = 925). We removed the trials in which both members opened their doors at the same 
time. To investigate the 2nd actors’ strategic choices, we created a binomial variable  establishing 
whether the choice of the 2nd actor was strategic or not based on the 1st actor decision for every 
combination of social and non-social conditions. We used this variable as the response variable in our 
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model. We expected that both social and non-social conditions would influence in the 2nd actors 
decisions. Moreover, we conducted pair-wise comparisons to analyse whether 2nd actors made 
strategic choices contingent upon the 1st actor’s decision for each combination of social and non-social 
conditions (8 levels in total). The full model included the test variables social condition and non-social 
condition as well as the two-way interaction between them. The control variables were the sex of the 
1st actor, the sex of the 2nd actor, session, trial, phase and species as fixed effects; first actor, second 
actor and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the 
null model was significant (GLMM: F27 = 43.413, N = 925, p <0.001). We found a significant two-way 
interaction between social condition, and non-social condition (see Table A16). The pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that 2nd actors were making strategic choices in 4 of 8 combinations (see Figure 
17 in Chapter 3).  
 
Table A16: Model 17. 
Test category (level 
5 non-social, COM 
condition) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 2.563 0.733 - - - 0.531/22.301 
Level 0 2.842 1.266 - - - -0.811/22.118 
Level 1 -0.278 0.885 - - - -18.633/2.596 
Level 3 -2.416 0.881 - - - -20.995/-0.126 
Phase 0.031 0.198 0.025 1 0.875 -0.548/0.696 
Session -0.015 0.156 0.009 1 0.926 -0.548/0.499 
Trial 0.047 0.127 0.14 1 0.708 -0.0367/0.444 
Species 0.332 0.484 0.446 1 0.504 -1.107/1.902 
Condition 
(Snowdrift) 
2.567 1.263 - - - -1.328/21.362 
Social 
condition*non-social 
condition 
- - 18.54 3 <0.001 - 
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Chapter 3 Studies 4a and 4b 
Subjects’ information Study 4a 
Table A17: Subject information for Study 4a in chapter 3. 
*these subjects only participated in the first phase of the test sessions.
Name Species Sex Age (years) Paired with 
Alex* Chimpanzee M 15 Jahaga 
Alexandra* Chimpanzee F 17 Daza 
Bangolo Chimpanzee M 7 Sandra 
Corrie Chimpanzee F 40 Frodo 
Daza* Chimpanzee F unknown Alexandra 
Dorien Chimpanzee F 36 Lome 
Frodo Chimpanzee M 23 Corrie 
Jahaga* Chimpanzee F 23 Alex 
Kofi Chimpanzee M 9 Lobo 
Lobo Chimpanzee M 12 Kofi 
Lome Chimpanzee M 15 Dorien 
Robert Chimpanzee M 41 Taï 
Sandra Chimpanzee F 23 Bangolo 
Taï Chimpanzee F 13 Robert 
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Model information Study 4a 
Due to the large number of trials in which chimpanzees did not wait to pull –in other words, zeros in 
our data-set (18% of trials), we analysed the latency measure with two different models. In the first 
model we explored whether chimpanzees waited or not to pull (binomial model), and in the second 
model we focused on the subset of the data in which they waited to pull (Gaussian model). We could 
not run a statistical model to explore what influences their likelihood to pull. The model was too over 
fitted relative to the small number of cases where no chimpanzee pulled (only 40 cases out of 760). In 
addition, we could not statistically analyse the duration of coordination trials during competitive 
sessions due to the small sample size of 77 coordination trials.  
 
Model 18. Binomial model of latencies in chimpanzees (GLMM) 
Model 18 investigated whether chimpanzees waited or not to pull. In this model we included the trials 
were at least one subject pulled one rope (N = 720). We transformed our response into a binomial 
response where 1 meant that the first subject waited more than 0 seconds to pull and 0 meant that 
the first subject did not wait to pull. We expected subjects to wait more in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
compared to the competitive condition and that this difference would increase across trials, sessions, 
and phases. The full model included the test variables condition, session, trial and phase as well as the 
interactions between condition and session, between condition and trial, and between condition and 
phase. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject in the right, subject in the 
left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null 
model was significant (GLMM: F27 = 22.14, N = 720, p = 0.002). We dropped the two non-significant 
two-way interactions: the interaction between condition and trial (GLMM, F21 = 3.41, N= 720, p = 0.064) 
and the interaction between condition and phase (GLMM, F21 = 0.09, N= 720, p = 0.76).  We found a 
significant two-way interaction between condition and session suggesting that chimpanzees waited 
more to pull across Prisoner’s Dilemma trials and waited less across competitive trials (see Table A18). 
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Table A18: Model 18. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 4.62 2.26 - - - -1.47/57.56 
Phase -0.15 0.57 0.78 1 0.79 -2.62/ 2.19
Sex of dyad - - 0.03 2 0.98 - 
Trial -0.13 0.12 1.19 1 0.27 -0.61/ 0.36
Condition*Session -1.75 0.55 7.61 1 0.005 -5.35/0.68
Model 19. Gaussian model of latencies in chimpanzees (LMM) 
Model 19 investigated how long the first individual of a pair waited to pull (only in those trials in which 
they waited to pull more than 0 seconds) (N = 590). The response was the time (in seconds) that a 
subject waited before start pulling. We expected subjects to wait longer in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
condition and pull faster in the competitive condition. We also expected them to wait longer to pull in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition across trials, sessions and phases. The full model included the test 
variables condition, session, trial and phase as well as the interactions between condition and session, 
between condition and trial and between condition and phase. The control variables were sex of the 
dyad as fixed effect; subject in the right, subject in the left and dyad as random effects and the random 
slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model was significant (LMM: F27 = 50.53, N = 590, 
p < 0.001). We dropped the non-significant two-way interaction between condition and phase (LMM: 
F21 = 0.46, N= 590, p = 0.5). We found a significant two-way interaction between condition and session 
(LMM, F21 = 6.41, N= 590, p= 0.01) and between condition and trial (LMM: F21 = 12.32, N= 590, p < 0.001) 
suggesting that chimpanzees waited longer to pull across Prisoner’s Dilemma trials and sessions but 
were faster across competitive trials and sessions (see Table A19). 
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Table A19: Model 19. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 0.13 0.75 - - - -2.02/1.94 
Phase -0.04 0.27 0.02 1 0.9 -0.73/0.71 
Sex of dyad - - 1.88 2 0.39 - 
Condition*Trial -0.49 0.21 12.57 1 <0.001 -0.77/-0.24 
Condition*Session -1.04 0.09 12.33 1 <0.001 -1.64/-0.45 
 
Model 20. Binomial model of coordination in chimpanzees (GLMM) 
Model 20 investigated whether chimpanzee dyads coordinated or not to pull together. In this model 
we included all trials (N = 759). We transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant 
that pairs coordinated (both pulled and divided their rewards) and 0 meant that dyads did not 
coordinate to collaborate. We expected dyads to coordinate more in both conditions across trials, 
sessions and phases. The full model included the test variables condition, session, trial and phase as 
well as the interactions between condition and session, between condition and trial and between 
condition and phase. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject in the right, 
subject in the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the 
full and the null model was significant (GLMM: F27 = 21.09, N = 759, p = 0.004). We dropped the two 
non-significant two-way interactions between condition and trial (GLMM, F21 =1.33, N = 759, p = 0.25) 
and between condition and phase (GLMM: F21 = 0.23, N = 759, p = 0.63). We found a strong trend 
between condition and session suggesting that chimpanzees coordinated more in competitive trials 
across sessions. Moreover, we found a main effect of phase (GLMM: F21 = 5.61, N = 759, p = 0.018) 
suggesting that chimpanzees coordinated more often in the second phase of the study (see Table 
A20). 
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Table A20: Model 20. 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept -5.09 1.61 - - - -69.45/-4.55 
Phase 0.76 0.26 5.61 1 0.018 -0.08/1.81
Sex of dyad - - 3.04 2 0.22 - 
Trial 0.26 0.2 1.51 1 0.22 -0.37/0.9
Condition*Session 1.4 0.73 3.58 1 0.058 -0.95/40.7
Relationship between food maximization and strategic choices 
We measured the relationship between the proportion of strategic choices individuals scored and the 
ratio of grapes per trial that individuals obtained. To calculate the proportion of strategic choices, we 
summed the proportion of pulls in competitive + the proportion of no-pulls in Prisoner’s Dilemma trials 
and we divided it by 2 for every individual. To calculate the ratio of grapes per trial as a measure of 
food maximization, we calculated a ratio between the total grapes consumed in the study divided by 
the total number of trials each chimpanzee performed. We found a positive correlation (r = 0.84; 
Figure A4) between food maximization and strategic choices. We found that two of the pullers 
obtained substantially more grapes than one strategiser. These two pullers learned to make short pulls 
during Prisoner’s Dilemma trials, resulting in some grapes jumping into their own bucket. Moreover, 
one strategiser obtained much less grapes than the other three strategisers. This strategiser was 
paired with another strategiser who performed better.  
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Figure A4. Positive correlation between the ratio of grapes per trial and the proportion of strategic choices. Each 
data point represents one subject. 
 
Model information Study 4b 
Model 21. Gaussian model of latencies in children (LMM) 
Model 21 investigated how long the first individual of a pair waited to pull (N = 303). The response 
was the time (in seconds) that a subject waited before start pulling. We removed the trials in which 
subjects did not pull (N = 15) and trials in which subjects did not wait (N = 2).  We expected subjects 
to wait longer in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition and pull faster in the competitive condition. We 
also expected them to wait longer to pull in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition across trials. The full 
model included the test variables condition, session and trial as well as the interaction between 
condition and trial (children only did one session, thus we did not include the interaction between 
condition and session). The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject in the right, 
subject in the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the 
full and the null model was significant (LMM: F24 = 32.56, N = 303, p < 0.001). We dropped the non-
significant two-way interaction between condition and trial (LMM, F21 = 2.4, N= 303, p = 0.12). We 
found a main effect of condition (LMM: F21 = 6.15, N = 303, p = 0.013) suggesting that children waited 
longer to pull in the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition. Moreover we found a main effect of session (LMM: 
F21 = 7.94, N = 303, p = 0.005) and of trial (LMM: F21 = 15.59, N = 303, p <0.001) in the same direction 
suggesting that children tended to pull faster across sessions and trials. (see Table A21). 
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Table A21: Model 21. 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 0.65 0.193 - - - 0.103/1.17 
Sex of dyad - - 3.89 1 0.048 - 
Session -0.202 0.065 7.94 1 0.005 -037/-0.015
Trial -0.282 0.056 15.59 1 <0.001 -0.442/-0.142
Condition 0.349 0.129 6.15 1 0.013 0.005/0.69 
Model 22. Turn-taking model (GLMM) 
Model 22 investigated whether children used a turn-taking strategy to solve the dilemma presented.
In this model we excluded the first trials of every session (N = 40) for a total of 280 trials.  We
transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant that children took a turn in a trial
and 0 meant children did not take a turn. A turn was defined as the occurrence of a unilateral pull by
individual A only when individual B had unilaterally pull in a previous trial. To calculate the probability
that a turn-taking event occurred by chance, we assumed that children were equally likely to either
defect (D) or cooperate (C) within a trial. Therefore, there were four possible outcomes within a trial
(C, C; D, D; C, D and D, C). Thus, there were 16 possible combinations between two consecutive trials
(the product of each trials’ combination) and only two resulted in turn-taking (C, D →D, C and D, C →
C, D). Thus, we determined that children had a probability to turn-take by chance in 12.5% of the trials
(2 of 16 possible combinations). We expected children to take more turns in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
condition. We also expected children to develop this strategy within the Prisoner’s Dilemma session.
The full model included the test variables condition, session and trial as well as the interaction
between condition and trial. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed effect; subject in the
right, subject in the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between
the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: F42 = 2.652, N = 280, p = 0.634). To investi-
gate whether children took turns significantly above chance, we adjusted the averages of the 
model predictors such that the intercept revealed the probability of a positive response. We found 
that the intercept deviated from the pre-established chance level (12.5 %) (Intercept: estimate = 
0.22, SE = 0.56, p < 0.001) meaning that children significantly used a turn-taking strategy.
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Model 23. Communication (GLMM) 
Model 23 investigated the occurrence of communication within a trial. In this model we included all 
trials (N = 320).  We transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant the presence 
of any communicative act between the members of the pair in a given trial (from the moment E1 
showed the marbles until the last child inserted the obtained rewards in their boxes); 0 meant no 
presence of communicative acts in a given trial. We expected children to communicate more in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma condition. We also expected children to communicate more by the end of the 
study, as a sign of learning. The full model included the test variables condition, trial and session as 
well as the interaction between condition and trial. The control variables were sex of the dyad as fixed 
effect; subject on the right, subject on the left and dyad as random effects and the random slopes. 
The comparison between the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: F24 = 8.75, N = 320, p 
= 0.068). 
 
Relationship between rewards maximization and strategic choices 
We measured the relationship between the proportion of strategic choices that children scored and 
the ratio of rewards per trial that they obtained. To calculate the proportion of strategic choices and 
the ratio of rewards per trial, we used the methodology of Study 4a (see page 153-154). We found a 
moderate positive correlation between the proportion of subject’s strategic choices and the amount 
of marbles obtained (r = 0.5; Figure A5). Interestingly, the strategiser child (orange data point) did not 
result in the most successful subject. 
 Appendices 
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Figure A5. Positive correlation between the ratio of marbles per trial and the proportion of strategic choices. Each 
data point represents one subject. 
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The present dissertation investigated the strategies that great apes and 5-year old children 
used to coordinate in situations of conflict in an attempt to shed light on the evolution of human 
cooperation.  
The first chapter investigated how pairs of chimpanzees coordinated their actions to 
overcome a conflict of interest in the form of a Snowdrift game.  During the game, individuals could 
either cooperate or free-ride to acquire a reward. Chimpanzees successfully managed a trade-off 
between maintaining successful cooperation and minimizing costs. 
The second chapter explored how pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and children solved 
another version of the Snowdrift game. In this game, individuals could not collaborate but could take 
turns to reciprocate their rewards. Apes and children waited longer to act when cooperation leaded 
to the lowest reward. However, they differed in their strategies. On the one hand, children preferred 
to act in a majority of trials to secure a proportion of the rewards, and on the other hand apes 
preferred one individual to pull and thus, reduce the risk to compete for the rewards. In a follow-up, 
chimpanzees and bonobos were presented with the possibility to choose between the social game 
and a non-social alternative that provided a secure reward. In this situation, apes behaved more 
strategically compared to the previous task. They managed the conflict by combining information 
about the rewards in the social and non-social options with their partners’ likely decisions. 
The last chapter investigated how pairs of chimpanzees and children solved a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. In this task, individuals could either cooperate alone and send all the rewards to a 
partner or collaborate and divide the rewards. Chimpanzees acted strategically, waiting for their 
partner to pull but did not reciprocate nor collaborate to obtain the rewards. In contrast, children 
developed a strategy based on turn-taking to reciprocate the rewards over time and thus maintain 
high levels of cooperation. 
The findings in this dissertation suggest that all species were successful at solving different 
situations of conflict. While there were similarities in the ways they coordinated their actions, 
children showed more efficient strategies to overcome the conflict, given support to the hypothesis 
that over the course of evolution, humans developed uniquely cognitive abilities for cooperation.   
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SUMMARY 
This dissertation investigates the strategies that chimpanzees, bonobos and children use to coordinate 
in situations of conflict. Socially complex animals such as humans and great apes regularly need to 
coordinate their actions to achieve cooperative goals not attainable individually. Collaboration, acting 
together for mutual goals, is a solution when individuals’ interests do not compete. However, in some 
situations, opportunities to cooperate come together with opportunities to defect. In that context, 
great apes and humans are likely to face conflicts of interest when they need to decide whether or 
not to cooperate with other group members. For instance, when chimpanzees initiate hunts in groups, 
some members may prefer to lag behind and wait for other chimpanzees to pay the costs related to 
the hunt. By presenting pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and 5-year old children with situations of 
conflicting interests we can explore the strategies that these species use to coordinate their actions 
to overcome those conflicts in an attempt to shed light on the evolution of human cooperation. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I present pairs of chimpanzees with a conflict situation in the form of
a Snowdrift game, a game theoretical model used to explore whether individuals cooperate when
their interests compete (Study 1). In this game, both players can either cooperate or free-ride. Mutual
cooperation results in a better reward than mutual defection. However, the key feature of this game
is that it is better to defect if your partner cooperates, but better to cooperate if your partner defects;
in other words, it is better to do the opposite of your partner. Returning to the example of chimpanzee
hunting, if a group member starts a hunt, others can benefit without actively participating and
incurring the costs. However, if no one starts the hunt, they all lose the chance to get the prey. The
dilemma faced by individuals in such situations is thus whether to initiate the action or not, given that
if no one initiates, everyone loses out.  To recreate the payoff structure of this game I presented pairs
of chimpanzees with a weighted tray containing rewards for both individuals. Subjects needed to
decide whether to collaborate (i.e., pull the tray together and share the costs) or pull alone 
and unilaterally pay the burden of cooperation. Chimpanzees had a limited amount of time to make 
their decisions before the rewards disappeared. The best strategy for an individual was to wait for a 
partner to pull and obtain the rewards when cooperative costs were high; maximizing benefits while 
reducing costs. Chimpanzees’ performance when cooperative costs were high was compared 
to their performance in a low weight condition in which the costs to cooperate were minimum.
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The findings showed that chimpanzees successfully coordinated their actions to overcome the conflict, 
obtaining the rewards the majority of times. Surprisingly, chimpanzees collaborated more often when 
the costs were high even though they had the opportunity to defect. However, they did not just 
collaborate to obtain the rewards; they showed clear signs of strategic decision-making to reduce 
costs. When costs were high, chimpanzees waited longer to pull, reducing the likelihood of incurring 
all the costs unilaterally. Moreover, when I investigated in more detail how they collaborated, I found 
that pairs of chimpanzees contributed unequal efforts, suggesting that they tried to minimize costs. 
In all, these results suggest that chimpanzees were able to manage the trade-off between successful 
coordination (within the time limits) and minimizing costs. 
In the second chapter of the dissertation I presented pairs of bonobos and chimpanzees (Study 2a),
and children (Study 2b) with a second version of the Snowdrift game. In this version of the game, in
contrast to the previous one, subjects could not collaborate within trials but they could use other
strategies to overcome the conflict over the course of the study (e.g.͕ taking-turns over trials). I
presented the three species with a rotatory tray baited with an unequal reward distribution. Two
detachable ropes were connected to the interior end of the tray. The ropes were oriented in opposite
directions and each fed into one subjects’ room. Each individual could pull from their rope and move
the interior end of the tray towards him while the exterior end moved towards the partner. Yet, if
both individuals pulled at the same time, the ropes could detach from the tray, preventing individuals
from accessing the rewards. In the Snowdrift condition, the preferred reward distribution was baited
on the interior end and it could only be obtained by waiting for the partner to pull. In contrast, in a
competitive condition, the reward distribution was changed (the best rewards were baited on the
interior). In this second condition, the best strategy was to pull before the partner. As in the previous
task, apes and children had a limited amount of time to decide on their actions. The main aim of this
study was to explore whether individuals would behave strategically in this version of the game;
waiting longer in the Snowdrift condition compared to the competitive one. Moreover, another aim
of the study was to compare the strategies that each of the three species used to solve the conflict
situation and to explore whether communication played a significant role in their performance.
The results of the study showed that the three species successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards 
most of times. In the critical condition, all three species waited longer to pull, showing a general 
understanding of the task. An analysis of their pulling strategies revealed that children learned to wait 
longer to pull across sessions, although they ended up pulling in most trials. In contrast, great apes 
were more likely to employ a strategy that consisted of only one individual pulling the majority of 
times in both the Snowdrift and the competitive condition. Yet, not all great apes employed this 
  
  
161 
 
strategy: some individuals behaved clearly strategically, pulling significantly more often during 
competitive than Snowdrift trials. With regard to whether apes and children used communicative acts 
to facilitate their coordination, I found that children but not apes communicated during the task. They 
used specific types of verbal communication to influence their partners’ decisions for their own 
benefit.  
 
Due to the strategies shown by some great apes in the first part of the study, I developed a follow-up 
to test chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ decision-making strategies in more detail (Study 3). For this 
purpose, I presented the same rotating tray that was used in the first part of the study (the social 
option) with the addition of an alternative secure reward for each subject (the non-social option). In 
this new context, individuals could decide whether to participate in the social dilemma or access the 
non-social option; inaction was no longer possible. Importantly, the quantity of the rewards presented 
in the non-social option varied between sessions. I hypothesized that the addition of the non-social 
option would allow subjects to better manage the risks and chose strategically depending on the 
reward distribution presented and the partners’ likely decisions. Moreover, by comparing 
chimpanzees and bonobos, I explored species’ sensitivity to social risk in a context in which those risks 
could be avoided by accessing the non-social option. Finally, I investigated whether individuals would 
take advantage of their partners’ previous actions to maximize their rewards.  
The results of this study showed that both great ape species coordinated to obtain the rewards in the 
majority of trials and behaved strategically during the task. Apes’ latencies to retrieve the rewards 
decreased as the quantity in the non-social option increased. Moreover, once they had chosen the 
social option, apes still waited longer in the critical condition, when the preferred reward could only 
be obtained if the partner had previously acted. Both ape species increased their choices towards the 
non-social option as the proportion of the rewards in the non-social option increased compared to the 
social option. This finding suggests that there were no significant differences between chimpanzees 
and bonobos in their sensitivity towards social risks. Finally, I found that great apes adjusted their 
choices to maximize their rewards while avoiding competitive situations and anticipating partners’ 
likely decisions.  
 
In the last chapter of the dissertation I presented pairs of chimpanzees (Study 4a) and children (Study 
4b) with a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. In contrast to the Snowdrift game, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
unilateral cooperation is the worst outcome for cooperators; individuals do not benefit from their 
unilateral actions. To recreate the Prisoner’s Dilemma I presented pairs of chimpanzees and children 
with a rectangular elevator baited with rewards at its ends. Each subject could pull from a rope 
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connected to one side of the apparatus. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition subjects had to wait for
their partners to cooperate (i.e., pull from the rope) in order to obtain the best rewards. In contrast, 
in a competitive condition that served as a control all the rewards could only be accessed by 
pulling before the partner. Moreover, in both conditions individuals could collaborate (i.e., pulling 
their ropes at the same time) and divide the rewards. As in previous studies, individuals had a lim-
ited amount of time to operate the apparatus and obtain the rewards.
The main aim of this comparative study was to explore whether chimpanzees and children would 
behave strategically in their attempts to overcome the conflict presented. I hypothesized that, 
because unilateral cooperation yielded no rewards for cooperators, individuals would behave more 
strategically in this context compared to a Snowdrift in which cooperation was always rewarded. A 
secondary aim of the study was to explore the strategies that individuals would use to overcome the 
conflict when collaboration was possible. Finally, in the case of children I was interested in the role of 
communication to maintain successful coordination in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. 
The findings of this comparative work indicate that both species substantially differed in their 
strategies to solve the task.  Chimpanzees learned to behave more strategically over the study period; 
in the competitive condition they pulled very quickly compared to the Prisoner´s Dilemma condition 
in which they increased their latencies. However, chimpanzees ultimately pulled in that condition. One 
possible explanation for these high levels of cooperation could be that chimpanzees tried to entice 
their partners to pull. This transformed Prisoner’s Dilemma trials into competitive trials, thereby 
increasing their likelihood to obtain the rewards.  Children developed a more efficient strategy that 
consisted of taking turns to reciprocate their rewards. Interestingly, they used this strategy in both 
conditions. In line with this finding, they became faster across the study period; once the turn-taking 
strategy was established, they waited less for their partner’s decisions. Finally, I found that children 
used specific types of communication to coordinate with their partners and maintain high levels of 
cooperation in both conditions, a reflection of their turn-taking strategy.  
By adapting the Snowdrift and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models, we have advanced our understanding 
of chimpanzees’, bonobos’ and children’s capacities to coordinate in situations of conflicting interests. 
The results of my studies have demonstrated that the three species were successful at solving 
different situations of conflict, showing some similarities in the ways they coordinated their actions, 
especially when their own actions resulted in direct benefits. At the same time, the findings support 
the idea that children possess uniquely cognitive abilities to coordinate, allowing them to develop 
more efficient strategies to overcome situations of conflict. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
 
 
In dieser Dissertation werden Strategien untersucht, mit denen sich Schimpansen, Bonobos und 
Kinder in Konfliktsituationen koordinieren. Sozial komplexe Tiere wie Menschen und Große 
Menschenaffen müssen ihr Verhalten regelmäßig untereinander koordinieren, um kooperative Ziele 
zu verwirklichen, die sie alleine nicht erreichen würden. Kollaboration, das heißt zusammenarbeiten 
für gemeinsame Ziele, stellt eine Lösung dar, wenn die Interessen der Individuen nicht im Widerspruch 
zueinander stehen. In manchen Situationen gehen allerdings Gelegenheiten zu kooperieren mit 
Gelegenheiten zu defektieren einher. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wahrscheinlich, dass sowohl 
Große Menschenaffen als auch Menschen mit Interessenkonflikten konfrontiert sind, wenn sie 
entscheiden müssen, ob sie mit anderen Gruppenmitgliedern kooperieren. Wenn zum Beispiel eine 
Gruppe von Schimpansen eine Jagd beginnt, könnte es sein, dass manche Gruppenmitglieder es 
bevorzugen, zurückzubleiben und darauf zu warten, dass andere Schimpansen die Kosten der Jagd 
tragen. Indem wir Schimpansen, Bonobos und fünfjährige Kinder jeweils paarweise mit 
Interessenkonflikten konfrontieren, können wir die Strategien untersuchen, die diese Arten benutzen, 
um ihr Verhalten in Konfliktsituationen miteinander zu koordinieren und den Konflikt zu überwinden. 
Durch diesen Artvergleich gewinnen wir Einblicke in die Evolution der menschlichen Kooperation. 
Im ersten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Schimpansen paarweise mit 
einer Konfliktsituation konfrontiert habe, die dem so genannten “Snowdrift Game“ entspricht (Studie 
1). Dieses Modell aus der Spieltheorie wird dazu benutzt, zu untersuchen, ob Individuen miteinander 
kooperieren, wenn ihre Interessen miteinander im Konflikt stehen. In diesem Spiel können die zwei 
Spieler entweder kooperieren oder von der Arbeit des anderen profitieren, ohne selbst etwas 
beizutragen. Beiderseitige Kooperation wird höher belohnt als beiderseitiges Defektieren. Jedoch ist 
ein Kernelement dieses Spiels, dass es besser ist zu defektieren, wenn der Partner kooperiert, und zu 
kooperieren, wenn der Partner defektiert. Mit anderen Worten, es ist besser, das Gegenteil von dem 
zu tun, was der Partner macht. Um auf das Beispiel der Jagd bei den Schimpansen zurückzukommen: 
Wenn ein Gruppenmitglied die Jagd startet, können die anderen davon profitieren, ohne selbst aktiv 
teilzunehmen und die Kosten zu tragen. Wenn jedoch niemand die Jagd startet, hat niemand eine 
Chance an die Beute zu kommen. Das Dilemma in dieser Situation besteht für die Individuen darin, ob 
sie die Jagd starten sollen oder nicht, angenommen, dass alle verlieren, wenn niemand die Jagd 
einleitet. Um die Anreizstruktur dieses Spiels nachzubilden, habe ich Schimpansen paarweise mit einer 
beschwerten Plattform konfrontiert, auf der sich Belohnungen für beide Individuen befanden. Die 
Schimpansen mussten entscheiden, ob sie kollaborieren (das heißt, die Plattform zusammen 
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heranziehen und die Kosten teilen) oder alleine ziehen und die Kosten für die Kooperation alleine 
tragen. Die Schimpansen hatten eine begrenzte Zeit zur Verfügung, um ihre Entscheidungen zu 
treffen, bevor ihre Belohnungen verschwanden. Wenn die Kosten für die Kooperation hoch waren, 
war es die beste Strategie für ein Individuum zu warten, bis der Partner zog und dann die Belohnung 
zu erhalten, was eine Maximierung der Vorteile bei einer gleichzeitigen Minimierung der Kosten 
darstellte. Die Leistung der Schimpansen bei hohen Kooperationskosten wurde mit ihrer Leistung in 
einer Bedingung mit wenig Gewicht verglichen, in der die Kooperationskosten minimal waren. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass Schimpansen erfolgreich ihr Verhalten miteinander koordinierten, um 
den Konflikt zu beseitigen, und dabei in den meisten Fällen die Belohnungen erhielten. 
Überraschenderweise kollaborierten Schimpansen häufiger, wenn die Kosten hoch waren, obwohl sie 
defektieren hätten können. Sie haben allerdings nicht nur kollaboriert, um die Belohnungen zu 
erhalten, sondern sie zeigten auch klare Anzeichen von strategischen Entscheidungen zur 
Kostenreduktion. Bei hohen Kosten warteten die Schimpansen länger, bevor sie am Seil zogen, was 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit reduzierte, alle Kosten alleine zu tragen. Bei einer genaueren Betrachtung der 
Kollaboration innerhalb der Paare zeigte sich, dass die Individuen ungleich viel Arbeit zum Ergebnis 
beitrugen. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass sie versucht haben, die Kosten zu reduzieren. Alles in allem 
weisen diese Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Schimpansen dazu fähig sind, zwischen erfolgreicher 
Koordination (innerhalb eines Zeitlimits) und einer Beschränkung der eigenen Kosten auf ein 
Minimum abzuwägen. 
 
Im zweiten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Bonobos und Schimpansen 
(Studie 2a) und Kinder (Studie 2b) jeweils paarweise mit einer zweiten Version des „Snowdrift Game“ 
konfrontiert habe. Im Gegensatz zu der vorherigen Version konnten die Individuen in dieser Version 
des Spiels nicht innerhalb der einzelnen Durchgänge kollaborieren. Jedoch konnten sie andere 
Strategien anwenden, um den Konflikt im Verlauf der Studie aufzulösen (zum Beispiel sich abwechseln 
über die Durchgänge hinweg). Ich habe die drei Arten mit einer rotierenden Plattform konfrontiert, 
die mit einer ungleichmäßigen Belohnungsstruktur versehen war. Zwei lösbare Seile waren an den 
beiden inneren Enden der Plattform befestigt. Die Seile verliefen gegenläufig zueinander und jeweils 
eins führte in die Räume der zwei Testteilnehmer. Jedes Individuum konnte an seinem Seil ziehen, um 
das innere Ende der Plattform in seine Richtung zu drehen, während gleichzeitig das äußere Ende der 
Plattform sich zum Partner bewegte. Wenn hingegen beide Individuen zur gleichen Zeit zogen, 
konnten sich die Seile von der Plattform lösen, so dass keiner einen Zugang zu den Belohnungen 
erhielt. In der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung war die bevorzugte Belohnung auf dem äußeren Ende 
positioniert. Sie konnte nur erreicht werden, wenn man darauf wartete, dass der Partner vor einem 
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am Seil zog. Im Gegensatz dazu war die bevorzugte Belohnung in der kompetitiven Bedingung auf dem 
inneren Ende gelegen. In dieser zweiten Bedingung war es besser, vor dem Partner zu ziehen. Wie in 
der vorangegangenen Studie gab es für die Affen und Kinder ein Zeitlimit, in dem sie eine Entscheidung 
treffen mussten. Das Hauptziel dieser Studie war es, zu untersuchen, ob sich die Individuen in dieser 
Version des Spiels strategisch verhalten würden, das heißt, ob sie in der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung länger 
warten würden als in der kompetitiven Bedingung. Ein weiteres Ziel dieser Studie lag darin, die 
Strategien zu vergleichen, die die drei Arten zur Konfliktbewältigung anwendeten, und zu 
untersuchen, inwieweit Kommunikation eine bedeutsame Rolle in ihrem Vorgehen spielte. 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigten, dass die drei Arten sich jeweils erfolgreich koordinierten und die 
Belohnungen in den meisten Fällen erhielten. In der kritischen Bedingung haben alle drei Arten länger 
mit dem Ziehen gewartet, was auf generelles Verständnis der Aufgabe hinweist. Eine Analyse ihrer 
Zieh-Strategien zeigt, dass Kinder über die Sitzungen hinweg gelernt haben länger zu warten, obwohl 
sie in den meisten Durchgängen letztlich gezogen haben. Im Gegensatz dazu neigten die Großen 
Menschenaffen dazu, eine Strategie anzuwenden, bei der nur ein Individuum die meiste Zeit über zog, 
sowohl bei der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung als auch bei der kompetitiven Bedingung. Jedoch wendeten 
nicht alle Menschenaffen diese Strategie an; einige Individuen verhielten sich klar strategisch und 
zogen signifikant häufiger in der kompetitiven als in der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung. Bei der Untersuchung 
der Frage, ob Affen und Kinder kommunikative Akte verwendeten, um die Koordination zu erleichtern, 
zeigte sich, dass nur die Kinder während der Aufgabe kommunizierten. Sie benutzten spezifische Arten 
verbaler Kommunikation, um die Entscheidung des Partners zu ihren eigenen Gunsten zu 
beeinflussen. 
Aufgrund der Strategien, die einige Große Menschenaffen im ersten Teil der Studie zeigten, habe ich 
einen Folgetest entwickelt, um die Entscheidungsstrategien von Schimpansen und Bonobos 
detaillierter zu untersuchen (Studie 3). Zu diesem Zweck habe ich die Tiere mit derselben rotierenden 
Plattform konfrontiert, die im ersten Teil der Studie verwendet wurde (die soziale Option), mit dem 
Zusatz einer sicheren Belohnung für die beiden Tiere (die nicht-soziale Option). Individuen konnten in 
diesem neuen Zusammenhang entscheiden, ob sie an dem sozialen Dilemma teilnehmen wollen oder 
ob sie die nicht-soziale Option wählen. Es war nun nicht mehr möglich, inaktiv zu bleiben. Ein wichtiger 
Punkt ist, dass die Menge der Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen Option über die Sitzungen hinweg 
variierte. Meiner Hypothese nach würde das Hinzufügen der nicht-sozialen Option den Tieren 
erlauben, die Risiken besser einzuschätzen und strategisch zu wählen, nämlich abhängig von der 
Verteilung der Belohnungen und der voraussichtlichen Wahl des Partners. Durch meinen direkten 
Vergleich von Schimpansen und Bonobos konnte ich untersuchen, wie empfindsam die beiden Arten 
gegenüber einem sozialen Risiko sind in einer Situation, in der dieses Risiko durch das Wählen der 
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nicht-sozialen Option umgangen werden konnte. Schließlich habe ich erforscht, ob Individuen das 
vorangegangene Verhalten ihres Partners zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil nutzen würden, um ihre 
Belohnungen zu maximieren. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigten, dass beide Menschenaffenarten sich koordiniert haben, um in 
den meisten Durchgängen an die Belohnungen zu kommen, und dass sie sich strategisch verhalten 
haben. Die Latenzzeiten, um an die Belohnungen zu kommen, verringerten sich, wenn die Menge der 
Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen Option erhöht wurde. Bei der Wahl der sozialen Option warteten 
die Affen in der kritischen Bedingung immer noch länger, denn die bevorzugte Belohnung konnte nur 
erlangt werden, wenn der Partner vor einem zog. Beide Menschenaffenarten wählten die nicht-soziale 
Option häufiger, wenn sich das Verhältnis der Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen und der sozialen 
Option zu Gunsten der nicht-sozialen Option erhöhte. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Schimpansen und 
Bonobos keinen signifikanten Unterschied bezüglich ihrer Empfindsamkeit für soziales Risiko 
aufweisen. Abschließend habe ich herausgefunden, dass Große Menschenaffen ihre Entscheidungen 
so anpassen, dass sie die Belohnungen maximieren, indem sie kompetitiven Situationen ausweichen 
und mögliche Entscheidungen des Partners vorhersehen. 
Im letzten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Schimpansen (Studie 4a) und 
Kinder (Studie 4b) jeweils paarweise mit einer Situation konfrontiert habe, die einem Gefangenen-
Dilemma („Prisoners‘ Dilemma“) entspricht. Im Gegensatz zum „Snowdrift Game“ gelangt der 
Kooperierende beim Gefangenen-Dilemma bei einseitiger Kooperation zum schlechtesten Ergebnis; 
Individuen profitieren nicht von ihrem einseitigen Handeln. Um das Gefangenen-Dilemma abzubilden, 
habe ich die Paare mit einer vertikal beweglichen Plattform konfrontiert, die an den Enden mit 
Belohnungen versehen wurde. Jeder Teilnehmer konnte an einem Seil ziehen, das mit einer Seite der 
Plattform verbunden war. In der Gefangenen-Dilemma-Bedingung  mussten die Teilnehmer warten, 
bis der Partner kooperiert (das heißt, an dem Seil zieht), um an die bevorzugte Belohnung zu kommen. 
Im Gegensatz dazu konnten die Belohnungen in der kompetitiven Bedingung nur erreicht werden, 
wenn man vor seinem Partner zog. Diese Bedingung diente als Kontrolle. Zudem konnten die beiden 
Individuen in beiden Bedingungen kollaborieren (das heißt, an den beiden Seilen zur gleichen Zeit 
ziehen) und ihre Belohnungen teilen. Wie bereits in den vorangegangenen Studien hatten die 
Individuen ein Zeitlimit, um an die Belohnungen auf der Plattform zu gelangen. 
Das Hauptziel dieser vergleichenden Studie war es, zu untersuchen, ob Schimpansen und Kinder sich 
strategisch verhalten würden, um den präsentierten Konflikt zu überwinden. Meiner Hypothese nach 
würden sich Individuen in diesem Kontext strategischer verhalten als in einer „Snowdrift“-Situation, 
weil einseitige Kooperation in diesem Fall zu keiner Belohnung für den Kooperierenden führte. Ein 
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zweites Ziel der Studie war es, die Strategien zu erforschen, die Individuen zur Konfliktüberwindung 
benutzen, wenn eine Kollaboration möglich ist. Bei den Kindern war ich zudem an der Rolle 
interessiert, die Kommunikation bei der Aufrechterhaltung einer erfolgreichen Koordination in diesem 
Gefangenen-Dilemma-Szenario einnimmt. 
Die Befunde dieser vergleichenden Studie wiesen darauf hin, dass sich beide Arten substanziell 
voneinander darin unterschieden, welche Strategien sie zur Lösung der Aufgabe wählten. 
Schimpansen lernten sich über den Verlauf der Studie strategischer zu verhalten; in der kompetitiven 
Bedingung zogen sie sehr schnell im Vergleich zu der Gefangenen-Dilemma-Bedingung, in der ihre 
Latenzzeiten sich erhöhten. Doch letztlich zogen die Schimpansen auch in dieser Bedingung. Eine 
mögliche Erklärung für dieses hohe Maß an Kooperation könnte sein, dass die Schimpansen versucht 
haben, ihren Partner zum Ziehen zu verleiten. Dies verwandelte die Gefangenen-Dilemma-
Durchgänge in kompetitive Durchgänge, wodurch die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Schimpansen erhöht 
wurde, an die Belohnungen zu kommen. Kinder entwickelten eine effizientere Strategie, die darin 
bestand, sich abzuwechseln, um die Belohnungen alternierend zu erhalten. Interessanterweise haben 
sie diese Strategie in beiden Bedingungen angewandt. Diesem Befund entsprechend wurden sie 
schneller im Verlauf der Studie; sobald die Strategie sich abzuwechseln einmal etabliert war, haben 
sie weniger lange auf die Entscheidung des Partners gewartet. Schließlich habe ich herausgefunden, 
dass Kinder spezifische Kommunikationsarten benutzt haben, um sich mit ihren Partnern zu 
koordinieren. Durch diese strategische Kommunikation konnten sie ein hohes Maß an Kooperation in 
beiden Bedingungen aufrechterhalten. 
Durch die Verwendung des “Snowdrift”- und des Gefangenen-Dilemma-Modells konnten wir unser 
Verständnis bezüglich der Fähigkeiten von  Schimpansen, Bonobos und Kindern vertiefen, sich in 
Situationen zu koordinieren, in denen Interessenkonflikte bestehen. Die Ergebnisse meiner Studien 
haben gezeigt, dass diese drei Arten verschiedene Konfliktsituationen erfolgreich lösen konnten, 
besonders, wenn ihr eigenes Handeln zu einem direkten Vorteil für sie führte. Zudem unterstützen die 
Ergebnisse die Annahme, dass Kinder einzigartige kognitive Fähigkeiten zur Koordination besitzen, was 
es ihnen erlaubt, effizientere Strategien zu entwickeln, um Konfliktsituationen zu bewältigen. 
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